---
date: 2026-11-02
issue: 101
title: Australia Unveils Modular Payloads for Ghost Shark Underwater Drones
standfirst: The Department of Defence showcased new capabilities for the Anduril-developed
  XLAUV, including sea mines and loitering munitions. The modular design is intended
  to support sea denial and the protection of undersea infrastructure.
jurisdictions:
- AU
- KR
- INT
- TW
- JP
- PH
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 86 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 29 Oct 04:43 UTC (4 days ago): “Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 59 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (6 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (38 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 1 Nov (yesterday); the notice is headed 1 Nov 23:00 UTC by the operator.  
  **New notice**: “Update: 02/11/2026 10:00 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Restoration activities for the INDIGO West Segment 1A fault continue to progress. During ongoing testing, additional cable defects were identified and are being addressed as part of the repair process. INDIGO West remains offline while repair activities continue. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 01 Nov 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 02 Nov 14:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 108.8ms -> 136.3ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 73 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 45.7ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (1 Nov 16:01 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- The Australian Department of Defence unveiled three modular payloads for the Ghost Shark XLAUV to protect undersea infrastructure [1].
- IngeniSPACE assesses that four Chinese vessels observed near Taiwan's undersea cable routes may be preparing for sabotage [3].
- A post on mablong.substack.com assesses that Australia's lack of sovereign repair capabilities for systems like Indigo West creates vulnerability to economic coercion [7].
- The FCC's Order DA 26-1163 requires HKT and PCCW Global to cease U.S. common carrier operations by September 1, 2027 [12].
- A subsea cable fault caused power outages in the Bahamas, with repairs on Guana Cay delayed by weather and diver unavailability [10].

## Today

The Australian Department of Defence unveiled three modular payloads for the Ghost Shark extra-large autonomous underwater vehicle (XLAUV) at a Sydney manufacturing center [1]. These payloads, which include sea mines, logistics supply caches, and a swarm of Altius-600 loitering munitions, allow the Royal Australian Navy to customize the vehicles for missions such as protecting undersea infrastructure [1]. The move is intended to fill capability gaps while Australia awaits nuclear-powered submarines [1].

## Suspected Interference and Maritime Security

The Yomiuri Shimbun reported that four Chinese vessels, the Xiangyang Hong 22, the Tongji, the Jia Geng, and the Mushanzi, have been observed making irregular moves near Taiwan's undersea cable routes since May [3]. Analysis by ingeniSPACE and Taiwanese authorities suggests these ships are surveying seabed topography and cable locations, which ingeniSPACE assesses as potential preparation for sabotage [3]. Motohiro Tsuchiya warns that these 'gray zone' tactics could lead to intentional communication outages [3].

At the Manama Dialogue, Singapore and Greece called for increased security cooperation to protect global shipping routes and undersea infrastructure from disruption by state and non-state actors [4]. Singapore's Zaqy Mohamad emphasized the need for littoral states to share information to protect these assets, while Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis highlighted the urgency of securing waterways in West Asia and the Black Sea [4].

## Autonomous Systems and Sovereign Repair Capabilities

The Australian government is reallocating approximately A$5 billion to prioritize a network-based approach to autonomy, which includes transitioning from Huon-class minehunters to autonomous underwater vehicles [5]. This strategic shift toward distributed autonomous systems is occurring alongside the declassification of the Ghost Shark, an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV) capable of deploying sea mines and drone swarms to protect undersea infrastructure [8]. While the UK's Royal Navy is seeking industry interest for its own Type 93 XLUUV programme under the AUKUS pact, the Australian defense industry minister noted the Ghost Shark's design allows for covert navigation of inland waterways to deliver payloads [8].

A post on mablong.substack.com assesses that Australia's reliance on foreign-controlled repair infrastructure was exposed by the failures of the Indigo West, Indigo Central, and Australia Singapore cables between August and September 2026 [7]. The author argues that Australia remains vulnerable due to a lack of sovereign repair capabilities, suggesting that 'borrowed redundancy' allows for economic coercion or digital isolation [7]. To counter this, the post proposes an 'Indo-Pacific Sentry' mission and the inclusion of cable protection in the National Defence Strategy [7].

## International Infrastructure and Energy Security

A subsea cable fault contributed to multiple power outages across New Providence, Long Island, and Guana Cay in the Bahamas over the weekend [10]. Bahamas Power and Light (BPL) reported that repairs on Guana Cay were delayed by weather and the unavailability of divers, while BPL implemented a rotational power supply on Long Island following generation unit failures [10]. In the United Kingdom, the government has approved the Sea Link project, a 90-mile undersea electricity cable connecting Thorpeness and Aldeburgh to Pegwell Bay [11]. While National Grid stated the scheme is vital for transporting 2GW of low-carbon electricity to two million homes, Fiona Gilmore of Suffolk Energy Action Solutions (SEAS) characterized the project as an act of 'environmental vandalism' [11].

## FCC Mandates U.S. Market Exit for HKT and PCCW Global

The FCC released Order DA 26-1163, adopting a Consent Decree that requires HKT (International) Limited and its subsidiaries, including PCCW Global, to permanently cease all domestic interstate and international Section 214 common carrier operations in the US by September 1, 2027 [12]. This enforcement was triggered by China Unicom's 18.41% equity stake in PCCW Limited, necessitating a phased unwinding of HKT's transpacific subsea cable consortium assets and its Tier-1 IP backbone, AS3491 [12]. While HKT's submarine cable landing licenses for the JUPITER and AAG cables are preserved, the order dictates that commercialization and wet-plant operations touching U.S. shores will be significantly curtailed [12]. The move establishes that a minority stake by a Chinese state-owned enterprise can trigger a complete market exclusion for a telecommunications carrier in the United States, representing a tactical shift by the FCC toward negotiated 'off-ramps' to remove foreign-connected carriers from U.S. networks [12].

