---
date: 2026-11-13
issue: 112
title: SUBCO Announces Three New Subsea Cable Systems Connecting Australia and US
standfirst: The operator plans to deploy the APX North, APX East-2, and APX West systems
  to expand connectivity between Australia, Asia, and the United States. All three
  projects are slated for completion by 2029.
jurisdictions:
- AU
- INT
- TW
- IN
- IR
- FI
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 70 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.  
  Latest update, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (7 days ago): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (49 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 12 Nov 20:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Nov 21:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +42.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 13 Nov 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 13 Nov 02:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 13 Nov 06:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 106.4ms -> 133.0ms. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 84 days): Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 18.1ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.6ms, typical path up 14.5ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (12 Nov 16:05 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- SUBCO announced plans to construct APX North, APX East-2, and APX West systems to link Australia, Asia, and the US by 2029 [1].
- A post on promeuraz.substack.com reports a Finnish court sentenced two individuals to prison for damaging Finland-Estonia underwater infrastructure [4].
- The UK government is proposing to update 1885 legislation to increase penalties for undersea infrastructure damage to 14 years in prison [5].
- Analysts from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and IngeniSPACE assess that the Chinese vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03 conducted surveys to map seafloor topography east of Taiwan [11].
- Iran's Deputy communications minister Behzad Akbari proposed the 'Global Digital Resilience Corridors Initiative' to establish overland internet routes through West Asia [12].

## Today

SUBCO has unveiled plans to construct three new submarine cable systems: APX North, APX East-2, and APX West [1]. These systems are intended to link Australia, Asia, and the United States, with the operator expecting to complete all three projects by 2029 [1].

## Hybrid Warfare and Legislative Responses to Subsea Sabotage

A post on promeuraz.substack.com reports that a Finnish court sentenced Russian captain Andrei Maksimenko and Azerbaijani boatswain Vusal Majidov to prison terms for damaging underwater infrastructure connecting Finland and Estonia in late 2025 [4]. In the UK, the government is proposing to update 1885 legislation to increase penalties for damaging undersea infrastructure to up to 14 years in prison and unlimited fines, a move Telecoms minister Ian Murray attributes to suspicious Russian activity and previous incidents like the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage and 2023 Baltic connector damage [5].

Analysis from the Synergia Foundation argues that the 'mending gap' between a cable fault and its repair is a critical strategic vulnerability, suggesting that nations should focus on 'deterrence by restoration' by maintaining sovereign repair capabilities [2]. Meanwhile, a post on rte.ie describes a rise in hybrid warfare in Europe involving sabotage of underwater cables by actors including Russia, Iran, China, and Morocco, noting a shift toward using 'disposable agents' to provide plausible deniability for state actors [3]. Additionally, a RUSI publication by analyst Cristina Di Silvio Guest argues that protecting infrastructure in the Baltic Sea requires a combination of maritime surveillance, legal cooperation, and clear jurisdictional frameworks, referencing legal proceedings in Finland and Sweden regarding communication cable sabotage [6].

## Subsea Infrastructure Security and Maritime Surveillance

Optics11 raised €50 million in follow-on equity funding from investors including FORWARD.one and JOIN Capital to expand its fiber-optic sensing technology [7]. The company plans to use the funds for international growth and the delivery of systems like the OptiBarrier, a static seabed system capable of detecting acoustic signals up to 100 kilometers from shore without powered electronics [7]. This funding follows the Dutch Ministry of Defence's selection of a containerized version of the technology for its ASWINABO program [7].

In the Indo-Pacific, analysis by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research and IngeniSPACE suggests that the Chinese research vessel Xiang Yang Hong 03, escorted by Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels, conducted repeated surveys of the Yaeyama and Gagua Ridges east of Taiwan in August [11]. These operations are assessed by the analysts as efforts to map seafloor topography and hydrographic conditions to optimize Chinese submarine navigation and sonar [11]. Additionally, the Japan Coast Guard reported the vessel deployed a wire-like object in Japan's EEZ off Hateruma Island between August 17 and 24 [11].

## International Infrastructure and Resilience Trends

Iran has proposed the 'Global Digital Resilience Corridors Initiative' to establish overland internet routes through West Asia, aiming to provide alternative paths for international traffic during submarine cable failures [12]. Presented by Deputy communications minister Behzad Akbari at an International Telecommunication Union conference, the plan includes preliminary understandings with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to link Central Asia to the Persian Gulf [12].

Separately, researchers are exploring the use of distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) to repurpose existing undersea fiber-optic cables into a global whale-monitoring network [13]. By analyzing laser pulse reflections, the technology could detect and triangulate whale calls to provide a cost-effective early-warning system for ship-whale collisions [13].

## Offshore Data Center Infrastructure and Connectivity

Offshore data centers are being developed to utilize subsea cables for internet connectivity while leveraging seawater heat exchangers for cooling and power from offshore wind, land grids, or powerships [14]. Specific projects include Shanghai Lingang’s planned 24 MW underwater cluster, which features a 2.3 MW demonstration phase, and a Kinetics and Mitsui O.S.K. Lines vessel-based platform with a target capacity of 20, 73 MW by 2027 [14]. 

