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21 October 2026 · Issue 89

DKI APCSS Hosts International Cohort to Discuss Undersea Cable Resilience

Participants from ten nations met to discuss maritime security and infrastructure vulnerabilities. The session aimed to identify regional priorities for future workshops on national resilience.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (20 Oct 16:05 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) hosted a cohort from the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program on October 14, 2026 [1]. Participants from ten nations, including Australia, Fiji, and Taiwan, discussed international cooperation and maritime domain awareness to address vulnerabilities in the infrastructure carrying over 98% of international data traffic [1]. The session served to identify regional priorities for a future workshop on national resilience and expand a network of security practitioners [1].

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Maritime Security

An ISPI assessment highlights that Pacific Island nations remain vulnerable to single points of failure, noting that most cable faults are caused by accidental human activity such as fishing and anchors rather than sabotage [2]. The assessment notes that repairs for these incidents typically cost between £500,000 and £1 million [2]. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey have issued competing NAVTEX notices regarding geophysical surveys for the East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) fiber-optic cable, with the Hellenic Navy's Hydrographic Service declaring Turkey's notice invalid [6]. Greece has scheduled the Bahamas-flagged vessel Kobi Ruegg to conduct surveys in two stages from Oct. 23-25 and Oct. 27-30 [6].

Undersea Infrastructure Threats and Maritime Security

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials have designated seven undersea fiber cables in the Strait of Hormuz as 'legitimate new targets' for a potential 'third phase' of conflict with the U.S. and its allies [8]. The IRGC specifically identified the Asia-Africa-Europe-1 cable, which stretches 15,050 miles from Asia to Europe through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar, as a potential target [8]. While the IRGC warns that these cables could be targeted in retaliation for attacks on Iranian infrastructure, technology expert Mehdi Saremifar assesses that these threats are largely rhetorical because the Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International cables account for less than one percent of global bandwidth [9].

In other regional developments, the Russian Baltic Fleet's press service confirmed the deployment of the naval training ship Perekop to Namibia's Walvis Bay port on October 20, 2026, as part of a four-ocean military expedition [11]. The vessel, which is equipped with 76 mm and 30 mm naval guns and anti-submarine rocket launchers, is currently training cadets from the Admiral Fyodor Ushakov Baltic Higher Naval School while navigating the Arctic, Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic Oceans [11].

International Infrastructure Developments and Resilience

The Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System, the first international public telecommunications subsea cable in the Caspian Sea, was inaugurated on October 15, 2026 [12]. Spanning 380 kilometers between Aktau, Kazakhstan, and Sumgayit, Azerbaijan, the system was developed by a joint venture between Kazakhtelecom JSC and AzerTelecom International and is managed by CaspiLink B.V. [12]. The project aims to provide a non-Russian, non-Red Sea digital bridge between East Asia and Europe with a capacity exceeding 400 Tbps, utilizing a Dutch corporate structure to offer Western hyperscalers a sanctions-ring-fenced route [12].

In Europe, a voltage drop at Red Eléctrica's substation in Algeciras on Wednesday triggered a total blackout in Ceuta lasting nearly an hour [13]. The fault traveled through the Strait interconnector submarine cable, causing a cascading shutdown of the city's power grid and the diesel power plant's Unit 11 before Endesa engineers restored power between 09:56 and 10:34 [13]. Meanwhile, a post on note.com reports that the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has selected operators for the 'Digital Infrastructure Resilience Project' to disperse submarine cable landing points to regions like Tomakomai City and Wakayama City [14]. The post notes that 99% of Japan's international communications rely on these cables and argues that regional dispersion is critical to mitigate 'single point of failure' risks following incidents such as a severed cable to Singapore in the Philippines on October 2, 2026, and two failed Subco cables off Perth, Australia, in August 2026 [14].

Regional Cooperation and Infrastructure Security Policy

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam organized the 2nd Southeast Asia-Pacific Dialogue on October 8, 2026, to address vulnerabilities in regional submarine cable networks [15]. Participants proposed initiatives to diversify cable routes, mobilize financing, and establish coordinated incident response mechanisms, with Dr. Nguyen Hung Son suggesting the dialogue become an annual event involving ASEAN, Pacific Island nations, Australia, and New Zealand [15]. Separately, a post on aidonthehill.substack.com argues that maintaining civilian development and non-military assistance is essential to protect trans-Pacific undersea cables and maritime corridors from authoritarian influence [16]. The post calls on Congress to secure stable funding for these projects to protect the $6 trillion in annual trade hosted in the Indo-Pacific [16].

