---
date: 2026-11-06
issue: 105
title: United States Expands Pacific Cyber Defenses to Protect Undersea Cables
standfirst: The U.S. military is establishing a regional hub and deploying specialized
  forces to monitor transoceanic fiber-optic networks. The initiative targets potential
  espionage and sabotage at key geographical choke points.
jurisdictions:
- US
- TW
- AU
- INT
- JP
- PH
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 63 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Monitoring.  
  **New update**, 6 Nov 02:37 UTC (today): “Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (42 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Jakarta [RECOVERY] at 06 Nov 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured route**: Perth to Singapore [RECOVERY] at 06 Nov 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 77 days): Perth to Singapore best path 47.2ms, typical path up 41.8ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 21.9ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.6ms, typical path up 37.8ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (5 Nov 16:06 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- The U.S. military is deploying Cyber Defense Forces and a regional hub to monitor vessel behavior near cables in Hawaii and Guam [1].
- The Epoch Times assesses that Beijing is escalating maritime drills to map underwater terrain and identify cables for potential sabotage [2].
- A debuglies.com assessment argues that global systems face a critical repair capacity deficit for simultaneous, multi-theatre disruptions during wartime [5].
- A Submarine Networks analyst reports that HKT reached a Consent Decree with the FCC to cease U.S. common carrier operations by September 1, 2027 [9].
- An analyst assessment identifies the Persian Gulf as a critical corridor for systems including GBI, TGN-Gulf, FALCON, AAE-1, SEA-ME-WE 5, SEA-ME-WE 6, POI, and 2Africa [12].

## Today

The United States military is expanding its cyber defense infrastructure in the Pacific to protect transoceanic undersea cable networks from espionage and sabotage [1]. This initiative includes the deployment of specialized Cyber Defense Forces and a regional hub to monitor for anomalous vessel behaviors near critical conduits in Hawaii and Guam [1]. The move represents a shift toward proactive, intelligence-led defense to secure fiber-optic lines supporting military command and global commerce [1].

## Maritime Drills and Infrastructure Monitoring

Analysts at The Epoch Times warn that Beijing is escalating maritime drills and 'law enforcement' patrols to control waters surrounding Taiwan [2]. These maneuvers are assessed by the source as a strategy to map underwater terrain for submarines and identify undersea cables for potential sabotage [2]. Meanwhile, a Spanish project led by Indra is developing SIPRIS, a surveillance system using autonomous vehicles and acoustic sensors to monitor underwater infrastructure [4]. The Spanish Navy is also preparing to deploy the Poseidón and Proserpina vessels to inspect deep-sea infrastructure as part of these security efforts [4].

## Subsea Infrastructure Surveillance and Repair Capacity

A strategic assessment by debuglies.com argues that global submarine communications face a critical repair capacity deficit, as current systems are designed for manageable accidents rather than simultaneous, multi-theatre disruptions during wartime [5]. While the European Commission and the U.S. have made investments in cable security, the report notes these do not guarantee the ability to mobilize vessels and components in hostile environments [5]. This assessment highlights a gap between political security declarations and the operational capacity to restore the 99% of intercontinental internet traffic that relies on these cables [5].

In Europe, Indra has taken a lead role in a seven-company Spanish alliance to develop SIPRIS, a system for the continuous surveillance of undersea cables and critical infrastructure [8]. The system integrates fiber-optic anomaly detection, sonar, uncrewed vehicles, drones, and satellite coverage, with field testing scheduled to begin immediately [8]. Separately, Naval Group signed 10 new contracts and two Memoranda of Understanding with Greek companies at EURONAVAL 2026 to include research into undersea warfare and marine sensors [6]. Meanwhile, an analyst assessment in outsidethebeltway.com notes that while the U.S. has implemented supplier screening, it lacks a wartime restoration strategy for simultaneous cable failures across multiple theaters [7].

## Regulatory Precedents and Network Decoupling

Submarine Networks analyst reports that HKT reached a Consent Decree with the FCC to cease U.S. common carrier operations by September 1, 2027, to avoid fines and the 'Covered List' [9]. The analyst attributes this outcome to a 9.4% effective ownership stake by China Unicom, which created a legal vulnerability for the FCC, and the physical difficulty of disconnecting the AS3491 network [9]. This settlement follows stricter restrictions placed on previous projects like the Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN), Hong Kong Americas (HKA), and CAP-1 [9]. The analyst notes the case establishes a precedent for using complex corporate equity structures to navigate national security regulations while highlighting the technical challenges of decoupling integrated Tier-1 networks from U.S. infrastructure [9].

## Subsea Infrastructure Capacity and Regional Security

An analysis highlights that over 99% of international data travels via subsea cables, identifying them as a critical bottleneck for AI infrastructure in Asia [11]. The report argues that countries like Singapore and India are vital transit hubs requiring coordinated investment in cable capacity and repair readiness to manage volatile AI-driven data demands [11]. Furthermore, an analyst assessment identifies the Persian Gulf seabed as a critical corridor for systems including Gulf Bridge International (GBI), TGN-Gulf, FALCON, Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), SEA-ME-WE 5, SEA-ME-WE 6, POI, and 2Africa [12]. This assessment notes that while individual damage can be rerouted, simultaneous disruptions to these systems could significantly impact global digital banking, supply chains, and energy coordination [12].

In terms of hardware procurement, CM Energy is providing an integrated package of cable-handling and marine equipment for a new vessel dedicated to the ASSO cable lay project [10]. The project involves engineering and manufacturing at CM Energy's facilities in China while engaging the European supply chain [10].

