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16 November 2026 · Issue 115

Subsea Infrastructure Protection Market Projected to Reach 28.5 Billion by 2036

Market demand is shifting from reactive incident response toward permanent monitoring and route risk mapping. The sector is expected to expand at a 33.4% CAGR as national security concerns drive a need for proactive seabed surveillance.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (15 Nov 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

The subsea cable and critical infrastructure protection services market is projected to grow from USD 1.60 billion in 2026 to USD 28.50 billion by 2036 [1]. This growth reflects a shift toward permanent monitoring and repair readiness for telecom cables and offshore energy assets, with Norway expected to lead country growth at a 38.0% CAGR [1].

Hostile Threats and Grey-Zone Tactics

National Grid CEO Zoë Yujnovich warned that hostile states are developing offensive cyber capabilities faster than companies can respond, though she stated that three days should be sufficient to repair an extreme assault on the electricity transmission network [2]. This warning follows reports from Defence Secretary Wes Streeting that Russian activity in UK waters rose by two-fifths this year, leading the Royal Navy to develop a network of uncrewed vessels to monitor the seabed [2]. A post on dredfern.substack.com identifies the Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), and Gulf Bridge International as specific networks at risk of sabotage by actors including Iran, Russia, and China [3]. The post further argues that repurposed industrial underwater vehicles and 'grey-zone' tactics by Chinese vessels pose credible threats to these strategic choke points [3].

Maritime Surveillance and Infrastructure Security Initiatives

The UK's maritime surveillance capabilities have been strengthened by the integration of the RAF's Protector RG1 into the P-8A Poseidon Force, a move intended to enhance seabed security [8]. In Europe, the European Commission announced it will allocate €50 million to establish a joint Black Sea Maritime Security Centre to coordinate risk assessment and information sharing for undersea cables and pipelines [9]. This follows a ministerial meeting in Brussels chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas to discuss protecting critical infrastructure and restoring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea [9].

In the Indo-Pacific, analysts Dr. Kumar and Dr. Jasmeet Kaur assess that the region is shifting toward a complex network of overlapping partnerships involving India, the US, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which includes cooperation on undersea cables and maritime surveillance [5]. This shift is part of a broader trend where subsea connectivity and landing station security are increasingly recognized as critical dependencies for the growth of AI and cloud services [6]. Meanwhile, NATO is urging Gulf states to share defense technology to address vulnerabilities in the maritime domain as part of a broader effort to prepare for uncrewed warfare and other evolving threats [7].

International Infrastructure Developments and Legal Disputes

The Trans-Caspian Cable, a 380-kilometer fiber-optic link between Aktau and Sumgayit, was inaugurated on 15 October 2026 by Kazakhtelecom and AzerTelecom [11]. Kazakhtelecom chairman Bagdat Mussin stated the system, operated by the CaspiLink joint venture, could support the Data Center Valley complex, while President Ilham Aliyev claimed it provides a westbound route to Europe that bypasses Russian networks [11]. In the Caribbean, the EU and Dutch government are investing in the CELIA Caribbean European Territories Cable (CELIA CETC), a 3,700-kilometer system with 170 Tbps capacity connecting Aruba, Florida, Martinique, and Puerto Rico [12]. Orange SA is coordinating the project with SETAR NV, with Alcatel Submarine Networks as the supplier, aiming for an operational date in the third quarter of 2027 [12].

Legal and security vulnerabilities remain prominent in other regions, as Greece issued a NAVTEX for seabed surveys by the French-flagged vessel Abeille Marengo for the Great Sea Interconnector electricity cable between Greece and Cyprus [13]. While Turkey claimed to have given consent for these surveys based on its 2020 unilateral coordinate submissions, Greek legal experts argue that UNCLOS Articles 79 and 87 provide a legal basis for laying cables in areas where maritime boundaries are not delimited [13]. Additionally, a global Microsoft outage on 13 November 2026 disrupted Australian government services and businesses, leading analyst David Higginbottom to argue that Australia must prioritize infrastructure resilience and diverse communication routes over conventional weapons alone [10].

