Situation
- Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 73 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.
Latest update, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (10 days ago): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (52 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
Vocus's page has not been checked since 2026-11-12; this may be out of date. - Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [DIRECT_LOST] at 16 Nov 09:00 UTC — direct paths down to 2 of the 6 this route normally holds. Best path 37.1ms -> 37.1ms. 3 of 6 paths stepped with it. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [RECOVERY] at 16 Nov 12:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Nov 14:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths stepped, median +21.3ms against each path's own floor. 1 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 87 days): Perth to Singapore best path 47.2ms, typical path up 34.5ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 18.0ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.6ms, typical path up 12.9ms per probe against its own history.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (15 Nov 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- A post on dredfern.substack.com identifies Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, AEE1, and Gulf Bridge International as networks at risk of sabotage [3].
- Analysts Dr. Kumar and Dr. Jasmeet Kaur assess that the Indo-Pacific is shifting toward overlapping partnerships for undersea cables and maritime surveillance [5].
- Kazakhtelecom chairman Bagdat Mussin stated the Trans-Caspian Cable could support the Data Center Valley complex [11].
- The EU and Dutch government are investing in the CELIA Caribbean European Territories Cable, with an operational date in Q3 2027 [12].
- Analyst David Higginbottom argues Australia must prioritize infrastructure resilience and diverse communication routes following a global Microsoft outage [10].
Today
The subsea cable and critical infrastructure protection services market is projected to grow from USD 1.60 billion in 2026 to USD 28.50 billion by 2036 [1]. This growth reflects a shift toward permanent monitoring and repair readiness for telecom cables and offshore energy assets, with Norway expected to lead country growth at a 38.0% CAGR [1].
Hostile Threats and Grey-Zone Tactics
National Grid CEO Zoë Yujnovich warned that hostile states are developing offensive cyber capabilities faster than companies can respond, though she stated that three days should be sufficient to repair an extreme assault on the electricity transmission network [2]. This warning follows reports from Defence Secretary Wes Streeting that Russian activity in UK waters rose by two-fifths this year, leading the Royal Navy to develop a network of uncrewed vessels to monitor the seabed [2]. A post on dredfern.substack.com identifies the Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), and Gulf Bridge International as specific networks at risk of sabotage by actors including Iran, Russia, and China [3]. The post further argues that repurposed industrial underwater vehicles and 'grey-zone' tactics by Chinese vessels pose credible threats to these strategic choke points [3].
Maritime Surveillance and Infrastructure Security Initiatives
The UK's maritime surveillance capabilities have been strengthened by the integration of the RAF's Protector RG1 into the P-8A Poseidon Force, a move intended to enhance seabed security [8]. In Europe, the European Commission announced it will allocate €50 million to establish a joint Black Sea Maritime Security Centre to coordinate risk assessment and information sharing for undersea cables and pipelines [9]. This follows a ministerial meeting in Brussels chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas to discuss protecting critical infrastructure and restoring freedom of navigation in the Black Sea [9].
In the Indo-Pacific, analysts Dr. Kumar and Dr. Jasmeet Kaur assess that the region is shifting toward a complex network of overlapping partnerships involving India, the US, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which includes cooperation on undersea cables and maritime surveillance [5]. This shift is part of a broader trend where subsea connectivity and landing station security are increasingly recognized as critical dependencies for the growth of AI and cloud services [6]. Meanwhile, NATO is urging Gulf states to share defense technology to address vulnerabilities in the maritime domain as part of a broader effort to prepare for uncrewed warfare and other evolving threats [7].
International Infrastructure Developments and Legal Disputes
The Trans-Caspian Cable, a 380-kilometer fiber-optic link between Aktau and Sumgayit, was inaugurated on 15 October 2026 by Kazakhtelecom and AzerTelecom [11]. Kazakhtelecom chairman Bagdat Mussin stated the system, operated by the CaspiLink joint venture, could support the Data Center Valley complex, while President Ilham Aliyev claimed it provides a westbound route to Europe that bypasses Russian networks [11]. In the Caribbean, the EU and Dutch government are investing in the CELIA Caribbean European Territories Cable (CELIA CETC), a 3,700-kilometer system with 170 Tbps capacity connecting Aruba, Florida, Martinique, and Puerto Rico [12]. Orange SA is coordinating the project with SETAR NV, with Alcatel Submarine Networks as the supplier, aiming for an operational date in the third quarter of 2027 [12].
Legal and security vulnerabilities remain prominent in other regions, as Greece issued a NAVTEX for seabed surveys by the French-flagged vessel Abeille Marengo for the Great Sea Interconnector electricity cable between Greece and Cyprus [13]. While Turkey claimed to have given consent for these surveys based on its 2020 unilateral coordinate submissions, Greek legal experts argue that UNCLOS Articles 79 and 87 provide a legal basis for laying cables in areas where maritime boundaries are not delimited [13]. Additionally, a global Microsoft outage on 13 November 2026 disrupted Australian government services and businesses, leading analyst David Higginbottom to argue that Australia must prioritize infrastructure resilience and diverse communication routes over conventional weapons alone [10].
