← Cable Watch

10 October 2026 · Issue 78

AsiaHub One and NTT Sign Letter of Intent for MViSTA Cable

The 2,569 km system will connect Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand to support regional AI compute clusters. The project aims for a 2029 Ready for Service date.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (9 Oct 17:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

AsiaHub One Pte. Ltd. and NTT Ltd. Japan signed a non-binding Letter of Intent on September 24, 2026, for the MViSTA Subsea Cable System [1]. The 16-fiber-pair system is designed to connect Singapore's Tuas Hub with landing sites in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand to facilitate an open-access 'AI Production Network' for moving large datasets between GPU clusters [1]. The joint venture, involving Stavian Group, Midas Capital, OMS Group, and APTelecom, targets a 2029 Ready for Service date with an estimated CapEx exceeding $300 million [1].

Suspected interference and anchor drag

A report by hellenicshippingnews.com details suspicious maritime activity between August and September 2026 involving several vessels loitering over critical subsea infrastructure [2]. Specifically, a Chinese-flagged fishery patrol vessel conducted research-pattern grids near the Guam cable hub, affecting the Bulikula and SEA-US cables, while a Chinese research vessel owned by a state university made 27 low-speed stops over the JUNO, Jupiter, FASTER, Topaz, Unity, PLCN, Pacific Crossing-1, and TGN-Pacific cables east of Japan [2]. The same report notes a Chinese research vessel spoofed its AIS in the Bashi Channel over the SEA-ME-WE 3, China-US Cable Network, SJC, EAC-C2C, APCN-2, and FLAG North Asia Loop [2].

Analyst assessments from hellenicshippingnews.com suggest these activities, which include seabed mapping and AIS spoofing, may indicate deliberate efforts to gather data for submarine navigation or to target transpacific and regional telecommunications and energy infrastructure [2]. In Europe, a post on themacrobutler.substack.com reports a coordinated drone attack on October 6, 2026, struck two commercial vessels off Bulgaria, which the author assesses as part of a 'shadow war' involving drones and sabotage [5]. Additionally, Dr. Brendan Flynn warned at the Atlantic Summit Galway that Ireland's energy pipelines are a critical vulnerability to deliberate sabotage, while Elisabeth Braw of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assessed that Ireland's role as a hub for US multinationals makes its undersea cable concentration a target for intentional interference [3, 4].

Submarine Cable Repair Logistics and Maintenance

A post on note.com featuring engineer Asuka Oda describes the manual technical process of reconnecting hair-thin optical fibers inside a swaying tent on a repair ship [6]. Oda, who works for a subsidiary of KDDI (au), notes that these repairs are frequently necessitated by human activities such as fishing [6]. The post also highlights a 2011 incident where over 20 locations were severed off the coasts of Chiba and Ibaraki due to the Great East Japan Earthquake [6].

NATO Undersea Domain Awareness and Infrastructure Protection

Britain is leading a NATO program to establish the Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network, which aims to link frigates, uncrewed underwater vehicles, surface relay nodes, and satellite links into a single interoperable network [7]. Commodore David Burton stated the initiative is the alliance's most significant undersea domain awareness effort since the Cold War, seeking to create an 'Internet of Things' in the underwater landscape to protect critical infrastructure [7]. The program, which currently involves 12 nations, is moving into a second phase worth over thirty million to establish alliance-wide standards for transitioning from large assets to many small ones [7].

To support these efforts, the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (NMCSCUI) was established in May 2024 as an information-sharing hub for oil pipelines, platforms, and submarine cables [9]. The center utilizes the MAINSAIL platform, which integrates artificial intelligence with satellite data and underwater sensors to track ship movements and detect suspicious behavior [9]. In January 2025, the NMCSCUI supported the Baltic Sentry mission to monitor infrastructure in the Baltic Sea using French Navy surface vessels and ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft [9].

Midgard Sweden-Finland Subsea Cable Extension

Midgard Infra, formerly Altibox Carrier, announced plans on October 8, 2026, to extend its Oslo to Stockholm long-haul fibre route into Finland via a new 200-kilometre subsea crossing [10]. The extension will feature 144 fibre pairs in an unrepeatered design, connecting the coast northeast of Stockholm to southwest Finland [10]. Construction is scheduled to begin in early 2027, with the system expected to enter service in 2029 [10]. The project aims to provide a physically diverse corridor for hyperscalers and data centres to address route concentration risks while supporting Finland's AI and colocation markets [10].

Trade Policy and Infrastructure Statistics

Prapasiri “Nan” Suttisome argues that the U.S. 'Agreements on Reciprocal Trade' (ARTs) signed with ten countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, could threaten equitable internet access in the Global South [11]. Suttisome asserts that provisions allowing the U.S. to exclude Chinese ICT suppliers like Huawei and ZTE may slow network rollouts in low-income nations that rely on Chinese infrastructure and subsidies, potentially increasing the digital divide [11].

A post on note.com reports that approximately 99% of international data travels through submarine cables, with about 500 systems covering over 1.7 million kilometers [12]. The post notes that over 80% of the 200 annual cable failures are caused by human activities such as fishing and ship anchors, and mentions a 2,250-kilometer cable completed in May 2026 by NEC connecting Kiribati, Nauru, and the Federated States of Micronesia [12].

References

  1. AsiaHub One and NTT Inks LOI on MViSTA Subsea Cable System (Submarine Networks)
    submarinenetworks.com
  2. Vessels Loiter Over Subsea Cables and Pipelines Across Five Theaters (hellenicshippingnews.com)
    hellenicshippingnews.com
  3. Atlantic Summit Galway hears dire warning of energy supply risks (galwaydaily.com)
    galwaydaily.com
  4. Abundance of US multinationals leaves Ireland prone to undersea cable attacks, expert says (irishexaminer.com)
    Published: 09 Oct 2026 · irishexaminer.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IE, INT
  5. The Week That It Was...As of October 9, 2026 (themacrobutler.substack.com)
    Published: 09 Oct 2026 · themacrobutler.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: Alfa Watan, ABLE · Jurisdictions: INT, BG, RO
  6. If a submarine cable breaks, who fixes it?, The people who connect lines as thin as hair on a swaying ship (note.com)
    Published: 08 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: repair, analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, CN, KR
  7. Britain leads biggest NATO undersea effort since Cold War (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
    ukdefencejournal.org.uk
  8. Google, Meta said to be paying premium for land routes amid Red Sea clash - Rest of World (restofworld.org)
    Published: 07 Oct 2026 · restofworld.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, ID, AU, INT
  9. How NATO Protects Seabed Infrastructure, SeaWaves Magazine (seawaves.com)
    Published: 09 Oct 2026 · seawaves.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT, FR
  10. Midgard Plans Sweden-Finland Subsea Cable (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
    subtelforum.com
  11. Trump’s ‘Agreements on Reciprocal Trade’ (ARTs) threaten equitable access to the internet in Global South (globalvoices.org)
    globalvoices.org
  12. Useful for Junior High School Entrance Exams! World Current Affairs Course for Elementary School Students 13 | The Internet Passes Through the Bottom of ... - note(ノート) (note.com)
    Published: 08 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, US, INT

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 591 successful fetches in 24h, 26 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-10 18:09 UTC.