Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 87 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 29 Oct 04:43 UTC (5 days ago): “Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 60 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (7 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (39 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 3 Nov (today); the notice is headed 3 Nov 00:25 UTC by the operator.
New notice: “Update: 03/11/2026 11:25 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Restoration activities for the INDIGO West Segment 1A fault continue to progress. The additional cable defects identified during testing have been addressed, and restoration works continue following successful completion of key repair activities. INDIGO West remains offline while repair activities continue. No change to the restoration forecast has been confirmed at this stage. …” - Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 02 Nov 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Jakarta [GROUP_STEP] at 02 Nov 19:00 UTC — 22 of 40 paths stepped, median -49.2ms against each path's own floor. 4 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Jakarta [RECOVERY] at 03 Nov 00:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Jakarta [GROUP_STEP] at 03 Nov 04:00 UTC — 22 of 40 paths stepped, median -49.1ms against each path's own floor. 4 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Jakarta [RECOVERY] at 03 Nov 08:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 03 Nov 10:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 108.8ms -> 134.5ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Jakarta [GROUP_STEP] at 03 Nov 14:00 UTC — 20 of 37 paths stepped, median -49.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 74 days): Perth to Singapore best path 91.1ms, up 44.6ms on its 46.6ms baseline, down 96.4ms since the last brief; Sydney to Singapore best path 87.1ms, typical path up 40.1ms per probe against its own history, down 57.2ms since the last brief.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (2 Nov 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- OMS Group secured $1.0315 billion in financing to expand its subsea cable-laying fleet with four new vessels by 2028 [1].
- A CSIS report found Chinese research ships loiter near cables more than any other nation, while a U.S. congressional report highlighted China's development of electric cable-cutting devices [3].
- ASPI assesses that Australia's security is vulnerable to capabilities exceeding traditional northern deployments, proposing a 'forward defence in depth' strategy [4].
- Telecom Review Asia assesses that hyperscaler investments in systems like MAREA and Equiano are driven by AI and cloud adoption [13].
- A post on southasianherald.com argues that geopolitical power is shifting toward controlling data infrastructure and manufacturing bottlenecks [12].
Today
Malaysia's OMS Group has secured $1.0315 billion in financing to expand its subsea cable-laying capacity [1]. The funds, which include $911.5 million in corporate and export credit agency-backed facilities and $120 million in trade facilities, are earmarked for four new vessels expected to join the fleet between 2027 and 2028 [1]. This expansion is supported by export credit agencies Atradius Dutch State Business and Export Finance Norway, with HSBC Singapore and Standard Chartered Bank acting as joint global coordinators [1].
Suspected interference and anchor drag
A Chinese research vessel reportedly ignored Philippine Coast Guard demands to withdraw while loitering near an undersea cable, utilizing a false ID and evasive maneuvers to avoid capture [3]. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies found that Chinese research ships spend more time loitering near cables than any other nation, while a 2025 U.S. congressional report highlighted China's development of electric cutting devices capable of severing armored cables at depths of 13,000ft [3]. The specific cable system affected by the loitering was not named in the report [3].
Maritime Surveillance and Infrastructure Protection
European and regional defense strategies are increasingly prioritizing autonomous systems and 'forward defence' to protect undersea infrastructure from maritime threats. Sweden's defense procurement agency announced a contract with a U.S. firm to deploy four autonomous Voyager surface vessels for maritime surveillance in the Baltic Sea to protect undersea infrastructure as part of NATO’s Task Force X Baltic [6]. Similarly, the Euronaval exhibition in France reported that industry leaders like Naval Group and TKMS are focusing on integrating autonomous systems and AI into vessels to identify anonymous maritime threats and counter aggression against undersea infrastructure [7].
In the Indo-Pacific, ASPI assesses that Australia's current security is vulnerable to capabilities that exceed the reach of traditional northern deployments, proposing a 'forward defence in depth' strategy to project power across all five domains to detect and deter threats further from Australian territory [4]. While these reports focus on broader maritime security, they reflect a strategic shift toward persistent sensing and unmanned monitoring to secure critical subsea assets.
International Infrastructure and Connectivity Developments
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan inaugurated a 380-kilometer fiber-optic Caspian cable connecting Aktau to Sumqayit on October 15 [9]. Theparliamentmagazine.eu argues that the EU should conduct a practical trial of the route via its Connectivity Agenda Platform to ensure it provides a resilient alternative to data paths through Russia and the Red Sea, noting that technical adjustments are expected to continue until the end of 2026 [9]. Meanwhile, Telecom Egypt is managing the expansion of the Trans-Egypt telecommunications corridor to transition the country into a data processing destination, including the India-Europe-Xpress (IEX) system connecting Mumbai to Milan and the SEA-ME-WE 6 system connecting Singapore to Marseille [10]. Egypt also expects the 200-kilometre Red Sea Subsea Festoon Cable System linking Sharm El Sheikh and Taba to be completed by Q4 2027 [10].
Infrastructure Investment and Geopolitical Security
Hyperscalers including Google and Meta are increasingly investing directly in subsea infrastructure to secure routing, capacity, and resilience for AI and cloud workloads [13]. Telecom Review Asia assesses that while AI is a primary driver, this investment cycle is also fueled by broader cloud adoption and the requirement for diverse international connectivity across systems such as MAREA, Dunant, Equiano, Grace Hopper, 2Africa, Africa-1, Echo, and Apricot [13].
