---
date: 2026-11-04
issue: 103
title: Taihan Cable Renames Acquired Vessel to Expand South Korean Offshore Wind Capacity
standfirst: The company renamed the former DOF cable layer Skandi Connector to Taihan
  Connector following its acquisition. The vessel will join the Palos to form a dedicated
  two-vessel operation for offshore wind infrastructure.
jurisdictions:
- KR
- DE
- RU
- INT
- DK
- FI
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 61 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (8 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (40 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 4 Nov (today); the notice is headed 3 Nov 23:40 UTC by the operator.  
  **New notice**: “Update: 04/11/2026 10:40 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Repair activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault have been completed, and the cable has been successfully repaired. The Indigo West fibres have been normalised. Please check your services to ensure everything is working as expected. If you experience any issues, please contact our support team. Further updates will be provided as required. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Singapore [GROUP_STEP] at 03 Nov 17:00 UTC — 33 of 61 paths stepped, median -74.4ms against each path's own floor. 4 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 75 days): Perth to Singapore best path 47.2ms, typical path up 41.8ms per probe against its own history, **down 43.9ms since the last brief**; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 22.0ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 91.3ms, typical path up 36.6ms per probe against its own history.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (3 Nov 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- Taihan Cable and Solution stated it renamed the CLV Skandi Connector to Taihan Connector to support offshore wind projects [1].
- A post on hightechir.substack.com argues that 11 of India's 18 subsea cables will reach end-of-life within five years [6].
- An analyst assessment in en.ilsole24ore.com argues that geopolitical competition is shifting toward controlling the physical infrastructure of data flow [9].
- An analyst assessment suggests that Washington should prepare repair access and alternative routes to counter Iranian leverage [10].

## Today

Taihan Cable and Solution has renamed the recently acquired cable laying vessel (CLV) Skandi Connector to Taihan Connector [1]. The 138.4-metre vessel, which was delivered in July after being purchased from DOF in May 2026, features a flat-bottom hull designed for Korea's west coast [1]. Taihan stated the vessel will join the Palos to form the country's only two-vessel CLV operation focused on offshore wind projects, specifically for installing inter-array, export, and HVDC submarine cables [1].

## European Infrastructure Security and Maritime Surveillance

Nordic allies and NATO members have expressed concern over escalating Russian hybrid warfare and sabotage in the Baltic Sea, including damage to undersea infrastructure [3]. In response, NATO has established new commands such as Commander Task Force Baltic and Baltic Sentry to enhance maritime awareness and regional presence [3]. To counter these threats, the Netherlands has proposed a bill to intercept Russia's 'shadow fleet' near wind farms, while the UK is considering a permanent military presence in Shetland to protect undersea cables [4].

German defense startup Stark Defence announced plans to launch the Vanta 24, a 24-meter unmanned surface vessel, in 2027 to monitor Russia’s shadow fleet and protect critical underwater infrastructure in the Baltic and North seas [2]. CEO Uwe Horstmann stated the platform can carry a 50 metric ton payload, including missiles and cannons, and reach speeds exceeding 40 miles per hour [2]. These developments reflect a shift toward multi-layered defense strategies, including physical guarding and legislative controls, to secure European energy and communication networks against hybrid threats [4].

## Subsea Infrastructure Protection and Regional Security Risks

The European Commission and the EU’s High Representative released a joint report detailing the 2023 EU Maritime Security Strategy, which includes funding for regional cable surveillance hubs in the Baltic and Mediterranean [7]. This strategy incorporates a Cable Security Toolbox and sanctions against over 700 'shadow fleet' vessels to counter infrastructure sabotage [7]. To support these security goals, STARK announced the Vanta 24, an autonomous naval vessel designed for northern waters to monitor 'shadow fleet' tankers and protect subsea infrastructure [5]. The vessel is intended to support a 'hybrid navy' concept used by British, Norwegian, and German forces to provide scalable maritime deterrence [5].

In the Indo-Pacific, a post on hightechir.substack.com argues that India faces significant security risks due to aging subsea infrastructure, with 11 of its 18 cables expected to reach end-of-life within five years [6]. The author notes that India's current repair timeline relies entirely on foreign vessels, which can take four to five months to complete repairs [6]. Meanwhile, an analyst assessment in en.ilsole24ore.com argues that geopolitical competition is shifting toward controlling the physical infrastructure of data flow, such as the East to Med Data Corridor, as a primary strategic lever [9]. The assessment notes that technological power remains vulnerable to disruptions in the underlying connectivity and transport routes [9].

## Strategic Repair Readiness and Iranian Leverage

An analyst assessment suggests that Washington should prepare repair access, reserve capacity, and alternative routes for undersea critical infrastructure cables to counter Iranian leverage [10]. The assessment indicates that maintaining rapid repair capabilities could prevent Iran from leveraging infrastructure damage to impact essential services [10].

## LS Cable Showcases HVDC and Submarine Infrastructure at BIXPO 2026

LS Cable & System showcased HVDC technology and infrastructure at BIXPO 2026 in Seoul, specifically targeting the West Coast Energy Highway and AI data center requirements [11]. The company presented integrated offerings with LS Marine Solution, including 525-kilovolt, 80-degree-Celsius HVDC submarine cables and plans for a new 13,000-ton capacity cable-laying vessel [11]. LS Cable & System also highlighted superconducting cable systems and busducts developed in collaboration with Gaon Cable, LS Eco Energy, and LS Materials [11].

