---
date: 2026-11-15
issue: 114
title: Australia and Philippines to Sign Major Defense Cooperation Agreement in Manila
standfirst: The agreement aims to bolster Philippine maritime security and expand
  reciprocal military access to counter Chinese influence in the South China Sea.
  It follows the formation of a four-nation informal bloc including Australia, the
  United States, Japan, and the Philippines.
jurisdictions:
- AU
- PH
- CN
- INT
- GB
- RU
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 72 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.  
  Latest update, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (9 days ago): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (51 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”  
  <sub>Vocus's page has not been checked since 2026-11-12; this may be out of date.</sub>
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 14 Nov 19:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 15 Nov 05:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 106.4ms -> 132.6ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 15 Nov 12:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 86 days): Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 18.0ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.7ms, typical path up 12.9ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (14 Nov 16:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- Cirion Technologies reported a shunt fault in the Panama to St. Croix submarine cable's power supply system [8].
- Congo Telecom confirmed a repair vessel is scheduled to reach the West Africa Cable System (WACS) fault location on November 11, 2026 [12].
- A post on resilienciero.substack.com assesses that Starlink V4's laser links are designed to bypass all undersea cables [2].
- The UK is investing £90 million in an underwater surveillance system for the Atlantic Net programme [3].

## Today

Australia and the Philippines are scheduled to sign a major defense cooperation agreement during the ASEAN summit in Manila this Sunday [1]. The deal focuses on enhancing the Philippine Navy and coastguard, expanding reciprocal military access, and increasing information sharing to counter Chinese maritime influence [1]. This move follows the formation of 'the Squad,' an informal four-nation bloc planning to establish a Combined Coordination Centre [1].

## Orbital Bypass and Subsea Infrastructure Displacement

A post on resilienciero.substack.com argues that Elon Musk's planned Starlink V4 constellation, featuring 100,000 satellites with laser links, is designed to create a planetary signal envelope capable of bypassing all undersea cables [2]. The author assesses that this architecture aims to replace rather than complement existing terrestrial systems, creating a jurisdictional bypass for data transit that operates outside the reach of sovereign nations and national regulators [2]. The post frames this orbital infrastructure as a delivery mechanism for a 'breakaway space civilization' and 'Internet-of-Bodies' technology [2].

## Arctic and Baltic Subsea Infrastructure Security

The UK is investing £90 million in an underwater surveillance system for the Atlantic Net programme to counter Russian military infrastructure on the Kola Peninsula [3]. This move follows a House of Commons Defence Committee report and statements from Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton warning of a 'catastrophic drop' in British frigate numbers, which could leave undersea infrastructure and NATO supply routes vulnerable to Russian submarine capabilities [6]. To address these risks, the ten maritime members of the Joint Expeditionary Force signed the Northern Navies Initiative on 10 November to improve coordination and joint patrols [6].

In the Baltic, NATO conducted Exercise Dynamic Merlin 26 from November 9 to 13, 2026, to practice anti-submarine warfare and protect undersea infrastructure, specifically the telecommunications cables between Finland and Estonia [4]. Meanwhile, the 7th Symposium on Global Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance in Sanya highlighted that insufficient trust and inadequate infrastructure currently hinder international responses to vulnerabilities in submarine cables and pipelines [7]. A post on deirdrekent.substack.com also noted Iranian threats to target seven major internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz, though the author noted no reliable evidence for claims of a coordinated global blackout [5].

## International Infrastructure Developments and Faults

Cirion Technologies reported a shunt fault in the power supply system of the Panama to St. Croix submarine cable, which was first identified on November 10 [8]. The fault is causing international connectivity interruptions and intermitencies, leading Cirion to enable additional capacity to mitigate business disruptions while technical teams coordinate a permanent repair [8]. Separately, Congo Telecom confirmed that a repair vessel is scheduled to reach the West Africa Cable System (WACS) fault location on November 11, 2026 [12]. The fault was isolated to the segment linking the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo following a circuit disruption on October 29, though Congo Telecom reported that redundancy mechanisms maintained customer service during the outage [12].

In terms of new deployments, Lebanon's Communications Minister Charles El Hage announced that the vessel Sophie Germain is laying the Cadmus-2 submarine cable between Lebanon and Cyprus [9]. Meanwhile, a report on the FAA's nationwide ground stop noted that while the White House situation room was activated due to fears of a cyberattack, officials concluded the communications failure originated from a technical fault during routine maintenance by contractor L3Harris [10]. Additionally, industry bodies including The Crown Estate and CIGRE have recommended integrated ground modelling to manage engineering risks caused by seabed uncertainty, which can affect burial tool performance and cable thermal ratings for offshore wind projects [11].