India's East Coast Cable Diversification
India is exploring new submarine internet cable landing sites along its eastern coastline, specifically targeting Machilipatnam in Andhra Pradesh and locations in the Bay of Bengal [14]. This initiative aims to reduce the current 70% concentration of infrastructure on the western coast and follows recommendations from the Broadband India Forum (BIF) to increase landing stations tenfold [14]. The BIF urged the government to diversify routes to mitigate risks from the Iran conflict in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, while also recommending the acquisition of an India-flagged repair vessel to decrease reliance on foreign operators in Dubai and Singapore [14].
Also noted
- The Royal Air Force said a Protector RG1 uncrewed aircraft tracked a Russian vessel for more than 10 hours [15].
- The First Sea Lord issued a warning to Andy Burnham to prepare for war [16].
- Representatives of all ten nations in the Joint Expeditionary Force signed an agreement to train and plan together for North Atlantic and Baltic operations [17].
- Kongsberg CEO Eirik Lie stated that drone warfare seen in Ukraine will spread to the sea and under it, highlighting a gap in undersea countermeasures [18].
References
- Subsea Cable & Critical Infrastructure Protection Services Market to Reach USD 28.50 Billion by 2036, Expanding at 33.4% CAGR (openpr.com)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · openpr.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, US, AU, SG, JP (+1 more) - Could Britain be plunged into darkness? National Grid warns of growing hostile threats to power infrastructure (londonlovesbusiness.com)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · londonlovesbusiness.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT - Underwater cables - by David Redfern - A Level of Geography (dredfern.substack.com)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · dredfern.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), Gulf Bridge International · Jurisdictions: IR, IL, US, BH, IQ, KW (+10 more) - A Dutch crew took a 402-foot cable-laying ship 33 miles out to sea and lowered six hubs of live oysters onto the seabed inside a 52-turbine wind farm, about 3,600 European flat oysters and thousands ... (autonocion.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 13 Nov 2026 · autonocion.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis · Systems named: inter-array cables · Vessels named: Nexus · Jurisdictions: INT - Indo-Pacific: Opportunity For India (rediff.com)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · rediff.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, IN, JP, US, ID, VN (+1 more) - SubTel Forum Issue 151, Data Centers & New Technology OUT NOW! (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT - NATO urges Gulf states to share defence technology (quantumzeitgeist.com)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · quantumzeitgeist.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT - Protector: Guarding the UK's Undersea Infrastructure (raf.mod.uk)
Published: 14 Nov 2026 · raf.mod.uk · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Protector RG1, P-8A Poseidon · Jurisdictions: GB - Black Sea Security Brings Ministers Together in Brussels (fakti.bg)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · fakti.bg · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, UA, TR, MD, GE, AZ (+1 more) - Microsoft outage exposes cracks in Australia's defence armour (independentaustralia.net)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · independentaustralia.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent · Systems named: Australia-Singapore submarine cable · Jurisdictions: AU, SG, INT - A Second Path Under the Caspian: What the Trans-Caspian Cable Changes for Eurasian Connectivity (besacenter.org)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · besacenter.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Trans-Caspian Cable · Vessels named: Rubymar · Jurisdictions: KZ, AZ, RU, INT - Netherlands Antilles submarine data cable project (tendersgo.com)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · tendersgo.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: CELIA, CELIA CETC, BCA · Jurisdictions: NL, AW, BQ, PR, MQ, US - The Legal Battle Behind the Greece-Cyprus Power Cable (tovima.com)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · tovima.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Great Sea Interconnector · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, FR, TR - Iran War Pushes India to Scout New Internet Cable Landing Sites on East Coast - Lapaas Voice (lapaasvoice.com)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · lapaasvoice.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: IN, INT - Royal Air Force says Protector RG1 uncrewed aircraft tracked a Russian vessel for more than 10 hours (defence-industry.eu)
Published: 16 Nov 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT - Andy Burnham just got told to prepare for war - if he's not listening we're in big trouble (express.co.uk)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · express.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Iron Duke, HMS Richmond, HMS Chiddingfold · Jurisdictions: INT - Joint Expeditionary Force navies agree to train and plan together for North Atlantic and Baltic operations (defence-industry.eu)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: INT - Kongsberg chief warns of undersea countermeasures gap (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
Published: 15 Nov 2026 · ukdefencejournal.org.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, CA, DE
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
6 Nov 02:37 UTCMonitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
page last checked 2026-11-16 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-11-12 19:42 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 15d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 47.2ms; typical path 238.3ms (+34.5ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 47.0ms; queuing 0.5ms; 87 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 22 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 141.7ms (+18.0ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 128.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; steady against 87 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 19 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.5ms (+0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.6ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 87 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 94.6ms; typical path 238.5ms (+12.9ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 125.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 87 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 7/24 paths direct (normally 12)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 49.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 9.5ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 57.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 114.6ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 46.0ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 30/64 paths direct (normally 31)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.0ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 194.7ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.2ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 24/108 paths direct (normally 28)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 48)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 185/303 paths direct (normally 252)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Collection: 598 successful fetches in 24h, 32 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-11-16 16:04 UTC.