---
date: 2026-10-21
issue: 89
title: DKI APCSS Hosts International Cohort to Discuss Undersea Cable Resilience
standfirst: Participants from ten nations met to discuss maritime security and infrastructure
  vulnerabilities. The session aimed to identify regional priorities for future workshops
  on national resilience.
jurisdictions:
- AU
- FJ
- PW
- PG
- PH
- SB
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 74 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (14 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 47 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (14 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (26 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (2 days ago); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.  
  Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 20 Oct 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 20 Oct 19:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 110.8ms -> 134.9ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 20 Oct 21:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 21 Oct 12:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 110.8ms -> 135.2ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 61 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.7ms, up 141.1ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 45.7ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (20 Oct 16:05 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- IRGC officials designated seven undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz, including Asia-Africa-Europe-1, as 'legitimate new targets' [8].
- Technology expert Mehdi Saremifar assesses that IRGC threats to the Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International cables are largely rhetorical [9].
- The Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System was inaugurated on October 15, 2026, providing a non-Russian route between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan [12].
- A voltage drop at a substation in Algeciras triggered a blackout in Ceuta via the Strait interconnector submarine cable [13].
- A post on note.com reports that Japan has selected operators to disperse submarine cable landing points to mitigate single point of failure risks [14].

## Today

The Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS) hosted a cohort from the State Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program on October 14, 2026 [1]. Participants from ten nations, including Australia, Fiji, and Taiwan, discussed international cooperation and maritime domain awareness to address vulnerabilities in the infrastructure carrying over 98% of international data traffic [1]. The session served to identify regional priorities for a future workshop on national resilience and expand a network of security practitioners [1].

## Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Maritime Security

An ISPI assessment highlights that Pacific Island nations remain vulnerable to single points of failure, noting that most cable faults are caused by accidental human activity such as fishing and anchors rather than sabotage [2]. The assessment notes that repairs for these incidents typically cost between £500,000 and £1 million [2]. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece and Turkey have issued competing NAVTEX notices regarding geophysical surveys for the East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) fiber-optic cable, with the Hellenic Navy's Hydrographic Service declaring Turkey's notice invalid [6]. Greece has scheduled the Bahamas-flagged vessel Kobi Ruegg to conduct surveys in two stages from Oct. 23-25 and Oct. 27-30 [6].

## Undersea Infrastructure Threats and Maritime Security

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officials have designated seven undersea fiber cables in the Strait of Hormuz as 'legitimate new targets' for a potential 'third phase' of conflict with the U.S. and its allies [8]. The IRGC specifically identified the Asia-Africa-Europe-1 cable, which stretches 15,050 miles from Asia to Europe through Oman, the UAE, and Qatar, as a potential target [8]. While the IRGC warns that these cables could be targeted in retaliation for attacks on Iranian infrastructure, technology expert Mehdi Saremifar assesses that these threats are largely rhetorical because the Asia-Africa-Europe-1, FALCON, and Gulf Bridge International cables account for less than one percent of global bandwidth [9].

In other regional developments, the Russian Baltic Fleet's press service confirmed the deployment of the naval training ship Perekop to Namibia's Walvis Bay port on October 20, 2026, as part of a four-ocean military expedition [11]. The vessel, which is equipped with 76 mm and 30 mm naval guns and anti-submarine rocket launchers, is currently training cadets from the Admiral Fyodor Ushakov Baltic Higher Naval School while navigating the Arctic, Pacific, Indian, and Atlantic Oceans [11].

## International Infrastructure Developments and Resilience

The Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System, the first international public telecommunications subsea cable in the Caspian Sea, was inaugurated on October 15, 2026 [12]. Spanning 380 kilometers between Aktau, Kazakhstan, and Sumgayit, Azerbaijan, the system was developed by a joint venture between Kazakhtelecom JSC and AzerTelecom International and is managed by CaspiLink B.V. [12]. The project aims to provide a non-Russian, non-Red Sea digital bridge between East Asia and Europe with a capacity exceeding 400 Tbps, utilizing a Dutch corporate structure to offer Western hyperscalers a sanctions-ring-fenced route [12].