Simultaneously, the Quad nations met in Atlanta on October 31 to identify chokepoints in semiconductor and AI supply chains as a primary security concern [12]. A post on southasianherald.com argues that geopolitical power is shifting toward controlling data infrastructure and manufacturing bottlenecks as a primary lever of national power [12]. Furthermore, WilmerHale provides an assessment that US data centers face risks from state-sponsored actors and physical attacks, advising developers to conduct rigorous due diligence on equipment provenance and foreign investment to mitigate risks during geopolitical conflicts [14].
Also noted
- Calls have been made for the defense of the Shetland Isles to be strengthened [15].
References
- Malaysia's OMS Group raises $1.03B loan to expand subsea cable fleet (Light Reading)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · lightreading.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, policy · Jurisdictions: MY, SG · Also reported by: marinelink.com - Taihan Cable & Solution Renames Acquired Cable-Laying Vessel to Taihan Connector - News and Statistics - IndexBox (indexbox.io)
Not cited in the text · Published: 03 Nov 2026 · indexbox.io · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: vessel_activity · Vessels named: Taihan Connector, Skandi Connector, PALOS · Jurisdictions: KR, INT - Chinese survey ship loitering near undersea cable ignores Philippine demands to withdraw, evasive action point to growing PRC threats to data lines in the Pacific | Tom's Hardware (tomshardware.com)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: PH, CN, TW, US, INT - Forward defence in depth: how to preserve Australia’s strategy of denial (ASPI, The Strategist)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · aspistrategist.org.au · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, INT - Royal Navy Tracked Russian Spy Ship Near Outer Hebrides During NATO Drill (aroundprague.cz)
Not cited in the text · Published: 02 Nov 2026 · aroundprague.cz · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Viktor Leonov, HMS Dauntless, HMS Tyne, Neustrashimy, Aleksandr Shabalin, Energy-2 (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: INT - Sweden Contracts U.S. Firm for Baltic Sea Unmanned Maritime Surveillance (2026) (yourdreaminterpretations.com)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · yourdreaminterpretations.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Voyager · Jurisdictions: SE, INT - European naval defence industry meets as threats drive fleet upgrades | 102.7 WBOW | The Valley's Greatest Hits | Terre Haute, IN (1027wbow.com)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · 1027wbow.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: FR, DE, INT · Also reported by: straitstimes.com - Reuters World News Summary (devdiscourse.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 03 Nov 2026 · devdiscourse.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT - The EU should put the new Caspian cable to the test (theparliamentmagazine.eu)
Published: 02 Nov 2026 · theparliamentmagazine.eu · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Caspian cable · Jurisdictions: EU, KZ, AZ, GE - From Subsea Cables to AI Computing: How Egypt Is Building a Digital Infrastructure Hub - Kenya Engineer (kenyaengineer.co.ke)
Published: 02 Nov 2026 · kenyaengineer.co.ke · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: EG, INT - North - South Interconnectors, Part 2 - by Alex Terrell (alexterrell.substack.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 03 Nov 2026 · alexterrell.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: FR, ES, GB, GR, IT, DE - Capital Latitude: The Age of Chokepoints (southasianherald.com)
Published: 02 Nov 2026 · southasianherald.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: AU, IN, JP, US, CN, INT - The Subsea Cable Investment Boom Behind the AI Economy (Telecom Review Asia)
Published: 03 Nov 2026 · telecomreviewasia.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Systems named: MAREA, Dunant, Equiano, Grace Hopper, 2Africa, Africa-1 (+2 more) · Jurisdictions: AU, SG, ID, TW, US, JP (+2 more) - Data Center Security: Managing Foreign-Adversary Risk in Critical Systems (jdsupra.com)
Published: 01 Nov 2026 · jdsupra.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: US, FR, AE, BH - Do the Shetland Isles need Cold War-style military protection? (bbc.com)
Published: 02 Nov 2026 · bbc.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: INT, GB
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
29 Oct 04:43 UTCIdentified: Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
page last checked 2026-11-03 15:10 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
27 Oct 04:53 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
page last checked 2026-11-03 15:09 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-11-03 13:43 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 3 Nov 01:17 UTC (headed 3 Nov 00:25 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 03/11/2026 11:25 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Restoration activities for the INDIGO West Segment 1A fault continue to progress. The additional cable defects identified during testing have been addressed, and restoration works continue following successful completion of key repair activities. INDIGO West remains offline while repair activities continue. No change to the restoration forecast has been confirmed at this stage. …
page last checked 2026-11-03 15:11 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 2d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 91.1ms, +44.6ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 310.7ms (+88.5ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.1ms; queuing 0.4ms; 74 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 177.4ms (+0.5ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 133.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 74 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s), 2 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.9ms (+0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 28.0ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 74 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 87.1ms; typical path 263.1ms (+40.1ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 179.6ms; queuing 0.6ms; 74 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 8/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 53.3ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 64.1ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 37 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 131.8ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 47.3ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 17/61 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.8ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 4/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.5ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 21/100 paths direct (normally 28)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 37/65 paths direct (normally 49)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 5)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 201/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-27unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 576 successful fetches in 24h, 58 errors across 16 source(s). Generated 2026-11-03 16:04 UTC.