## References

1. [Major defence deal for Australia, Philippines amid clashes with China - ABC News](https://abc.net.au/news/2026-11-14/major-defence-deal-astralia-philippines-clashes-china/107381694) (abc.net.au)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · abc.net.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: AU, PH, CN
2. [D12 · Arch-Technocrat Orbital Bypass · 100,000 Satellites to Outcompete the Undersea Cable](https://resilienciero.substack.com/p/d12-arch-technocrat-orbital-bypass) (resilienciero.substack.com)
   Published: 15 Nov 2026 · resilienciero.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
3. [Rishi Sunak: The UK Must Show Putin That Russia Cannot Dominate the Arctic](https://fakti.bg/en/mnenia/1101016-rishi-sunak-the-uk-must-show-putin-that-russia-cannot-dominate-the-arctic) (fakti.bg)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · fakti.bg · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, NO
4. [Hide and seek in the Baltic, inside NATO’s submarine hunt](https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/hide-and-seek-in-the-baltic-inside-natos-submarine-hunt/) (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · ukdefencejournal.org.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: telecommunications cables between Finland and Estonia · Vessels named: HSwMS Helsingborg, Fitburg, HNLMS Den Helder, HMCS Ville de Québec · Jurisdictions: SE, DE, FI, EE, NL, CA (+4 more)
5. [Is Something Happening to the World’s Digital Infrastructure?](https://deirdrekent.substack.com/p/is-something-happening-to-the-worlds) (deirdrekent.substack.com)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · deirdrekent.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, US, IL
6. [‘A catastrophic drop in frigate numbers’: Britain’s vulnerability to Russia in the Arctic](https://www.tovima.com/world/a-catastrophic-drop-in-frigate-numbers-britains-vulnerability-to-russia-in-the-arctic/) (tovima.com)
   Published: 15 Nov 2026 · tovima.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
7. [From Shared Risks to Practical Cooperation: Rethinking Emerging Ocean Governance | Press Releases | citynewsokc.com](https://citynewsokc.com/online_features/press_releases/from-shared-risks-to-practical-cooperation-rethinking-emerging-ocean-governance/article_27011fad-90ca-5cef-b7a4-fd292582acf8.html) (citynewsokc.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · citynewsokc.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: CN, INT
8. [Actualización sobre nuestra infraestructura en Saint Croix - Cirion Technologies](https://press.ciriontechnologies.com/2026/11/14/actualizacion-infraestructura-saint-croix) (press.ciriontechnologies.com)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · press.ciriontechnologies.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, repair · Systems named: Panama to St. Croix submarine cable · Jurisdictions: PA, VI
9. [Photos: Lebanon-Cyprus Undersea Cable Project Takes Shape - MTV Lebanon](https://www.mtv.com.lb/en/news/1758511) (mtv.com.lb)
   Published: 15 Nov 2026 · mtv.com.lb · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair · Systems named: Cadmus-2 · Vessels named: Sophie Germain · Jurisdictions: LB, CY
10. [FAA telecom problems that triggered the ground stop were so alarming the White House situation room and national security apparatus went into action | Fortune](https://fortune.com/2026/11/14/faa-ground-stop-telecom-router-cybersecurity-white-house-situation-room-national-security-apparatus-l3harris) (fortune.com)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · fortune.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
11. [Seabed uncertainty creates compounding engineering risks for offshore wind cable installation and protection decisions](https://energiesmedia.com/seabed-uncertainty-offshore-cable-installation) (energiesmedia.com)
   Published: 14 Nov 2026 · energiesmedia.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: INT
12. [WACS cable repairs enter critical phase](https://extensia-ltd.com/2026/11/09/wacs-cable-repairs-enter-critical-phase/) (extensia-ltd.com)
   Published: 09 Nov 2026 · extensia-ltd.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, repair · Systems named: West Africa Cable System, WACS · Jurisdictions: CD, CG, ZA, PT, GB

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
  - `6 Nov 02:37 UTC` Monitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-15 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-12 19:42 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 14d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 238.4ms (+0.6ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 46.8ms; queuing 0.4ms; 86 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 22 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 141.6ms (+18.0ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 128.1ms; queuing 0.6ms; steady against 86 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 21 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.5ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 86 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 94.7ms; typical path 238.5ms (+12.9ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 118.2ms; queuing 0.4ms; 86 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 7/24 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.7ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 57.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 121.3ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.0ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 31/64 paths direct (normally 31) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 194.7ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.3ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 21/108 paths direct (normally 29) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 48) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.8ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 185/303 paths direct (normally 257) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 592 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-11-15 16:03 UTC.</sub>
