---
date: 2026-11-05
issue: 104
title: Helsinki Court Jails Russian Captain for Baltic Sea Cable Sabotage
standfirst: A court has established criminal responsibility for the intentional dragging
  of an anchor across 130 kilometers of seabed. The act severed two telecommunications
  cables and endangered several other pieces of subsea infrastructure.
jurisdictions:
- FI
- EE
- RU
- INT
- AZ
- IN
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 62 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  **New update**, 5 Nov 08:49 UTC (today): “Indigo West returned to service yesterday morning and has remained stable since. We have restored traffic which has normalised routing. We look forward to also seeing ASC come online in the next few days to provide further redundancy. The repair ship has located the fault and is beginning work.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (41 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 4 Nov (yesterday); the notice is headed 3 Nov 23:40 UTC by the operator.  
  Notice: “Update: 04/11/2026 10:40 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Repair activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault have been completed, and the cable has been successfully repaired. The Indigo West fibres have been normalised. Please check your services to ensure everything is working as expected. If you experience any issues, please contact our support team. Further updates will be provided as required. …”
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 76 days): Perth to Singapore best path 47.2ms, typical path up 41.8ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 21.9ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 94.5ms, typical path up 37.8ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (4 Nov 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- A Helsinki court sentenced two crew members for intentionally severing Elisa and Arelion cables in the Gulf of Finland [1].
- Windward assesses that three sanctioned Iran-linked tankers loitered near seven cable systems in the Gulf of Oman [3].
- Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh called for international cooperation to safeguard undersea cables and other critical assets in the Indo-Pacific [2, 6].
- The Broadband India Forum urged India to acquire a domestic repair vessel to reduce reliance on Dubai and Singapore [5].
- Oman aims to expand its submarine cable footprint from 19 to 31 systems by 2030 [9].

## Today

A Helsinki court has sentenced Russian captain Andrei Maksimenko to three years and six months in prison and Azerbaijani boatswain Vusal Majidov to two years and ten months for aggravated criminal damage [1]. The court found the crew of the cargo vessel Fitburg intentionally dragged its anchor and chain across approximately 130 kilometers of seabed in the Gulf of Finland on December 31, 2025, which severed two telecommunications cables belonging to Elisa and Arelion [1]. The ruling establishes a legal precedent for prosecuting intentional criminal acts against cross-border maritime infrastructure outside of territorial waters [1].

## Maritime Security and Suspected Sabotage Activity

Windward and Vortexa data indicate that three sanctioned Iran-linked tankers, including the VLGC CELESTIAL SEA (IMO 9397030), loitered and went dark near seven undersea cable systems in the Gulf of Oman between October 14 and October 28, 2026 [3]. These systems include 2Africa, Bay of Bengal Gateway, Asia Africa Europe-1, Oman Australia Cable, Europe India Gateway, Transworld, and SeaMeWe-4 [3]. Windward assesses these movements as potential mapping or sabotage operations by Iran-linked vessels to target critical telecommunications infrastructure connecting 12 countries, following explicit threats from IRGC officials to attack the cables if conflict resumes [3].

In a separate development, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh stated that the global maritime security environment is strained by deliberate trade disruptions, and he called for stronger international cooperation and technological collaboration to safeguard undersea cables and other critical assets in the Indo-Pacific [2]. Meanwhile, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations Christian Buck informed the European Parliament’s SEDE Committee that the 'Baltic Sentry' operation has reduced incidents of undersea infrastructure sabotage in the Baltic Sea since January 2025 [4]. Buck stated that the operation, which utilizes frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, and naval drones, has made sabotage too costly for Russia in terms of reputation and economics [4].

## Maritime Strategy and Infrastructure Diversification

During the Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue 2026 in New Delhi, Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh called for a maritime security strategy that prioritizes the protection of undersea communication cables, commercial ports, and offshore energy facilities [6]. Singh characterized the protection of this infrastructure as a critical national security priority because over 95 percent of global digital traffic travels through undersea fiber-optic cables [6]. To address these vulnerabilities, the Broadband India Forum (BIF), representing companies including Meta, Google, Tata Communications, Lightstorm, and NEC, urged the Department of Telecommunications to acquire an India-flagged repair vessel to reduce reliance on Dubai-based E-Marine and Singapore-based SEACOM [5]. The BIF also requested a policy framework to diversify routes, increase landing stations tenfold, and allow non-telecom infrastructure providers to build and operate cable landing stations [5].

BIF highlighted that while India accounts for nearly 20 percent of global data consumption, it is connected to only around 3 percent of the world's submarine cables [5]. The forum noted that current repair response times can extend to three to five months, with downtime costs exceeding $1.5 million per hour [5]. Separately, LD Armateurs has acquired three resales for cable-laying conversion offshore [7].

## Historical Networking Milestones

Converge Digest highlights several historical networking milestones from November 5 across different years [8]. These include Scintil Photonics' 2025 presentation on DWDM co-packaged optics, Ayar Labs' 2020 $35 million Series B funding, Cerberus Capital Management's 2018 acquisition of SubCom, and MACOM's 2013 acquisition of Mindspeed Technologies [8].

## Regional Capacity Expansion and Infrastructure Development

Oman aims to expand its submarine cable footprint from 19 to 31 systems by 2030, a growth plan that includes 12 systems with contracts already signed or in force, such as the Oman Australia Cable [9]. To support this connectivity, Ooredoo and DE-CIX are partnering to launch Gulf Gateway-IX by early 2027, a national internet exchange fabric connecting Muscat and Salalah that will utilize Oman's dual subsea corridors to provide a single virtual exchange [11]. 

