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19 November 2026 · Issue 118

Technical Fault on SEA-ME-WE 5 Cable Impacts Pakistan Connectivity

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority confirmed a fault 11 kilometres off the coast, causing nationwide internet degradation. Traffic is currently being rerouted through alternative international links.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (18 Nov 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) confirmed a technical fault occurred on the SEA-ME-WE 5 (SMW5) submarine cable system on November 18, 2026 [1]. The fault, located approximately 11 kilometres off Pakistan's coast, has resulted in intermittent connectivity and slowed speeds for domestic users [1]. Transworld Associates (TWA) is currently coordinating with the SMW5 Consortium to investigate the cause and establish a restoration timeline [1].

SEA-ME-WE 5 Fault and Regional Security Context

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) reported a fault in the SEA-ME-WE 5 international submarine cable system approximately 11 kilometres off Pakistan's coast on November 19, 2026 [2]. Transworld Associates (TWA) is coordinating with the SMW5 consortium to identify the cause, while the PTA is currently rerouting traffic through alternative links to mitigate service degradation [2].

Mathrubhumi English reports that this incident follows a separate report from October 23 stating that Iran considered targeting undersea cables in the Gulf during potential future conflicts [2]. While the PTA is managing the immediate technical impact, the report highlights broader concerns regarding the vulnerability of regional digital infrastructure [2].

Indo-Pacific Maritime Security and Infrastructure Cooperation

During a meeting in Manila on November 17, 2026, leaders from the Quad, India, the United States, Australia, and Japan, announced the Indo-Pacific Maritime Surveillance Collaboration to improve information sharing [3]. The summit signaled a shift toward 'deterrence by awareness and resilience' by pledging cooperation on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and critical mineral supply chains [3]. Additionally, the ministers from India and Japan issued a joint statement during a 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo committing to strengthen undersea cable infrastructure and cybersecurity to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific [4].

International Cable Repair Capacity and Mitigation

The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) reports that fishing and anchoring remain responsible for approximately 84% of subsea cable faults, though the frequency of these incidents has improved from one per 5,000 km in 2015 to one per 10,500 km [5]. While the industry maintains sufficient repair vessels, the ICPC notes that bureaucratic hurdles such as permits and customs are the primary bottlenecks delaying restoration, which typically takes 5 to 9 days [5].

In the Baltic Sea, the European Union has awarded EUR 9.55 million in co-funding to Merikarhu to establish rapid repair capacity [6]. This project, coordinated by Finland's National Emergency Supply Agency, aims to procure equipment that can be deployed on a vessel within three days of arrival to support telecommunications and energy links when commercial capacity is unavailable [6].

Quantum Security and Infrastructure Expansion

SK Broadband announced it will build an international quantum-security test network on the Busan, Singapore segment of the SJC2 (Southeast Asia-Japan Cable 2) undersea cable, with a target launch date of 2027 [7]. Selected for South Korea's 'Open Quantum Testbed Advancement and Expansion' program, the company plans to deploy a hybrid system using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) for short-range networks and Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) for the long-distance undersea stretch to mitigate 'harvest now, decrypt later' attacks [7].

In separate infrastructure developments, Google announced three new subsea cable systems, Alisios, Canoa, and OlaLuz, to expand connectivity across the Dominican Republic, Panama, Chile, Bermuda, and the United States [8]. Other regional projects include V.tal's 9,700-kilometer Synapse cable connecting New Jersey to São Paulo, EllaLink's Lum@link project connecting French Guiana, Brazil, and Portugal, and Chile's advancement of the Humboldt cable to connect South America to Australia [8].

References

  1. SMW5 Cable Fault Slows Down Pakistan Internet Again (techx.pk)
    Published: 19 Nov 2026 · techx.pk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, repair · Systems named: SMW5 · Jurisdictions: PK · Also reported by: brandsynario.com, pakistantimes.com, phoneworld.com.pk, timesofkarachi.pk, techjuice.pk, humenglish.com
  2. Pakistan's internet cable fault follows Iran's reported Gulf threat: What connects the two? | Mathrubhumi English (english.mathrubhumi.com)
    Published: 19 Nov 2026 · english.mathrubhumi.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: SEA-ME-WE 5 · Jurisdictions: PK, IR, INT
  3. Quad’s Quiet Deterrence (clarionindia.net)
    Published: 18 Nov 2026 · clarionindia.net · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, ID, SG, TW, INT
  4. India And Japan Condemn Terrorism, Call For Action Against UN-Listed Terror Groups (ommcomnews.com)
    Published: 19 Nov 2026 · ommcomnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, JP, INT
  5. Fault Finding: Understanding Cable Fault Mitigation and Repair (TeleGeography blog)
    Published: 19 Nov 2026 · resources.telegeography.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, repair · Jurisdictions: INT
  6. EU Funds Baltic Subsea Cable Repair Capacity (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
    Published: 18 Nov 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, repair · Jurisdictions: FI, SE, EE, EU
  7. SK Broadband to Build Quantum-Security Test Network on Busan, Singapore Undersea Cable (finance.biggo.com)
    Published: 18 Nov 2026 · finance.biggo.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: SJC2 · Jurisdictions: KR, SG · Also reported by: Light Reading, kmib.co.kr
  8. The New Internet Highways: Subsea Cables, Satellites, and Digital Sovereignty - Telecom Review Americas (telecomreviewamericas.com)
    Published: 19 Nov 2026 · telecomreviewamericas.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Alisios, Canoa, OlaLuz, Nuvem, Sol, Firmina (+4 more) · Jurisdictions: DO, PA, CL, BM, US, BR (+3 more)

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Collection: 626 successful fetches in 24h, 40 errors across 13 source(s). Generated 2026-11-19 16:06 UTC.