Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 63 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (3 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 36 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (3 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (15 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 9 Oct (yesterday); the notice carries no date of its own.
Notice: “We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time. Next Update :12-10-2026 11:00 AEDT (12-10-2026 00:00 UTC), or earlier should there be any significant developments.” - Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 09 Oct 19:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.0ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 09 Oct 19:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 09 Oct 20:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 09 Oct 20:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 09 Oct 21:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 09 Oct 21:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 09 Oct 23:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 09 Oct 23:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 00:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 00:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 01:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 03:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 03:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 04:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 05:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 05:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 06:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 06:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 07:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 07:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 08:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 08:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 09:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 09:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 10:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 10:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 11:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 11:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 12:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 12:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 13:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 13:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 14:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 14:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 15:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 15:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 10 Oct 16:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 10 Oct 16:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured latency (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 50 days): Perth to Singapore 191.6ms, up 145.1ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.0ms, up 43.8ms on its 100.5ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.4ms, up 48.0ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (9 Oct 17:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- hellenicshippingnews.com reports Chinese vessels conducted research-pattern grids and AIS spoofing near the Bulikula, SEA-US, JUNO, and several other cables [2].
- hellenicshippingnews.com analysts assess these maritime activities may indicate deliberate efforts to gather data for submarine navigation or to target infrastructure [2].
- Midgard Infra announced plans to extend its Oslo to Stockholm route into Finland via a new 200-kilometre subsea crossing [10].
- Commodore David Burton stated Britain is leading a NATO program to link underwater vehicles and sensors into an interoperable domain awareness network [7].
- AsiaHub One and NTT Ltd. Japan signed a Letter of Intent for the MViSTA Subsea Cable System to connect Singapore to Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand [1].
Today
AsiaHub One Pte. Ltd. and NTT Ltd. Japan signed a non-binding Letter of Intent on September 24, 2026, for the MViSTA Subsea Cable System [1]. The 16-fiber-pair system is designed to connect Singapore's Tuas Hub with landing sites in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand to facilitate an open-access 'AI Production Network' for moving large datasets between GPU clusters [1]. The joint venture, involving Stavian Group, Midas Capital, OMS Group, and APTelecom, targets a 2029 Ready for Service date with an estimated CapEx exceeding $300 million [1].
Suspected interference and anchor drag
A report by hellenicshippingnews.com details suspicious maritime activity between August and September 2026 involving several vessels loitering over critical subsea infrastructure [2]. Specifically, a Chinese-flagged fishery patrol vessel conducted research-pattern grids near the Guam cable hub, affecting the Bulikula and SEA-US cables, while a Chinese research vessel owned by a state university made 27 low-speed stops over the JUNO, Jupiter, FASTER, Topaz, Unity, PLCN, Pacific Crossing-1, and TGN-Pacific cables east of Japan [2]. The same report notes a Chinese research vessel spoofed its AIS in the Bashi Channel over the SEA-ME-WE 3, China-US Cable Network, SJC, EAC-C2C, APCN-2, and FLAG North Asia Loop [2].
Analyst assessments from hellenicshippingnews.com suggest these activities, which include seabed mapping and AIS spoofing, may indicate deliberate efforts to gather data for submarine navigation or to target transpacific and regional telecommunications and energy infrastructure [2]. In Europe, a post on themacrobutler.substack.com reports a coordinated drone attack on October 6, 2026, struck two commercial vessels off Bulgaria, which the author assesses as part of a 'shadow war' involving drones and sabotage [5]. Additionally, Dr. Brendan Flynn warned at the Atlantic Summit Galway that Ireland's energy pipelines are a critical vulnerability to deliberate sabotage, while Elisabeth Braw of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assessed that Ireland's role as a hub for US multinationals makes its undersea cable concentration a target for intentional interference [3, 4].
Submarine Cable Repair Logistics and Maintenance
A post on note.com featuring engineer Asuka Oda describes the manual technical process of reconnecting hair-thin optical fibers inside a swaying tent on a repair ship [6]. Oda, who works for a subsidiary of KDDI (au), notes that these repairs are frequently necessitated by human activities such as fishing [6]. The post also highlights a 2011 incident where over 20 locations were severed off the coasts of Chiba and Ibaraki due to the Great East Japan Earthquake [6].
NATO Undersea Domain Awareness and Infrastructure Protection
Britain is leading a NATO program to establish the Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network, which aims to link frigates, uncrewed underwater vehicles, surface relay nodes, and satellite links into a single interoperable network [7]. Commodore David Burton stated the initiative is the alliance's most significant undersea domain awareness effort since the Cold War, seeking to create an 'Internet of Things' in the underwater landscape to protect critical infrastructure [7]. The program, which currently involves 12 nations, is moving into a second phase worth over thirty million to establish alliance-wide standards for transitioning from large assets to many small ones [7].