Assessments from Professor Li Zhen and Jacobs indicate that while seawater cooling can significantly reduce refrigeration power, the engineering required to manage corrosion and environmental impacts remains complex [14]. The analysis notes that these offshore locations do not replace standard infrastructure requirements such as backup power and secure fiber routes, and many current projects remain in planning or demonstration phases with unproven lifetime performance [14].

## References

1. [SUBCO unveils three subsea cable systems connecting Australia, Asia and the US - The Tech Capital](https://thetechcapital.com/subco-unveils-three-subsea-cable-systems-connecting-australia-asia-and-the-us) (thetechcapital.com)
   Published: 12 Nov 2026 · thetechcapital.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: APX North, APX East-2, APX West, APX East · Jurisdictions: AU, INT
2. [The World on a Wire - Synergia Foundation](https://synergiafoundation.org/2026/11/13/the-world-on-a-wire) (synergiafoundation.org)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · synergiafoundation.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, IN, IR, AU, INT
3. [Hybrid warfare in Europe: sabotage, cyberattacks, and agents at the service of rival powers](https://www.rte.ie/news/a-european-perspective/2026/1112/1598923-spain-cyber-attacks/) (rte.ie)
   Published: 12 Nov 2026 · rte.ie · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
4. [Espionage and Sabotage on the Eastern Flank - by Promeuraz](https://promeuraz.substack.com/p/espionage-and-sabotage-on-the-eastern) (promeuraz.substack.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · promeuraz.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: confirmed_fact (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: precedent, investigation · Jurisdictions: FI, INT
5. [Why the UK wants to jail undersea cable saboteurs and why tougher punishment may not be enough | Euronews](https://euronews.com/2026/11/13/why-the-uk-wants-to-jail-undersea-cable-saboteurs-and-why-tougher-punishment-may-not-be-en) (euronews.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · euronews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: GB, DK, INT
6. [Maritime Jurisdiction and Undersea Security in Europe](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/maritime-jurisdiction-and-undersea-security-europe) (RUSI publications)
   Published: 12 Nov 2026 · rusi.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent, seabed_security · Vessels named: YI PENG 3 · Jurisdictions: INT
7. [Optics11 Raises €50 Million for Fibre Sensing](https://subtelforum.com/optics11-raises-50-million-for-fibre-sensing/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   Published: 12 Nov 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NL, INT
8. [UK and JEF Allies Sign Landmark Northern Navies Initiative Aboard HMS Prince of Wales](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/11/uk-and-jef-allies-sign-landmark-northern-navies-initiative-aboard-hms-prince-of-wales/) (Naval News)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 12 Nov 2026 · navalnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales · Jurisdictions: INT
9. [The Coming Era of Undersea Anarchy](https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/11/12/undersea-anarchy-turkey-greece-cyprus-energy) (foreignpolicy.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 12 Nov 2026 · foreignpolicy.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Great Sea Interconnector · Jurisdictions: GR, TR, CY, IL, CN
10. [US plans to turn submarines into drone motherships: How India is charting its own course - The Times of India](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/defence/news/us-plans-to-turn-submarines-into-drone-motherships-how-india-is-charting-its-own-course/articleshow/135793379.cms) (timesofindia.indiatimes.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 13 Nov 2026 · timesofindia.indiatimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: SSN(X), Virginia-class, Columbia-class, Seawolf class, SAVIOR, CASCADE-ASW (+2 more) · Jurisdictions: US, IN
11. [Chinese Research Ship May Be Mapping Submarine Routes Near Taiwan | Japan Forward](https://japan-forward.com/chinese-research-ship-may-be-mapping-submarine-routes-near-taiwan) (japan-forward.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · japan-forward.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Xiang Yang Hong 03, 2502, 1306, Min Fuding Yu 07902 · Jurisdictions: TW, JP, CN
12. [Iran Proposes Overland Internet Corridors to Reduce Reliance on Undersea Cables - Pravda EN](https://news-pravda.com/eu/2026/11/13/2741738.html) (news-pravda.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · news-pravda.com · Publisher: republishes other outlets, not independent corroboration · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: IR, TM, KZ, INT
13. [The Internet's Underwater Cables Could Double as a Whale-Monitoring Network](https://zmescience.com/science/oceanography/the-internets-underwater-cables-could-double-as-a-whale-monitoring-network) (zmescience.com)
   Published: 12 Nov 2026 · zmescience.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
14. [Offshore Data Centers: Power, Cooling and Internet Explained](https://itechguides.com/how-do-offshore-data-centers-work-at-sea) (itechguides.com)
   Published: 13 Nov 2026 · itechguides.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Systems named: subsea cables · Vessels named: Mitsui O.S.K. Lines · Jurisdictions: CN, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
  - `6 Nov 02:37 UTC` Monitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-13 15:11 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-12 19:42 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 12d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 238.6ms (+1.4ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 46.8ms; queuing 0.6ms; 84 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 26 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 141.6ms (+18.1ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 128.0ms; queuing 0.6ms; steady against 84 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 26 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 28.0ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 84 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 94.6ms; typical path 241.8ms (+14.5ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 125.2ms; queuing 0.6ms; 84 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 7/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 53.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.9ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 57.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 133.0ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.1ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 31/64 paths direct (normally 29) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.0ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 194.8ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.2ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 21/108 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 48) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 178/303 paths direct (normally 258) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 601 successful fetches in 24h, 32 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-11-13 16:04 UTC.</sub>