In Southeast Asia, several new systems are scheduled to increase capacity and route diversity for AI and hyperscale workloads, including the SJC2 (10,500 km, 126 Tbps) connecting various Asian locations by July 2025 and the SEA-H2X (5,746 km, 200 Tbps) connecting Hong Kong and Hainan to Southeast Asia by July 2026 [10]. Other projects in the region include the I-2SEA (3,600 km) connecting India, Malaysia, and Singapore by 2029, and the Nongsa-Changi Cable (50 km, 1.6 Pbps) between Batam and Singapore by July 2026 [10].

## References

1. [Finland Jails Russian Captain Over Baltic Sea Cable Sabotage as Court Establishes Criminal Responsibility](https://eutoday.net/finland-fitburg-captain-baltic-sea-cable-sabotage/) (eutoday.net)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · eutoday.net · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: investigation, precedent, fault · Systems named: Elisa, Arelion · Vessels named: Fitburg, Eagle S · Jurisdictions: FI, EE, RU, INT · Also reported by: themoscowtimes.com, euronews.com, en.portnews.ru, irishtimes.com, globetv.app, straitstimes.com
2. [‘Global maritime security environment is strained by deliberate trade disruptions’: Rajnath Singh](https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/global-maritime-security-environment-is-strained-by-deliberate-trade-disruptions-rajnath-singh/videoshow/135558898.cms) (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · economictimes.indiatimes.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, INT
3. [Sanctioned Iran-Linked Tankers Went Dark Over Gulf of Oman Cables as the IRGC Threatened Them](https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/sanctioned-iran-linked-tankers-went-dark-over-gulf-of-oman-cables-as-the-irgc-threatened-them/) (hellenicshippingnews.com)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · hellenicshippingnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: vessel_activity, seabed_security · Systems named: 2Africa, Bay of Bengal Gateway, Asia Africa Europe-1, Oman Australia Cable, Europe India Gateway, Transworld (+2 more) · Vessels named: CELESTIAL SEA, IMO 9397030, SAVIZ, BEHSHAD · Jurisdictions: OM, AE, SA, QA, KW, BH (+7 more)
4. [Baltic Sentry makes sabotage too costly for Russia, NATO man tells lawmakers](https://euperspectives.eu/2026/11/baltic-sentry-made-sabotage-too-costly-for-russia-nato-man-tells-lawmakers) (euperspectives.eu)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · euperspectives.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: INT
5. [West Asia conflict: Subsea cable industry seeks diversified routes, 10x landing stations and Indian repair ship- Moneycontrol.com](https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/telecom/west-asia-conflict-subsea-cable-industry-seeks-diversified-routes-10x-landing-stations-and-indian-repair-ship-14068834.html) (moneycontrol.com)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · moneycontrol.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: E-Marine, SEACOM · Jurisdictions: IN, AE, SG
6. [Not Submarines or Ships, India is Prioritising This Major Aspect of the Maritime Strategy - https://indianmasterminds.com](https://indianmasterminds.com/news/defence/india-maritime-security-undersea-cables-248523) (indianmasterminds.com)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · indianmasterminds.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, INT
7. [LD Armateurs pounces on trio of resales for cable-laying conversionoffshore](https://www.tradewindsnews.com/offshore/ld-armateurs-pounces-on-trio-of-resales-for-cable-laying-conversion/2-1-2069731) (TradeWinds)
   Published: not dated by the source · tradewindsnews.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: INT
8. [On This Day: November 5](https://convergedigest.com/on-this-day-november-5/) (Converge Digest)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · convergedigest.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: INT
9. [Oman Plans 31 Submarine Cable Systems by 2030](https://subtelforum.com/oman-plans-31-submarine-cable-systems-by-2030/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Oman Australia Cable · Jurisdictions: OM, AU
10. [Strategic Connectivity: Subsea cables in SEA - Southeast Asia Infrastructure](https://southeastasiainfra.com/strategic-connectivity-subsea-cables-in-sea) (southeastasiainfra.com)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · southeastasiainfra.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: SEA-H2X, ALC, SJC2, Echo, Bifrost, MIST (+4 more) · Jurisdictions: SG, ID, TH, MY, VN, AU (+6 more)
11. [Ooredoo partners with DE-CIX for new internet exchange in Oman](https://w.media/ooredoo-partners-with-de-cix-for-new-internet-exchange-in-oman/) (W.Media)
   Published: 05 Nov 2026 · w.media · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: OM, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `5 Nov 08:49 UTC` Update: Indigo West returned to service yesterday morning and has remained stable since. We have restored traffic which has normalised routing. We look forward to also seeing ASC come online in the next few days to provide further redundancy. The repair ship has located the fault and is beginning work.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-05 15:12 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-05 13:35 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 4 Nov 00:12 UTC (headed 3 Nov 23:40 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 04/11/2026 10:40 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Repair activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault have been completed, and the cable has been successfully repaired. The Indigo West fibres have been normalised. Please check your services to ensure everything is working as expected. If you experience any issues, please contact our support team. Further updates will be provided as required. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-05 15:14 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 4d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 240.7ms (+41.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 47.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 76 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 143.9ms (+21.9ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 129.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; steady against 76 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s), 21 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 30.2ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 28.3ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 76 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 94.5ms; typical path 242.4ms (+37.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 126.3ms; queuing 0.6ms; 76 days of history; 2 intervening hop(s) included (21 probe(s), 2 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 8/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.1ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.5ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 58.0ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 37 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 116.2ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.7ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 26/64 paths direct (normally 17) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 36.9ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.4ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 22/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 30/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.8ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 188/289 paths direct (normally 281) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-27` unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 610 successful fetches in 24h, 29 errors across 8 source(s). Generated 2026-11-05 16:06 UTC.</sub>