India's East Coast Cable Diversification

India is exploring new submarine internet cable landing sites along its eastern coastline, specifically targeting Machilipatnam in Andhra Pradesh and locations in the Bay of Bengal [14]. This initiative aims to reduce the current 70% concentration of infrastructure on the western coast and follows recommendations from the Broadband India Forum (BIF) to increase landing stations tenfold [14]. The BIF urged the government to diversify routes to mitigate risks from the Iran conflict in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, while also recommending the acquisition of an India-flagged repair vessel to decrease reliance on foreign operators in Dubai and Singapore [14].

Also noted

References

  1. Subsea Cable & Critical Infrastructure Protection Services Market to Reach USD 28.50 Billion by 2036, Expanding at 33.4% CAGR (openpr.com)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · openpr.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, US, AU, SG, JP (+1 more)
  2. Could Britain be plunged into darkness? National Grid warns of growing hostile threats to power infrastructure (londonlovesbusiness.com)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · londonlovesbusiness.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
  3. Underwater cables - by David Redfern - A Level of Geography (dredfern.substack.com)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · dredfern.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), Gulf Bridge International · Jurisdictions: IR, IL, US, BH, IQ, KW (+10 more)
  4. A Dutch crew took a 402-foot cable-laying ship 33 miles out to sea and lowered six hubs of live oysters onto the seabed inside a 52-turbine wind farm, about 3,600 European flat oysters and thousands ... (autonocion.com)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 13 Nov 2026 · autonocion.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis · Systems named: inter-array cables · Vessels named: Nexus · Jurisdictions: INT
  5. Indo-Pacific: Opportunity For India (rediff.com)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · rediff.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, IN, JP, US, ID, VN (+1 more)
  6. SubTel Forum Issue 151, Data Centers & New Technology OUT NOW! (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
  7. NATO urges Gulf states to share defence technology (quantumzeitgeist.com)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · quantumzeitgeist.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
  8. Protector: Guarding the UK's Undersea Infrastructure (raf.mod.uk)
    Published: 14 Nov 2026 · raf.mod.uk · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Protector RG1, P-8A Poseidon · Jurisdictions: GB
  9. Black Sea Security Brings Ministers Together in Brussels (fakti.bg)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · fakti.bg · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, UA, TR, MD, GE, AZ (+1 more)
  10. Microsoft outage exposes cracks in Australia's defence armour (independentaustralia.net)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · independentaustralia.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent · Systems named: Australia-Singapore submarine cable · Jurisdictions: AU, SG, INT
  11. A Second Path Under the Caspian: What the Trans-Caspian Cable Changes for Eurasian Connectivity (besacenter.org)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · besacenter.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Trans-Caspian Cable · Vessels named: Rubymar · Jurisdictions: KZ, AZ, RU, INT
  12. Netherlands Antilles submarine data cable project (tendersgo.com)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · tendersgo.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: CELIA, CELIA CETC, BCA · Jurisdictions: NL, AW, BQ, PR, MQ, US
  13. The Legal Battle Behind the Greece-Cyprus Power Cable (tovima.com)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · tovima.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Great Sea Interconnector · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, FR, TR
  14. Iran War Pushes India to Scout New Internet Cable Landing Sites on East Coast - Lapaas Voice (lapaasvoice.com)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · lapaasvoice.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: IN, INT
  15. Royal Air Force says Protector RG1 uncrewed aircraft tracked a Russian vessel for more than 10 hours (defence-industry.eu)
    Published: 16 Nov 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
  16. Andy Burnham just got told to prepare for war - if he's not listening we're in big trouble (express.co.uk)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · express.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Iron Duke, HMS Richmond, HMS Chiddingfold · Jurisdictions: INT
  17. Joint Expeditionary Force navies agree to train and plan together for North Atlantic and Baltic operations (defence-industry.eu)
    Published: 13 Nov 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: INT
  18. Kongsberg chief warns of undersea countermeasures gap (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
    Published: 15 Nov 2026 · ukdefencejournal.org.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, CA, DE

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Collection: 598 successful fetches in 24h, 32 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-11-16 16:04 UTC.