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9 November 2026 · Issue 108

US Military Relocates Cyber Staff to Hawaii for Pacific Monitoring

The move establishes a regional center under the Cyber Defence Forces Pacific initiative to monitor undersea cable and electromagnetic threats. Personnel at the command headquarters are expected to increase by approximately 20 percent.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (8 Nov 16:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

The US military is relocating cyber staff from Maryland to Hawaii to establish a regional monitoring center under the Cyber Defence Forces Pacific initiative [1]. The Defence Information Systems Agency’s Pacific command aims to improve the detection of threats to military communications, specifically including undersea cable damage and electromagnetic spectrum problems [1]. This shift addresses a previous assessment that US forces were not adequately postured for regional requirements regarding the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure and communication routes in the Pacific [1].

Joint Expeditionary Force Expansion and Russian Submarine Monitoring

The UK is leading a coalition of nine Northern European allies to expand the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) to monitor Russian submarine movements across the North Atlantic, Arctic, and Baltic Seas [4, 5, 6]. This initiative, which will be formalized on November 10 aboard the HMS Prince of Wales, involves intensified naval, air, and ground patrols to protect undersea cables and pipelines from Russian sabotage [4, 5]. The expansion follows a US-backed operation in April 2026 that disrupted Russian vessels, including an Akula-class attack submarine and two GUGI submarines, near North Atlantic infrastructure [4].

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, has characterized the current security environment as the most dangerous of his career due to Russian sabotage and cyberattacks [5, 6]. The coalition aims to counter threats from Russian GUGI submarines and deep-sea vessels capable of disabling communication cables without leaving evidence [5]. Additionally, the UK and allies are sharing live tracking data to respond to a previous probe that identified 17 Russian trawlers performing over 500 suspicious maneuvers near cables connecting Britain to Europe and America [2].

AUKUS Pillar II and Allied Subsea Surveillance Developments

The UK Ministry of Defence announced it will lead the development of three AUKUS Pillar II undersea payloads for uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), including Synthetic Aperture Sonar, a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor, and a deployable Non-Kinetic Effector [7]. These payloads, intended for use across Australian, UK, and US fleets starting in 2027, aim to create an interchangeable mission equipment framework to support the protection of subsea cables and offshore energy facilities [7]. Separately, the Royal Navy commissioned its first squadron of unmanned boats, including the Kraken and Rattler vessels, to monitor threats to international communications and financial networks more discreetly than crewed warships [10].

In the Baltic and North Atlantic, the US Navy is constructing the Virginia-class USS Baltimore to replace the Seawolf-class USS Jimmy Carter as a specialized submarine equipped with seabed sensors as part of a 'Seabed Superiority' program [11]. Analyst James F. Dunnigan notes that China is closing the US advantage in stealthy naval operations through its National Seafloor Scientific Observation Network and advanced ocean modeling [11]. Meanwhile, approximately 48 US Marines are deploying to the Baltic Sea to support NATO's Baltic Sentry mission, providing drone and littoral sensor data to protect undersea infrastructure following the late 2024 severing of two fiber-optic cables and damage to the Estlink 2 power cable [9].

International Infrastructure and Connectivity Trends

Congo Telecom stated that a repair vessel is scheduled to reach the West Africa Cable System (WACS) fault location on Wednesday, 11 November, to begin physical restoration [12]. The fault was isolated to the segment linking the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo following a 29 October disruption on the 14,500-kilometre network [12]. While the WACS serves as a regional backbone connecting South Africa, Portugal, and the UK, Congo Telecom reported that redundancy mechanisms successfully prevented customer service disruptions during the outage [12].

Separately, a post on xenospectrum.com reports that Elon Musk stated on X that a network of over 100,000 laser-linked satellites could compete with subsea cables [13]. The post notes that the statement does not provide specific information regarding satellite-to-ground capacity [13].

Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Resilience Planning

National Telecom Public Company Limited (NT) confirmed it has established a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) to prioritize bandwidth for security, healthcare, and financial sectors during crises [14]. The company stated it will utilize seven international submarine cable systems with automated traffic redirection to mitigate cybersecurity threats and physical disruptions to national infrastructure [14]. To further reduce overseas dependency, NT is implementing caching technologies and localized content [14].