## References

1. [US Expands Pacific Cyber Defences, Sets Up Regional Hub To Protect Undersea Cables Amid China Concerns | What We Know](https://sundayguardianlive.com/world/us-expands-pacific-cyber-defences-sets-up-regional-hub-to-protect-undersea-cables-amid-china-concerns-what-we-know-318376) (sundayguardianlive.com)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · sundayguardianlive.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: US, TW, AU, INT
2. [Beijing Poised to Escalate Drills, Clashes in Push to Control Taiwan’s Waters: Analysts | The Epoch Times](https://theepochtimes.com/china/beijing-poised-to-escalate-drills-clashes-in-push-to-control-taiwans-waters-analysts-6118570) (theepochtimes.com)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · theepochtimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: TW, JP, PH, CN
3. [Eurobites: Ukraine's Kyivstar cracks on in Q3](https://www.lightreading.com/operations/eurobites-ukraine-s-kyivstar-cracks-on-in-q3) (Light Reading)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 06 Nov 2026 · lightreading.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: investigation, precedent · Vessels named: Fitburg, Eagle S · Jurisdictions: FI, INT
4. [Indra Leads Spanish Project to Monitor Underwater Infrastructure](https://thedefensepost.com/2026/11/05/indra-spain-underwater-infrastructure/) (thedefensepost.com)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · thedefensepost.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy, analysis · Vessels named: Poseidón, Proserpina · Jurisdictions: ES, INT
5. [Submarine Cable Security in Wartime: The Global Repair Capacity Deficit and the Strategic Vulnerability of Digital Infrastructure - https://debuglies.com](https://debuglies.com/2026/11/05/submarine-cable-security-in-wartime-the-global-repair-capacity-deficit-and-the-strategic-vulnerability-of-digital-infrastructure) (debuglies.com)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · debuglies.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, TW, INT, US, EU, GB (+3 more)
6. [Naval Group signs 10 new contracts with Greek companies](https://www.euro2day.gr/en/article/2376870/naval-group-signs-10-new-contracts-with-greek-comp) (euro2day.gr)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · euro2day.gr · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GR, INT
7. [Friday’s Forum](https://outsidethebeltway.com/fridays-forum-306) (outsidethebeltway.com)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · outsidethebeltway.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: submarine cables linking the islands of Svalbard to mainland Norway · Vessels named: George Washington · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, US, INT
8. [Indra stock gains seabed-security role in Spanish SIPRIS alliance](https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/boerse/news/corporate-news/indra-stock-gains-seabed-security-role-in-spanish-sipris-alliance/70465395) (ad-hoc-news.de)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · ad-hoc-news.de · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: ES, INT
9. [From "Summary Execution" to "Graceful Exit": The Macro Trading Window, Micro Physical Rigidity, and Legal Actuarial Calculus Behind HKT’s FCC Consent Decree](https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/hkt-us-exit) (Submarine Networks)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Systems named: AS3491, Pacific Light Cable Network (PLCN), Hong Kong Americas (HKA), CAP-1 · Jurisdictions: US, HK, TW, PH
10. [CM Energy Contributes to ASSO Cable Lay Project](https://marinelink.com/news/cm-energy-contributes-asso-cable-lay-544187) (marinelink.com)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · marinelink.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy · Systems named: ASSO · Jurisdictions: NL, CN
11. [Asia can’t afford a ‘cloudless’ day. That means paying attention to undersea cables ...Middle East](https://eng.pressbee.net/show4959659.html) (eng.pressbee.net)
   Published: 06 Nov 2026 · eng.pressbee.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: SG, IN, ID, TW, INT · Also reported by: wdctv.news, msnbctv.news
12. [Hormuz’s Invisible Arteries: Where Is Pulse of Global Digital Economy?](https://nournews.ir/en/news/358445/hormuz-invisible-arteries-where-is-pulse-of-global-digital-economy) (nournews.ir)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · nournews.ir · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Systems named: Gulf Bridge International (GBI), TGN-Gulf, FALCON, Asia-Africa-Europe 1 (AAE-1), SEA-ME-WE 5, SEA-ME-WE 6 (+2 more) · Jurisdictions: IR, OM, EG, IN, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Monitoring, open since 4 Sep
  - `6 Nov 02:37 UTC` Monitoring: Update from Vocus: Vocus continues to progress restoration activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault, with marine repair operations having commenced at the ASC fault location. The repair vessel successfully commenced cable recovery operations, with one end of the damaged cable recovered onboard. During repair operations, a crew member of the repair vessel required urgent medical attention. …
  - `5 Nov 08:49 UTC` Update: Indigo West returned to service yesterday morning and has remained stable since. We have restored traffic which has normalised routing. We look forward to also seeing ASC come online in the next few days to provide further redundancy. The repair ship has located the fault and is beginning work.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-06 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-06 13:47 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 5d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 242.3ms (+41.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 47.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 77 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 141.7ms (+21.9ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 129.3ms; queuing 0.6ms; steady against 77 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 22 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.6ms; typical path 29.9ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 28.1ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 77 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 94.6ms; typical path 242.4ms (+37.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 150.2ms; queuing 0.6ms; 77 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s), 3 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 8/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 49.8ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.2ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 58.0ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 37 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 130.0ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.7ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 26/64 paths direct (normally 26) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.0ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.5ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 22/106 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 41/65 paths direct (normally 48) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.8ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 186/289 paths direct (normally 281) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 630 successful fetches in 24h, 29 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-11-06 16:05 UTC.</sub>