In Europe, a voltage drop at Red Eléctrica's substation in Algeciras on Wednesday triggered a total blackout in Ceuta lasting nearly an hour [13]. The fault traveled through the Strait interconnector submarine cable, causing a cascading shutdown of the city's power grid and the diesel power plant's Unit 11 before Endesa engineers restored power between 09:56 and 10:34 [13]. Meanwhile, a post on note.com reports that the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has selected operators for the 'Digital Infrastructure Resilience Project' to disperse submarine cable landing points to regions like Tomakomai City and Wakayama City [14]. The post notes that 99% of Japan's international communications rely on these cables and argues that regional dispersion is critical to mitigate 'single point of failure' risks following incidents such as a severed cable to Singapore in the Philippines on October 2, 2026, and two failed Subco cables off Perth, Australia, in August 2026 [14].

## Regional Cooperation and Infrastructure Security Policy

The Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam organized the 2nd Southeast Asia-Pacific Dialogue on October 8, 2026, to address vulnerabilities in regional submarine cable networks [15]. Participants proposed initiatives to diversify cable routes, mobilize financing, and establish coordinated incident response mechanisms, with Dr. Nguyen Hung Son suggesting the dialogue become an annual event involving ASEAN, Pacific Island nations, Australia, and New Zealand [15]. Separately, a post on aidonthehill.substack.com argues that maintaining civilian development and non-military assistance is essential to protect trans-Pacific undersea cables and maritime corridors from authoritarian influence [16]. The post calls on Congress to secure stable funding for these projects to protect the $6 trillion in annual trade hosted in the Indo-Pacific [16].

A post on note.com also critiques the reliance on high-cost hardware, specifically analyzing Japan's S-net, N-net, and DONET seafloor earthquake observation systems [17]. The author argues that the effectiveness of these multi-billion yen wired power supply systems is limited by human response and government operation, citing an October 16, 2026, incident where a system malfunction caused an M6.9 earthquake in the Kamchatka Peninsula to be misidentified as an M9.9 [17].