A post on note.com also critiques the reliance on high-cost hardware, specifically analyzing Japan's S-net, N-net, and DONET seafloor earthquake observation systems [17]. The author argues that the effectiveness of these multi-billion yen wired power supply systems is limited by human response and government operation, citing an October 16, 2026, incident where a system malfunction caused an M6.9 earthquake in the Kamchatka Peninsula to be misidentified as an M9.9 [17].

References

  1. DKI APCSS Hosts International Visitor Leadership Program Cohort on Undersea Cable Resilience - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (dkiapcss.edu)
    Published: 20 Oct 2026 · dkiapcss.edu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, FJ, PW, PG, PH, SB (+5 more)
  2. Pacific Undersea Cables and Island Security Explained | ISPI (ispiglobal.com)
    Published: 18 Oct 2026 · ispiglobal.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent · Systems named: East Micronesia Cable, HANTRU-1 · Vessels named: Reliance · Jurisdictions: AU, TW, ID, INT
  3. EU plans Arctic cable protection centre and expanded icebreaker fleet - Seawanderer (seawanderer.org)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 20 Oct 2026 · seawanderer.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, IS, NO, GL, JP, KR (+1 more)
  4. Evidence of a Russian 'hybrid war' in Europe is vanishingly thin | Responsible Statecraft (responsiblestatecraft.org)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 21 Oct 2026 · responsiblestatecraft.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: precedent, analysis · Systems named: Baltic cables · Vessels named: Chinese-flagged ships, Hong Kong-flagged ships · Jurisdictions: INT
  5. European Union Unveils Arctic Strategy To Strengthen Security, Resilience, And Climate Action: how 9 outlets framed it | NewsCord (newscord.org)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 21 Oct 2026 · newscord.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
  6. Greece Challenges Turkish NAVTEX, Sets New Survey Dates (tovima.com)
    Published: 20 Oct 2026 · tovima.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, policy, analysis · Systems named: East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) · Vessels named: Kobi Ruegg · Jurisdictions: GR, TR, CY, SA, INT
  7. The case for AUKUS nations building floating submarine dry docks together - Navy Lookout (navylookout.com)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 19 Oct 2026 · navylookout.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
  8. Iran threatens to attack undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz, calls them 'legitimate new targets' in future conflict, IRGC spokesman warns that a future 'third phase' in war with US could lead ... (tomshardware.com)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Asia-Africa-Europe-1 · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, QA, GB, ES, PT (+2 more) · Also reported by: tasnimnews.ir
  9. Pezeshkian says most of Iran’s seaborne trade has been blocked (iranintl.com)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · iranintl.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Asia Africa Europe-1, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International · Vessels named: Rubymar · Jurisdictions: IR, OM, KW, QA, AE, SA (+1 more)
  10. Signal No. 171 · Black Sea: NATO assets and a US P-8A at Varna (grosswald.org)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 20 Oct 2026 · grosswald.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Chelsea-3 · Jurisdictions: BG, RO, TR, INT
  11. Russia sends heavily armed naval training ship to an African country on four-ocean mission covering Atlantic and Arctic waters near NATO countries | Business Insider Africa (africa.businessinsider.com)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · africa.businessinsider.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Perekop · Jurisdictions: RU, NA, EU, INT
  12. Digitizing the Middle Corridor: CaspiLink Activates the First Trans-Caspian Subsea Cable System (Submarine Networks)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System · Jurisdictions: KZ, AZ, NL, INT
  13. Total blackout paralyses Ceuta following fault at Algeciras substation | TodoAlicante (todoalicante.es)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · todoalicante.es · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: fault · Systems named: Strait interconnector · Jurisdictions: ES, MA
  14. If one cable breaks, the internet across the country slows down. Is the policy to "spread submarine cables to regional areas" in time? (note.com)
    Published: 20 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Subco · Jurisdictions: JP, PH, AU, EG, SY, INT
  15. SECOND SOUTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC DIALOGUE: PROMOTING COOPERATION AND INTER-REGIONAL SUBWAY CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY (vietnam.vn)
    Published: 21 Oct 2026 · vietnam.vn · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: VN, AU, ID, TW, INT
  16. Securing the Indo-Pacific: How Foreign Assistance Protects American Interests, Values (aidonthehill.substack.com)
    Published: 20 Oct 2026 · aidonthehill.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: TW, INT
  17. The Reality of the Multi-Billion Yen 'Seafloor Earthquake Observation Network' and the M9.9 False Alarm, Who Are the Massive S-net and N-net Infrastructures For? (note.com)
    Published: 18 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis · Systems named: S-net, N-net, DONET · Jurisdictions: JP

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 603 successful fetches in 24h, 45 errors across 14 source(s). Generated 2026-10-21 16:06 UTC.