In Indonesia, NTT DATA opened the Jakarta 2 Annex Data Center (JKT2A) on November 3, providing 12 MW of IT capacity for high-density computing [15]. The company also launched APN Connect, which uses All-Photonics Network technology to provide low-latency Layer 1 connectivity between the JKT2/JKT2A and JKT3 facilities [15].

Also noted

References

  1. US cyber staff shift to Hawaii under new Pacific monitoring centre (thehackacademy.com)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · thehackacademy.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: US, TW, AU, ID, INT
  2. Hunt for Red October: UK and allies race to stop Russian submarine sabotage | Dagens.com (dagens.com)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · dagens.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, INT
  3. Greece-Cyprus Cable: French Research Vessel Abeille Marengo Sets Sail Amid Diplomatic Thriller (en.parapolitika.gr)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 09 Nov 2026 · en.parapolitika.gr · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, vessel_activity, analysis · Systems named: Great Sea Interconnector · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo, Ievoli Relume · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, TR, FR, INT
  4. UK to lead Norway, Sweden and seven NATO allies against Russian submarines after US-backed operation stops suspected plot to damage undersea cables | Business Insider Africa (africa.businessinsider.com)
    Published: 08 Nov 2026 · africa.businessinsider.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: GB, NO, SE, US, INT
  5. UK to Lead 10 NATO Nations in Expanded Patrols Against Russian Submarines - Archynewsy (archynewsy.com)
    Published: 08 Nov 2026 · archynewsy.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales, Akula-class attack submarine · Jurisdictions: GB, DK, EE, FI, IS, LV (+5 more)
  6. UK Rallies Northern Europe to Hunt Russian Submarines Across Three Strategic Seas (united24media.com)
    Published: 08 Nov 2026 · united24media.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
  7. Britain will lead three AUKUS Pillar II undersea payload developments after Maritime trials in San Diego., Global Defense Corp (globaldefensecorp.com)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · globaldefensecorp.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
  8. Greece-Cyprus Cable Project Enters Its Most Critical Phase Yet (thenationalherald.com)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 08 Nov 2026 · thenationalherald.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, TR, FR
  9. US Marines head to the Baltic Sea to help NATO mission aimed at protecting European undersea cables from Russian interference | TechRadar (techradar.com)
    Published: 06 Nov 2026 · techradar.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Estlink 2 · Jurisdictions: FI, EE, GB, NO, US, INT
  10. ‘More reach, more striking power’: Royal Navy arms itself with boat drone squadron to counter Russian threat - London Business News | Londonlovesbusiness.com (londonlovesbusiness.com)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · londonlovesbusiness.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Kraken, Rattler · Jurisdictions: INT, GB
  11. Information Warfare: USN Seabed Warfare Submarine (strategypage.com)
    Published: 07 Nov 2026 · strategypage.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: USS Baltimore, USS Jimmy Carter, Zhu Hai Yun · Jurisdictions: US, CN, KR, KP, INT
  12. WACS cable repairs enter critical phase | ITWeb Africa (itweb.africa)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · itweb.africa · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair, fault · Systems named: West Africa Cable System, WACS · Jurisdictions: CD, CG, ZA, PT, GB
  13. Musk Says 100,000 Laser-Linked Satellites Could Beat Subsea Cables, but Ground Capacity Remains Unanswered (xenospectrum.com)
    Published: 08 Nov 2026 · xenospectrum.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
  14. NT มั่นใจระบบโครงข่ายพร้อมรับมือวิกฤต จัดคิวแบนด์วิดท์งานมั่นคง-แพทย์-การเงิน (telecomlover.com)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · telecomlover.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: TH
  15. NTT DATA Opens 12 MW Jakarta Data Center, Launches APN Service (Telecom Review Asia)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · telecomreviewasia.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: ID
  16. Finnish Navy: Russian fleet may have reached Baltic limit | UA.NEWS (ua.news)
    Published: 09 Nov 2026 · ua.news · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: FI, EE, INT

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Collection: 592 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-11-09 16:04 UTC.