To support these efforts, the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (NMCSCUI) was established in May 2024 as an information-sharing hub for oil pipelines, platforms, and submarine cables [9]. The center utilizes the MAINSAIL platform, which integrates artificial intelligence with satellite data and underwater sensors to track ship movements and detect suspicious behavior [9]. In January 2025, the NMCSCUI supported the Baltic Sentry mission to monitor infrastructure in the Baltic Sea using French Navy surface vessels and ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft [9].
Midgard Sweden-Finland Subsea Cable Extension
Midgard Infra, formerly Altibox Carrier, announced plans on October 8, 2026, to extend its Oslo to Stockholm long-haul fibre route into Finland via a new 200-kilometre subsea crossing [10]. The extension will feature 144 fibre pairs in an unrepeatered design, connecting the coast northeast of Stockholm to southwest Finland [10]. Construction is scheduled to begin in early 2027, with the system expected to enter service in 2029 [10]. The project aims to provide a physically diverse corridor for hyperscalers and data centres to address route concentration risks while supporting Finland's AI and colocation markets [10].
Trade Policy and Infrastructure Statistics
Prapasiri “Nan” Suttisome argues that the U.S. 'Agreements on Reciprocal Trade' (ARTs) signed with ten countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, could threaten equitable internet access in the Global South [11]. Suttisome asserts that provisions allowing the U.S. to exclude Chinese ICT suppliers like Huawei and ZTE may slow network rollouts in low-income nations that rely on Chinese infrastructure and subsidies, potentially increasing the digital divide [11].
A post on note.com reports that approximately 99% of international data travels through submarine cables, with about 500 systems covering over 1.7 million kilometers [12]. The post notes that over 80% of the 200 annual cable failures are caused by human activities such as fishing and ship anchors, and mentions a 2,250-kilometer cable completed in May 2026 by NEC connecting Kiribati, Nauru, and the Federated States of Micronesia [12].
References
- AsiaHub One and NTT Inks LOI on MViSTA Subsea Cable System (Submarine Networks)
submarinenetworks.com - Vessels Loiter Over Subsea Cables and Pipelines Across Five Theaters (hellenicshippingnews.com)
hellenicshippingnews.com - Atlantic Summit Galway hears dire warning of energy supply risks (galwaydaily.com)
galwaydaily.com - Abundance of US multinationals leaves Ireland prone to undersea cable attacks, expert says (irishexaminer.com)
Published: 09 Oct 2026 · irishexaminer.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IE, INT - The Week That It Was...As of October 9, 2026 (themacrobutler.substack.com)
Published: 09 Oct 2026 · themacrobutler.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: Alfa Watan, ABLE · Jurisdictions: INT, BG, RO - If a submarine cable breaks, who fixes it?, The people who connect lines as thin as hair on a swaying ship (note.com)
Published: 08 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: repair, analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, CN, KR - Britain leads biggest NATO undersea effort since Cold War (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
ukdefencejournal.org.uk - Google, Meta said to be paying premium for land routes amid Red Sea clash - Rest of World (restofworld.org)
Published: 07 Oct 2026 · restofworld.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, ID, AU, INT - How NATO Protects Seabed Infrastructure, SeaWaves Magazine (seawaves.com)
Published: 09 Oct 2026 · seawaves.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT, FR - Midgard Plans Sweden-Finland Subsea Cable (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
subtelforum.com - Trump’s ‘Agreements on Reciprocal Trade’ (ARTs) threaten equitable access to the internet in Global South (globalvoices.org)
globalvoices.org - Useful for Junior High School Entrance Exams! World Current Affairs Course for Elementary School Students 13 | The Internet Passes Through the Bottom of ... - note(ノート) (note.com)
Published: 08 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, US, INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-10 17:12 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.7 Oct 04:54 UTCUpdate: Repairs on Indigo West are scheduled for between the 16-26th of October. ASC is scheduled shortly after on the 4th of November. GSL will continue to route traffic on the best alternative paths to Singapore. Please note these timelines are subject to weather conditions, permits and condition of cables.
page last checked 2026-10-10 17:13 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-10 13:37 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 9 Oct 16:08 UTC (the page gives no date)
- We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time. Next Update :12-10-2026 11:00 AEDT (12-10-2026 00:00 UTC), or earlier should there be any significant developments.
page last checked 2026-10-10 17:12 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 14 documents, last 2026-09-26 (quiet 15d)
Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 191.6ms, +145.1ms on its best sustained 46.6ms; typical path 275.6ms (+72.9ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 150.5ms; queuing 0.6ms; 50 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s), 63 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.0ms; typical path 181.9ms (+43.8ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 134.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 50 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 26.7ms; typical path 34.5ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.5ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 50 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.4ms, +48.0ms on its best sustained 96.5ms; typical path 223.2ms (+43.7ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 163.3ms; queuing 0.6ms; 50 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms floor; 13/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 49.4ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 64.2ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 113.1ms against a 85.0ms floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 52.9ms against a 38.3ms floor; 11/67 paths direct (normally 11)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.7ms against a 31.5ms floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 189.3ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms floor; 24/106 paths direct (normally 24)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms floor; 50/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 280/302 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-03HT — NETWORK — Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 591 successful fetches in 24h, 26 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-10 18:09 UTC.