Situation
- Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 71 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.
Latest update, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (8 days ago): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (50 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
Vocus's page has not been checked since 2026-11-12; this may be out of date. - Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 13 Nov 21:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Honiara [DIRECT_LOST] at 14 Nov 07:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 38.3ms -> 38.4ms. Single vantage, held two hours. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Honiara [RECOVERY] at 14 Nov 09:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 85 days): Sydney to Singapore best path 94.4ms, typical path up 12.2ms per probe against its own history.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (13 Nov 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- The Norwegian PST assesses that Russian intelligence agencies are likely to conduct infrastructure sabotage operations in 2027 [1].
- Iranian security officials and IRGC spokespeople reportedly mapped plans to sever seven submarine cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz [4].
- A post on ukforcestracker.substack.com reports the Royal Navy is developing a network of Uncrewed Surface Vessels for seabed surveillance [5].
- EXA Infrastructure selected IT International Telecom Inc. as the marine installation contractor for the EXA Meridian transatlantic cable [6].
Today
The Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) issued a threat assessment [1] stating that Russian intelligence agencies are likely to conduct sabotage operations against Norwegian infrastructure in 2027. While no direct sabotage attempts have been detected yet, the PST identified defense contractors, military logistics, and energy companies as primary targets following reports of Russian technology testing to disable undersea cables [1].
Power Cable Deployment and Infrastructure Expansion
The Seaway Phoenix, a vessel converted from an internet cable layer to a power cable ship, has begun unspooling 311 miles of Hornsea 3 inter-array cables for Ørsted's wind farm off the British coast [2]. Operated by Seaway7, the ship is connecting 197 turbines to two offshore converter stations to facilitate a 2.9 GW capacity project [2]. This operation marks the first time Ørsted is using high-voltage direct current in Europe, which is intended to provide electricity for more than 3.3 million UK homes once completed [2].
Regional Infrastructure Sabotage and Maritime Security
Iranian security officials and IRGC spokespeople have reportedly mapped plans to sever seven major submarine cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz and block repair vessels if hostilities with the U.S. and Israel resume [4]. The strategy, according to brinztech.com, includes targeting US-linked data centers and AI facilities in the UAE and Bahrain as asymmetric choke points to cause regional economic and operational disruption [4].
Separately, a post on ukforcestracker.substack.com reports that the Royal Navy is developing a network of Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs), including the SYEOS Aerospace Rattler and Kraken Technology’s K3 Scout and K5 Kraken, to support mine countermeasures and surveillance [5]. The Navy also confirmed plans to join Norway’s P1118 Standardised Vessel Programme to acquire at least three Castle-class Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs) by 2031 to maintain seabed warfare capabilities as conventional minehunters retire [5].
Infrastructure Development and Fault Detection Technology
EXA Infrastructure has selected IT International Telecom Inc. as the marine installation contractor for the EXA Meridian, a 6,552 km transatlantic cable system linking New Jersey, U.S. to Brean, UK [6]. The project, scheduled for service in 2029, will utilize 24 fiber pairs with a 500 Tbps capacity and features a partnership intended to secure dedicated DP2 vessel capacity and seabed protection expertise to mitigate global vessel bottlenecks [6].
Separately, a report on bioengineer.org describes a new physics-grounded sequence-domain graph learning framework designed to improve fault-location accuracy in offshore wind transmission networks [7]. The framework, which combines a graph attention neural network with a three-sequence physics-informed neural network, achieved a mean relative location error of 0.195 percent in simulations involving submarine feeders [7]. This technology aims to improve the speed of identifying high-impedance faults and managing non-linear behaviors in modern wind turbine converters to reduce repair costs and system outages [7].
References
- Norwegian Intelligence Warns of Risk of Russian Sabotage Next Year (militarnyi.com)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · militarnyi.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NO, RU - A 426-foot ship built to lay internet cable across oceans can now carry about 4,400 tons of power cable on two giant turntables, and it has started unspooling 311 miles of it across the seabed of a ... (autonocion.com)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · autonocion.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: repair, vessel_activity · Systems named: Hornsea 3 inter-array cables · Vessels named: Seaway Phoenix · Jurisdictions: INT - Taiwan Excellence Quiccs Maiquez collaboration (tribune.net.ph)
Not cited in the text · Published: 13 Nov 2026 · tribune.net.ph · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, PH, CN - Iran Prepares Contingency Plans to Cut Gulf Undersea Internet Cables if Hostilities Resume (brinztech.com)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · brinztech.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, BH, INT - The future Royal Navy Coastal Force takes shape (ukforcestracker.substack.com)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · ukforcestracker.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Tyne, HMS Dauntless, HMS Stirling Castle · Jurisdictions: INT - EXA Infrastructure Selects IT International Telecom for Marine Installation of EXA Meridian (Submarine Networks)
Published: 14 Nov 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: EXA Meridian, North Shore Submarine Cable, Sunoque III TransGulf Cable, Ocean Networks HIFL Cable, Crosslake Fibre Lake Ontario · Vessels named: IT Intrepid, IT Integrity, IT Infinity · Jurisdictions: US, GB, CA - Physics-Grounded Graph Learning Accurately Locates Faults in Offshore Wind (bioengineer.org)
Published: 13 Nov 2026 · bioengineer.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
6 Nov 02:37 UTCMonitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
page last checked 2026-11-14 15:09 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-11-12 19:42 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 13d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 47.2ms; typical path 241.0ms (+0.7ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 46.7ms; queuing 0.5ms; 85 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 22 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 141.6ms (+9.8ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 128.0ms; queuing 0.6ms; steady against 85 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s), 23 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 85 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 94.4ms; typical path 238.5ms (+12.2ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 118.6ms; queuing 0.5ms; 85 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 7/24 paths direct (normally 12)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 53.1ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 12.3ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 7/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 57.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 132.2ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 46.0ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 31/64 paths direct (normally 29)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 38.4ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 4/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 194.7ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.3ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 22/108 paths direct (normally 28)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 40/65 paths direct (normally 48)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.8ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 135.8ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 185/303 paths direct (normally 258)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Collection: 589 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-11-14 16:02 UTC.