DKI APCSS Hosts International Cohort to Discuss Undersea Cable Resilience 2026-10-21 This is Cable Watch for 21 October 2026. DKI APCSS Hosts International Cohort to Discuss Undersea Cable Resilience. Executive summary. IRGC officials designated seven undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz, including Asia-Africa-Europe-1, as 'legitimate new targets'. Technology expert Mehdi Saremifar assesses that IRGC threats to the Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International cables are largely rhetorical. The Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System was inaugurated on October 15, 2026, providing a non-Russian route between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. A voltage drop at a substation in Algeciras triggered a blackout in Ceuta via the Strait interconnector submarine cable. A post on note.com reports that Japan has selected operators to disperse submarine cable landing points to mitigate single point of failure risks. Today. The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) hosted a cohort from the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program on October 14, 2026. Participants from ten nations, including Australia, Fiji, and Taiwan, discussed international cooperation and maritime domain awareness to address vulnerabilities in the infrastructure carrying over 98% of international data traffic. The session served to identify regional priorities for a future workshop on national resilience and expand a network of security practitioners. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Maritime Security. An ISPI assessment highlights that Pacific Island nations remain vulnerable to single points of failure, noting that most cable faults are caused by accidental human activity such as fishing and anchors rather than sabotage. The assessment notes that repairs for these incidents typically cost between £500,000 and £1 million. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey have issued competing NAVTEX notices regarding geophysical surveys for the East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) fiber-optic cable, with the Hellenic Navy's Hydrographic Service declaring Turkey's notice invalid. Greece has scheduled the Bahamas-flagged vessel Kobi Ruegg to conduct surveys in two stages from Oct. 23-25 and Oct. 27-30. Undersea Infrastructure Threats and Maritime Security. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials have designated seven undersea fiber cables in the Strait of Hormuz as 'legitimate new targets' for a potential 'third phase' of conflict with the U.S. and its allies. The IRGC specifically identified the Asia-Africa-Europe-1 cable, which stretches 15,050 miles from Asia to Europe through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar, as a potential target. While the IRGC warns that these cables could be targeted in retaliation for attacks on Iranian infrastructure, technology expert Mehdi Saremifar assesses that these threats are largely rhetorical because the Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International cables account for less than one percent of global bandwidth. In other regional developments, the Russian Baltic Fleet's press service confirmed the deployment of the naval training ship Perekop to Namibia's Walvis Bay port on October 20, 2026, as part of a four-ocean military expedition. The vessel, which is equipped with 76 mm and 30 mm naval guns and anti-submarine rocket launchers, is currently training cadets from the Admiral Fyodor Ushakov Baltic Higher Naval School while navigating the Arctic, Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic Oceans. International Infrastructure Developments and Resilience. The Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System, the first international public telecommunications subsea cable in the Caspian Sea, was inaugurated on October 15, 2026. Spanning 380 kilometers between Aktau, Kazakhstan, and Sumgayit, Azerbaijan, the system was developed by a joint venture between Kazakhtelecom JSC and AzerTelecom International and is managed by CaspiLink B.V.. The project aims to provide a non-Russian, non-Red Sea digital bridge between East Asia and Europe with a capacity exceeding 400 Tbps, utilizing a Dutch corporate structure to offer Western hyperscalers a sanctions-ring-fenced route. In Europe, a voltage drop at Red Eléctrica's substation in Algeciras on Wednesday triggered a total blackout in Ceuta lasting nearly an hour. The fault traveled through the Strait interconnector submarine cable, causing a cascading shutdown of the city's power grid and the diesel power plant's Unit 11 before Endesa engineers restored power between 09:56 and 10:34. Meanwhile, a post on note.com reports that the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has selected operators for the 'Digital Infrastructure Resilience Project' to disperse submarine cable landing points to regions like Tomakomai City and Wakayama City. The post notes that 99% of Japan's international communications rely on these cables and argues that regional dispersion is critical to mitigate 'single point of failure' risks following incidents such as a severed cable to Singapore in the Philippines on October 2, 2026, and two failed Subco cables off Perth, Australia, in August 2026. Regional Cooperation and Infrastructure Security Policy. The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam organized the 2nd Southeast Asia-Pacific Dialogue on October 8, 2026, to address vulnerabilities in regional submarine cable networks. Participants proposed initiatives to diversify cable routes, mobilize financing, and establish coordinated incident response mechanisms, with Dr. Nguyen Hung Son suggesting the dialogue become an annual event involving ASEAN, Pacific Island nations, Australia, and New Zealand. Separately, a post on aidonthehill.substack.com argues that maintaining civilian development and non-military assistance is essential to protect trans-Pacific undersea cables and maritime corridors from authoritarian influence. The post calls on Congress to secure stable funding for these projects to protect the $6 trillion in annual trade hosted in the Indo-Pacific. A post on note.com also critiques the reliance on high-cost hardware, specifically analyzing Japan's S-net, N-net, and DONET seafloor earthquake observation systems. The author argues that the effectiveness of these multi-billion yen wired power supply systems is limited by human response and government operation, citing an October 16, 2026, incident where a system malfunction caused an M6.9 earthquake in the Kamchatka Peninsula to be misidentified as an M9.9. That has been Cable Watch for 21 October 2026. Sourcing, claim types and the standing status of every tracked system are in the written brief.