---
date: 2026-11-09
issue: 108
title: US Military Relocates Cyber Staff to Hawaii for Pacific Monitoring
standfirst: The move establishes a regional center under the Cyber Defence Forces
  Pacific initiative to monitor undersea cable and electromagnetic threats. Personnel
  at the command headquarters are expected to increase by approximately 20 percent.
jurisdictions:
- US
- TW
- AU
- ID
- INT
- GB
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 66 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.  
  Latest update, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (3 days ago): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (45 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Fiji [DIRECT_LOST] at 09 Nov 10:00 UTC — direct paths down to 2 of the 6 this route normally holds. Best path 37.1ms -> 37.0ms. 3 of 6 paths stepped with it. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Fiji [RECOVERY] at 09 Nov 12:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 80 days): Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 21.9ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.5ms, typical path up 41.1ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (8 Nov 16:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- The US military is relocating cyber staff to Hawaii to establish a regional monitoring center for undersea cable damage [1].
- The UK is leading a nine-nation coalition to expand the Joint Expeditionary Force to monitor Russian submarine threats to undersea cables [4, 5, 6].
- The UK Ministry of Defence announced it will lead the development of three AUKUS Pillar II undersea payloads for uncrewed underwater vehicles [7].
- Congo Telecom stated a repair vessel is scheduled to reach the West Africa Cable System fault location on 11 November [12].
- National Telecom Public Company Limited (NT) confirmed it established a Business Continuity Plan to prioritize bandwidth for critical sectors during infrastructure disruptions [14].

## Today

The US military is relocating cyber staff from Maryland to Hawaii to establish a regional monitoring center under the Cyber Defence Forces Pacific initiative [1]. The Defence Information Systems Agency’s Pacific command aims to improve the detection of threats to military communications, specifically including undersea cable damage and electromagnetic spectrum problems [1]. This shift addresses a previous assessment that US forces were not adequately postured for regional requirements regarding the vulnerability of undersea infrastructure and communication routes in the Pacific [1].

## Joint Expeditionary Force Expansion and Russian Submarine Monitoring

The UK is leading a coalition of nine Northern European allies to expand the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) to monitor Russian submarine movements across the North Atlantic, Arctic, and Baltic Seas [4, 5, 6]. This initiative, which will be formalized on November 10 aboard the HMS Prince of Wales, involves intensified naval, air, and ground patrols to protect undersea cables and pipelines from Russian sabotage [4, 5]. The expansion follows a US-backed operation in April 2026 that disrupted Russian vessels, including an Akula-class attack submarine and two GUGI submarines, near North Atlantic infrastructure [4].

Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, has characterized the current security environment as the most dangerous of his career due to Russian sabotage and cyberattacks [5, 6]. The coalition aims to counter threats from Russian GUGI submarines and deep-sea vessels capable of disabling communication cables without leaving evidence [5]. Additionally, the UK and allies are sharing live tracking data to respond to a previous probe that identified 17 Russian trawlers performing over 500 suspicious maneuvers near cables connecting Britain to Europe and America [2].

## AUKUS Pillar II and Allied Subsea Surveillance Developments

The UK Ministry of Defence announced it will lead the development of three AUKUS Pillar II undersea payloads for uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), including Synthetic Aperture Sonar, a deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor, and a deployable Non-Kinetic Effector [7]. These payloads, intended for use across Australian, UK, and US fleets starting in 2027, aim to create an interchangeable mission equipment framework to support the protection of subsea cables and offshore energy facilities [7]. Separately, the Royal Navy commissioned its first squadron of unmanned boats, including the Kraken and Rattler vessels, to monitor threats to international communications and financial networks more discreetly than crewed warships [10].

In the Baltic and North Atlantic, the US Navy is constructing the Virginia-class USS Baltimore to replace the Seawolf-class USS Jimmy Carter as a specialized submarine equipped with seabed sensors as part of a 'Seabed Superiority' program [11]. Analyst James F. Dunnigan notes that China is closing the US advantage in stealthy naval operations through its National Seafloor Scientific Observation Network and advanced ocean modeling [11]. Meanwhile, approximately 48 US Marines are deploying to the Baltic Sea to support NATO's Baltic Sentry mission, providing drone and littoral sensor data to protect undersea infrastructure following the late 2024 severing of two fiber-optic cables and damage to the Estlink 2 power cable [9].