## References

1. [DKI APCSS Hosts International Visitor Leadership Program Cohort on Undersea Cable Resilience - Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies](https://dkiapcss.edu/dki-apcss-hosts-international-visitor-leadership-program-cohort-on-undersea-cable-resilience) (dkiapcss.edu)
   Published: 20 Oct 2026 · dkiapcss.edu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, FJ, PW, PG, PH, SB (+5 more)
2. [Pacific Undersea Cables and Island Security Explained | ISPI](https://ispiglobal.com/blog/pacific-undersea-cables-island-security-explainer) (ispiglobal.com)
   Published: 18 Oct 2026 · ispiglobal.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent · Systems named: East Micronesia Cable, HANTRU-1 · Vessels named: Reliance · Jurisdictions: AU, TW, ID, INT
3. [EU plans Arctic cable protection centre and expanded icebreaker fleet - Seawanderer](https://seawanderer.org/eu-plans-arctic-cable-protection-centre-and-expanded-icebreaker-fleet/) (seawanderer.org)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 20 Oct 2026 · seawanderer.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, IS, NO, GL, JP, KR (+1 more)
4. [Evidence of a Russian 'hybrid war' in Europe is vanishingly thin | Responsible Statecraft](https://responsiblestatecraft.org/hybrid-warfare-russia) (responsiblestatecraft.org)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 21 Oct 2026 · responsiblestatecraft.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: precedent, analysis · Systems named: Baltic cables · Vessels named: Chinese-flagged ships, Hong Kong-flagged ships · Jurisdictions: INT
5. [European Union Unveils Arctic Strategy To Strengthen Security, Resilience, And Climate Action: how 9 outlets framed it | NewsCord](https://newscord.org/article/european-union-unveils-arctic-strategy-to-strengthen-security-resilience-and-cli--Story_20261020_LaUEbuscareforzarsui47a98299) (newscord.org)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 21 Oct 2026 · newscord.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
6. [Greece Challenges Turkish NAVTEX, Sets New Survey Dates](https://www.tovima.com/politics/greece-challenges-turkish-navtex-sets-new-survey-dates/) (tovima.com)
   Published: 20 Oct 2026 · tovima.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, policy, analysis · Systems named: East to Med Data Corridor (EMC) · Vessels named: Kobi Ruegg · Jurisdictions: GR, TR, CY, SA, INT
7. [The case for AUKUS nations building floating submarine dry docks together - Navy Lookout](https://navylookout.com/the-case-for-aukus-nations-building-floating-submarine-dry-docks-together) (navylookout.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 19 Oct 2026 · navylookout.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
8. [Iran threatens to attack undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz, calls them 'legitimate new targets' in future conflict, IRGC spokesman warns that a future 'third phase' in war with US could lead ...](https://tomshardware.com/tech-industry/iran-threatens-to-attack-undersea-cables-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-calls-them-legitimate-new-targets-in-future-conflict-irgc-spokesman-warns-that-a-future-third-phase-in-war-with-us-could-lead-them-to-sever-global-data-links) (tomshardware.com)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Asia-Africa-Europe-1 · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, QA, GB, ES, PT (+2 more) · Also reported by: tasnimnews.ir
9. [Pezeshkian says most of Iran’s seaborne trade has been blocked](https://www.iranintl.com/en/202610214782) (iranintl.com)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · iranintl.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Asia Africa Europe-1, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International · Vessels named: Rubymar · Jurisdictions: IR, OM, KW, QA, AE, SA (+1 more)
10. [Signal No. 171 · Black Sea: NATO assets and a US P-8A at Varna](https://grosswald.org/signal-no-171-black-sea-nato-assets-and-a-us-p-8a-at-varna) (grosswald.org)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 20 Oct 2026 · grosswald.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Chelsea-3 · Jurisdictions: BG, RO, TR, INT
11. [Russia sends heavily armed naval training ship to an African country on four-ocean mission covering Atlantic and Arctic waters near NATO countries | Business Insider Africa](https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/russia-sends-heavily-armed-naval-training-ship-to-an-african-country-on-four-ocean/1y07xcg) (africa.businessinsider.com)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · africa.businessinsider.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Perekop · Jurisdictions: RU, NA, EU, INT
12. [Digitizing the Middle Corridor: CaspiLink Activates the First Trans-Caspian Subsea Cable System](https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/intra-asia/trans-caspian/caspilink-activates-the-first-trans-caspian-subsea-cable-system) (Submarine Networks)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable System · Jurisdictions: KZ, AZ, NL, INT
13. [Total blackout paralyses Ceuta following fault at Algeciras substation | TodoAlicante](https://todoalicante.es/english/total-blackout-paralyses-ceuta-20261021091003-nt.html) (todoalicante.es)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · todoalicante.es · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: fault · Systems named: Strait interconnector · Jurisdictions: ES, MA
14. [If one cable breaks, the internet across the country slows down. Is the policy to "spread submarine cables to regional areas" in time?](https://note.com/rm_blogcontents/n/n860cf480a229?hl=en) (note.com)
   Published: 20 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Subco · Jurisdictions: JP, PH, AU, EG, SY, INT
15. [SECOND SOUTHEAST ASIA-PACIFIC DIALOGUE: PROMOTING COOPERATION AND INTER-REGIONAL SUBWAY CABLE INFRASTRUCTURE CONNECTIVITY](https://vietnam.vn/en/doi-thoai-dong-nam-a-thai-binh-duong-lan-thu-2-thuc-day-hop-tac-va-ket-noi-ha-tang-cap-ngam-lien-khu-vuc) (vietnam.vn)
   Published: 21 Oct 2026 · vietnam.vn · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: VN, AU, ID, TW, INT
16. [Securing the Indo-Pacific: How Foreign Assistance Protects American Interests, Values](https://aidonthehill.substack.com/p/securing-the-indo-pacific-how-foreign) (aidonthehill.substack.com)
   Published: 20 Oct 2026 · aidonthehill.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: TW, INT
17. [The Reality of the Multi-Billion Yen 'Seafloor Earthquake Observation Network' and the M9.9 False Alarm, Who Are the Massive S-net and N-net Infrastructures For?](https://note.com/toyoshimanorio/n/n369cf3389d0a?hl=en) (note.com)
   Published: 18 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis · Systems named: S-net, N-net, DONET · Jurisdictions: JP

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `7 Oct 12:07 UTC` Identified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-21 15:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `7 Oct 08:12 UTC` Update: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-21 04:12 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-21 13:43 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-21 15:09 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 5d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.7ms, +141.1ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.8ms (+116.9ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; 61 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 26 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.8ms (+45.7ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.6ms; queuing 0.4ms; 61 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.8ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 61 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 265.3ms (+64.5ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 154.4ms; queuing 0.6ms; 61 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.5ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 61.5ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 123.0ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 50.2ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 7/61 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.4ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.2ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 25/106 paths direct (normally 27) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 47/65 paths direct (normally 50) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.4ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.6ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 249/289 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-13` UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 603 successful fetches in 24h, 45 errors across 14 source(s). Generated 2026-10-21 16:06 UTC.</sub>
