AsiaHub One and NTT Sign Letter of Intent for MViSTA Cable 2026-10-10 This is Cable Watch for 10 October 2026. AsiaHub One and NTT Sign Letter of Intent for MViSTA Cable. Executive summary. hellenicshippingnews.com reports Chinese vessels conducted research-pattern grids and AIS spoofing near the Bulikula, SEA-US, JUNO, and several other cables. hellenicshippingnews.com analysts assess these maritime activities may indicate deliberate efforts to gather data for submarine navigation or to target infrastructure. Midgard Infra announced plans to extend its Oslo to Stockholm route into Finland via a new 200-kilometre subsea crossing. Commodore David Burton stated Britain is leading a NATO program to link underwater vehicles and sensors into an interoperable domain awareness network. AsiaHub One and NTT Ltd. Japan signed a Letter of Intent for the MViSTA Subsea Cable System to connect Singapore to Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand. Today. AsiaHub One Pte. Ltd. and NTT Ltd. Japan signed a non-binding Letter of Intent on September 24, 2026, for the MViSTA Subsea Cable System. The 16-fiber-pair system is designed to connect Singapore's Tuas Hub with landing sites in Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand to facilitate an open-access 'AI Production Network' for moving large datasets between GPU clusters. The joint venture, involving Stavian Group, Midas Capital, OMS Group, and APTelecom, targets a 2029 Ready for Service date with an estimated CapEx exceeding $300 million. Suspected interference and anchor drag. A report by hellenicshippingnews.com details suspicious maritime activity between August and September 2026 involving several vessels loitering over critical subsea infrastructure. Specifically, a Chinese-flagged fishery patrol vessel conducted research-pattern grids near the Guam cable hub, affecting the Bulikula and SEA-US cables, while a Chinese research vessel owned by a state university made 27 low-speed stops over the JUNO, Jupiter, FASTER, Topaz, Unity, PLCN, Pacific Crossing-1, and TGN-Pacific cables east of Japan. The same report notes a Chinese research vessel spoofed its AIS in the Bashi Channel over the SEA-ME-WE 3, China-US Cable Network, SJC, EAC-C2C, APCN-2, and FLAG North Asia Loop. Analyst assessments from hellenicshippingnews.com suggest these activities, which include seabed mapping and AIS spoofing, may indicate deliberate efforts to gather data for submarine navigation or to target transpacific and regional telecommunications and energy infrastructure. In Europe, a post on themacrobutler.substack.com reports a coordinated drone attack on October 6, 2026, struck two commercial vessels off Bulgaria, which the author assesses as part of a 'shadow war' involving drones and sabotage. Additionally, Dr. Brendan Flynn warned at the Atlantic Summit Galway that Ireland's energy pipelines are a critical vulnerability to deliberate sabotage, while Elisabeth Braw of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assessed that Ireland's role as a hub for US multinationals makes its undersea cable concentration a target for intentional interference. Submarine Cable Repair Logistics and Maintenance. A post on note.com featuring engineer Asuka Oda describes the manual technical process of reconnecting hair-thin optical fibers inside a swaying tent on a repair ship. Oda, who works for a subsidiary of KDDI (au), notes that these repairs are frequently necessitated by human activities such as fishing. The post also highlights a 2011 incident where over 20 locations were severed off the coasts of Chiba and Ibaraki due to the Great East Japan Earthquake. NATO Undersea Domain Awareness and Infrastructure Protection. Britain is leading a NATO program to establish the Allied Underwater Battlespace Mission Network, which aims to link frigates, uncrewed underwater vehicles, surface relay nodes, and satellite links into a single interoperable network. Commodore David Burton stated the initiative is the alliance's most significant undersea domain awareness effort since the Cold War, seeking to create an 'Internet of Things' in the underwater landscape to protect critical infrastructure. The program, which currently involves 12 nations, is moving into a second phase worth over thirty million to establish alliance-wide standards for transitioning from large assets to many small ones. To support these efforts, the NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (NMCSCUI) was established in May 2024 as an information-sharing hub for oil pipelines, platforms, and submarine cables. The center utilizes the MAINSAIL platform, which integrates artificial intelligence with satellite data and underwater sensors to track ship movements and detect suspicious behavior. In January 2025, the NMCSCUI supported the Baltic Sentry mission to monitor infrastructure in the Baltic Sea using French Navy surface vessels and ATL2 maritime patrol aircraft. Midgard Sweden-Finland Subsea Cable Extension. Midgard Infra, formerly Altibox Carrier, announced plans on October 8, 2026, to extend its Oslo to Stockholm long-haul fibre route into Finland via a new 200-kilometre subsea crossing. The extension will feature 144 fibre pairs in an unrepeatered design, connecting the coast northeast of Stockholm to southwest Finland. Construction is scheduled to begin in early 2027, with the system expected to enter service in 2029. The project aims to provide a physically diverse corridor for hyperscalers and data centres to address route concentration risks while supporting Finland's AI and colocation markets. Trade Policy and Infrastructure Statistics. Prapasiri “Nan” Suttisome argues that the U.S. 'Agreements on Reciprocal Trade' (ARTs) signed with ten countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, could threaten equitable internet access in the Global South. Suttisome asserts that provisions allowing the U.S. to exclude Chinese ICT suppliers like Huawei and ZTE may slow network rollouts in low-income nations that rely on Chinese infrastructure and subsidies, potentially increasing the digital divide. A post on note.com reports that approximately 99% of international data travels through submarine cables, with about 500 systems covering over 1.7 million kilometers. The post notes that over 80% of the 200 annual cable failures are caused by human activities such as fishing and ship anchors, and mentions a 2,250-kilometer cable completed in May 2026 by NEC connecting Kiribati, Nauru, and the Federated States of Micronesia. That has been Cable Watch for 10 October 2026. Sourcing, claim types and the standing status of every tracked system are in the written brief.