## International Infrastructure and Connectivity Trends

Congo Telecom stated that a repair vessel is scheduled to reach the West Africa Cable System (WACS) fault location on Wednesday, 11 November, to begin physical restoration [12]. The fault was isolated to the segment linking the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo following a 29 October disruption on the 14,500-kilometre network [12]. While the WACS serves as a regional backbone connecting South Africa, Portugal, and the UK, Congo Telecom reported that redundancy mechanisms successfully prevented customer service disruptions during the outage [12].

Separately, a post on xenospectrum.com reports that Elon Musk stated on X that a network of over 100,000 laser-linked satellites could compete with subsea cables [13]. The post notes that the statement does not provide specific information regarding satellite-to-ground capacity [13].

## Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Resilience Planning

National Telecom Public Company Limited (NT) confirmed it has established a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) to prioritize bandwidth for security, healthcare, and financial sectors during crises [14]. The company stated it will utilize seven international submarine cable systems with automated traffic redirection to mitigate cybersecurity threats and physical disruptions to national infrastructure [14]. To further reduce overseas dependency, NT is implementing caching technologies and localized content [14].

In Indonesia, NTT DATA opened the Jakarta 2 Annex Data Center (JKT2A) on November 3, providing 12 MW of IT capacity for high-density computing [15]. The company also launched APN Connect, which uses All-Photonics Network technology to provide low-latency Layer 1 connectivity between the JKT2/JKT2A and JKT3 facilities [15].

## Also noted

- Finnish Navy Commander Rear Admiral Tuomas Tiilikainen stated that a Russian fleet may have reached its limit in the Baltic [16].