## Also noted

- Naval News reports that connecting adaptable naval platforms, underwater systems, and layered protection offers a more flexible response to threats [12].

## References

1. [South Korea's Taihan renames former DOF cable layer](https://bairdmaritime.com/offshore/exploration-development/offshore-construction/taihan-renames-skandi-connector-vessel) (bairdmaritime.com)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · bairdmaritime.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis · Vessels named: Skandi Connector, Taihan Connector, Palos · Jurisdictions: KR
2. [Germany Wants to Watch Russia’s Shadow Fleet. Its New Drone Ship Could Help Track It](https://united24media.com/world/germany-wants-to-watch-russias-shadow-fleet-its-new-drone-ship-could-help-track-it-24050) (united24media.com)
   Published: 03 Nov 2026 · united24media.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Vanta 24 · Jurisdictions: DE, RU, INT
3. [On ‘NATO's lake,’ Nordic allies worry about escalation with Russia](https://militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/11/03/on-natos-lake-nordic-allies-worry-about-escalation-with-russia) (militarytimes.com)
   Published: 03 Nov 2026 · militarytimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: INT, DK, FI, SE, DE
4. [From a spaceport to wastewater treatment facilities: What Europe is defending against Russia - Pravda USA](https://usa.news-pravda.com/world/2026/11/03/938609.html) (usa.news-pravda.com)
   Published: 03 Nov 2026 · usa.news-pravda.com · Publisher: republishes other outlets, not independent corroboration · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Vessels named: Yantar · Jurisdictions: GB, NL, DK, INT
5. [STARK introduces Baltic-focused Vanta 24 autonomous vessel for naval patrols and infrastructure protection](https://news.europawire.eu/stark-introduces-baltic-focused-vanta-24-autonomous-vessel-for-naval-patrols-and-infrastructure-protection/eu-press-release/2026/11/03/20/58/08/185939/) (news.europawire.eu)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · news.europawire.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Vanta 24 · Jurisdictions: DE, GB, NO, INT · Also reported by: asdnews.com
6. [#178 India’s internet has a shelf life - by Anwesha](https://hightechir.substack.com/p/178-indias-internet-has-a-shelf-life) (hightechir.substack.com)
   Published: 31 Oct 2026 · hightechir.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Systems named: I-2SEA, India Europe Xpress, Raman, SeaMeWe-6 · Jurisdictions: IN
7. [Rising maritime threats push EU into bold new naval operations](https://www.brusselstimes.com/2389937/rising-maritime-threats-push-eu-into-bold-new-naval-operations) (brusselstimes.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · brusselstimes.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, INT
8. [Russia Pressures Royal Navy's Weak Spot](https://maritime-executive.com/article/russians-pressure-royal-navy-s-weak-spot) (The Maritime Executive)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 03 Nov 2026 · maritime-executive.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Viktor Leonov, RFS Neustrashimy, HMS Glasgow, HMS Cardiff, HMS Venturer, HMS Queen Elizabeth (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: GB, RU
9. [Control over infrastructure is just as important as ownership: not just in the cyber world](https://en.ilsole24ore.com/art/control-over-infrastructure-is-just-as-important-as-ownership-not-only-in-the-cyber-world-AJ9Qkg3B) (en.ilsole24ore.com)
   Published: 03 Nov 2026 · en.ilsole24ore.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: East to Med Data Corridor · Jurisdictions: SA, CY, GR, TR, INT
10. [Rapid Undersea Critical Infrastructure Cable Repair Could Help Washington Counter Iranian Leverage](https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/critical-infrastructure/rapid-undersea-cable-repair-could-help-washington-counter-iranian-leverage/) (hstoday.us)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · hstoday.us · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: US, IR
11. [LS Cable Showcases Undersea Power Grid Technology at BIXPO 2026 - Seoul Economic Daily](https://en.sedaily.com/finance/2026/11/04/ls-cable-showcases-undersea-power-grid-technology-at-bixpo) (en.sedaily.com)
   Published: 04 Nov 2026 · en.sedaily.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: KR, INT
12. [From Naval to Underwater Capabilities](https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2026/11/from-naval-to-underwater-capabilities/) (Naval News)
   Published: 03 Nov 2026 · navalnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: X300, Catcher, Raptor · Jurisdictions: INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `27 Oct 04:53 UTC` Update: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-04 15:10 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-04 13:28 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 4 Nov 00:12 UTC (headed 3 Nov 23:40 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 04/11/2026 10:40 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Repair activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault have been completed, and the cable has been successfully repaired. The Indigo West fibres have been normalised. Please check your services to ensure everything is working as expected. If you experience any issues, please contact our support team. Further updates will be provided as required. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-04 15:11 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>2 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 3d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path 47.2ms; typical path 243.6ms (+41.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 64.2ms; queuing 0.5ms; 75 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 146.2ms (+22.0ms per probe against its own history, 16 probes); ocean crossing 132.6ms; queuing 0.5ms; steady against 75 days of history; clean crossing (16 probe(s), 23 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.6ms; typical path 30.3ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 28.0ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 75 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path 91.3ms; typical path 241.9ms (+36.6ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 150.3ms; queuing 0.6ms; 75 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 8/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 49.0ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 58.1ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 37 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 113.7ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 46.6ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 26/64 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 38.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 4/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.4ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 19/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 33/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 188/289 paths direct (normally 282) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-27` unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 606 successful fetches in 24h, 26 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-11-04 16:04 UTC.</sub>