## References

1. [US cyber staff shift to Hawaii under new Pacific monitoring centre](https://thehackacademy.com/us-military-pacific-cyber-monitoring-hawaii.htm) (thehackacademy.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · thehackacademy.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: US, TW, AU, ID, INT
2. [Hunt for Red October: UK and allies race to stop Russian submarine sabotage | Dagens.com](https://dagens.com/war/hunt-for-red-october-uk-and-allies-race-to-stop-russian-submarine-sabotage) (dagens.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · dagens.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, INT
3. [Greece-Cyprus Cable: French Research Vessel Abeille Marengo Sets Sail Amid Diplomatic Thriller](https://en.parapolitika.gr/politics/318925/greece-cyprus-cable-french-research-vessel-abeille-marengo-sets-sail-amid-diplomatic-thriller) (en.parapolitika.gr)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 09 Nov 2026 · en.parapolitika.gr · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, vessel_activity, analysis · Systems named: Great Sea Interconnector · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo, Ievoli Relume · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, TR, FR, INT
4. [UK to lead Norway, Sweden and seven NATO allies against Russian submarines after US-backed operation stops suspected plot to damage undersea cables | Business Insider Africa](https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/markets/uk-to-lead-norway-sweden-and-seven-nato-allies-against-russian-submarines-after-us/6jp22sk) (africa.businessinsider.com)
   Published: 08 Nov 2026 · africa.businessinsider.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: GB, NO, SE, US, INT
5. [UK to Lead 10 NATO Nations in Expanded Patrols Against Russian Submarines - Archynewsy](https://archynewsy.com/uk-to-lead-10-nato-nations-in-expanded-patrols-against-russian-submarines) (archynewsy.com)
   Published: 08 Nov 2026 · archynewsy.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales, Akula-class attack submarine · Jurisdictions: GB, DK, EE, FI, IS, LV (+5 more)
6. [UK Rallies Northern Europe to Hunt Russian Submarines Across Three Strategic Seas](https://united24media.com/world/uk-rallies-northern-europe-to-hunt-russian-submarines-across-three-strategic-seas-24175) (united24media.com)
   Published: 08 Nov 2026 · united24media.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
7. [Britain will lead three AUKUS Pillar II undersea payload developments after Maritime trials in San Diego., Global Defense Corp](https://globaldefensecorp.com/2026/11/09/britain-will-lead-three-aukus-pillar-ii-undersea-payload-developments-after-maritime-trials-in-san-diego) (globaldefensecorp.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · globaldefensecorp.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
8. [Greece-Cyprus Cable Project Enters Its Most Critical Phase Yet](https://www.thenationalherald.com/greece-cyprus-cable-project-enters-its-most-critical-phase-yet/) (thenationalherald.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 08 Nov 2026 · thenationalherald.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Greece-Cyprus electricity interconnection · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, TR, FR
9. [US Marines head to the Baltic Sea to help NATO mission aimed at protecting European undersea cables from Russian interference | TechRadar](https://www.techradar.com/pro/us-marines-head-to-the-baltic-sea-to-help-nato-mission-aimed-at-protecting-european-undersea-cables-from-russian-interference) (techradar.com)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · techradar.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Estlink 2 · Jurisdictions: FI, EE, GB, NO, US, INT
10. [‘More reach, more striking power’: Royal Navy arms itself with boat drone squadron to counter Russian threat - London Business News | Londonlovesbusiness.com](https://londonlovesbusiness.com/more-reach-more-striking-power-royal-navy-arms-itself-with-boat-drone-squadron-to-counter-russian-threat) (londonlovesbusiness.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · londonlovesbusiness.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Kraken, Rattler · Jurisdictions: INT, GB
11. [Information Warfare: USN Seabed Warfare Submarine](https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htiw/articles/20261108092110.aspx) (strategypage.com)
   Published: 07 Nov 2026 · strategypage.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: USS Baltimore, USS Jimmy Carter, Zhu Hai Yun · Jurisdictions: US, CN, KR, KP, INT
12. [WACS cable repairs enter critical phase | ITWeb Africa](https://itweb.africa/article/wacs-cable-repairs-enter-critical-phase/lLn14MmQ9DnMJ6Aa) (itweb.africa)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · itweb.africa · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair, fault · Systems named: West Africa Cable System, WACS · Jurisdictions: CD, CG, ZA, PT, GB
13. [Musk Says 100,000 Laser-Linked Satellites Could Beat Subsea Cables, but Ground Capacity Remains Unanswered](https://xenospectrum.com/en/musk-starlink-v4-undersea-cables-hormuz/) (xenospectrum.com)
   Published: 08 Nov 2026 · xenospectrum.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
14. [NT มั่นใจระบบโครงข่ายพร้อมรับมือวิกฤต จัดคิวแบนด์วิดท์งานมั่นคง-แพทย์-การเงิน](https://telecomlover.com/2026/11/09/nt-cybersecurity-critical-infrastructure-submarine-cable-continuity-plan) (telecomlover.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · telecomlover.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: TH
15. [NTT DATA Opens 12 MW Jakarta Data Center, Launches APN Service](https://www.telecomreviewasia.com/news/industry-news/30738-ntt-data-opens-12-mw-jakarta-data-center-launches-apn-service/) (Telecom Review Asia)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · telecomreviewasia.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: ID
16. [Finnish Navy: Russian fleet may have reached Baltic limit | UA.NEWS](https://ua.news/en/dovkolo-svitu/vms-finliandiyi-flot-derzhavi-agresora-mig-siagnuti-mezhi-u-baltitsi-anadolu-agency) (ua.news)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · ua.news · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: FI, EE, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
  - `6 Nov 02:37 UTC` Monitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
  - `5 Nov 08:49 UTC` Update: Indigo West returned to service yesterday morning and has remained stable since. We have restored traffic which has normalised routing. We look forward to also seeing ASC come online in the next few days to provide further redundancy. The repair ship has located the fault and is beginning work.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-09 15:08 UTC · https://www.gslstatus.com/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-09 13:32 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 8d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 241.6ms (+1.6ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 47.0ms; queuing 0.5ms; 80 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 146.3ms (+21.9ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 129.1ms; queuing 0.6ms; steady against 80 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 22 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (+0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.8ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 80 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 94.5ms; typical path 242.3ms (+41.1ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 149.6ms; queuing 0.6ms; 80 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (20 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 10/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 58.0ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 37 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 133.5ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.6ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 26/61 paths direct (normally 26) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.3ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 23/106 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 48) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.6ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 188/289 paths direct (normally 281) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 592 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-11-09 16:04 UTC.</sub>