## Also noted

- A post on indianarrative.com argues that subsea cable sovereignty is India's true maritime priority [13].
- Iran issued a warning regarding vulnerabilities to seven major international undersea internet cables running beneath the Strait of Hormuz [14].
- The Baltic's shallow waters, uneven seabed, and changing temperature and salinity create difficult conditions for submarine operations and anti-submarine warfare [15].
- A Navy veteran is using an AI solution to counter sea drone threats, while the French operation Pelagon is currently protecting ports [16].
- Indra showcased its Prisma-S naval radar, seabed-monitoring, and submarine technologies at Euronaval [17].
- A post on note.com discusses the 'Loss of Technical Autonomy' in Japan's digital society driven by outsourcing and invisible infrastructure dependency when submarine cables are cut [18].

## References

1. [Australia unveils secretive Ghost Shark underwater drone payloads - Defense News](https://defensenews.com/naval/2026/11/02/australia-unveils-secretive-ghost-shark-underwater-drone-payloads) (defensenews.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · defensenews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU
2. [Taihan Renames Cable-Laying Vessel Daehan Connector - Seoul Economic Daily](https://en.sedaily.com/finance/2026/11/02/taihan-renames-cable-laying-vessel-daehan-connector) (en.sedaily.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 02 Nov 2026 · en.sedaily.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis · Vessels named: Skandi Connector, Daehan Connector, Palos · Jurisdictions: KR, INT · Also reported by: thelec.net
3. [Chinese ships suspected of spying](https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2026/11/02/2003867004) (taipeitimes.com)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · taipeitimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Vessels named: Xiangyang Hong 22, Tongji, Jia Geng, Mushanzi · Jurisdictions: TW, JP, PH, CN, INT
4. [Beyond war, key maritime nations grope for solutions to keep waterways open](https://asianews.network/beyond-war-key-maritime-nations-grope-for-solutions-to-keep-waterways-open/) (asianews.network)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · asianews.network · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: SG, GR, INT
5. [Canberra’s A$5 Billion Reshuffle: Retiring Platforms to Fund the Network](https://sldinfo.com/2026/11/canberras-a5-billion-reshuffle-retiring-platforms-to-fund-the-network/) (sldinfo.com)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · sldinfo.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Vessels named: HMAS Yarra, HMAS Diamantina · Jurisdictions: AU
6. [UK Unleashes MQ-9B Protector Drone for First-Ever Mission to Shadow Russian Warship](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/uk-unleashes-mq-9b-protector-drone-for-first-ever-mission-to-shadow-russian-warship-23987) (united24media.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 01 Nov 2026 · united24media.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Dauntless, HMS Tyne, Neustrashimy, Viktor Leonov, Aleksandr Shabalin · Jurisdictions: GB, RU
7. [The Seabed War: Australia Is Running on Borrowed Redundancy](https://mablong.substack.com/p/the-seabed-war-australia-is-running) (mablong.substack.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · mablong.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Indigo West, Indigo Central, Australia Singapore Cable · Vessels named: Eagle S · Jurisdictions: AU, ID, TW, INT
8. [Ghost Shark: The drone-swarm submarine that could surface in central London - AOL](https://www.aol.com/articles/ghost-shark-drone-swarm-submarine-075800000.html) (aol.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · aol.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Ghost Shark, Excalibur · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
9. [The U.S. Secretly Tapped a Soviet Underwater Cable for Nearly 10 Years Until One Man Sold the Secret for $35,000](https://indiandefencereview.com/u-s-tapped-soviet-underwater-cable-man) (indiandefencereview.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 01 Nov 2026 · indiandefencereview.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Soviet naval telephone cable · Vessels named: USS Halibut, USS Parche · Jurisdictions: INT, RU
10. [Power outages plague islands | News | thenassauguardian.com](https://thenassauguardian.com/news/power-outages-plague-islands/article_7a966b4d-6f3e-4e4f-96e6-68d6b7cc08d9.html) (thenassauguardian.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · thenassauguardian.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: fault, repair · Jurisdictions: BS
11. [Sea Link cable project 'an act of vandalism', campaigner](https://bbc.com/news/articles/cr62y62j4x99o) (bbc.com)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · bbc.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Sea Link · Jurisdictions: INT
12. [FCC Mandates U.S. Market Exit for HKT and PCCW Global](https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/fcc-mandates-u-s-market-exit-for-hkt-and-pccw-global) (Submarine Networks)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: JUPITER, AAG · Jurisdictions: US, HK, CN
13. [Beyond Gunboats and Sea Lanes: Why Subsea Cable Sovereignty is India’s True Maritime Priority](https://www.indianarrative.com/tech/beyond-gunboats-and-sea-lanes-why-subsea-cable-sovereignty-is-indias-true-maritime-priority/) (indianarrative.com)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · indianarrative.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, INT
14. [Iran Warns of Undersea Internet Cable Vulnerabilities in Strait of Hormuz - World Today Journal](https://world-today-journal.com/iran-warns-of-undersea-internet-cable-vulnerabilities-in-strait-of-hormuz) (world-today-journal.com)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · world-today-journal.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: IR, INT
15. [How Sweden’s Baltic submarine expertise supports NATO’s undersea defence capabilities](https://defence-industry.eu/how-swedens-baltic-submarine-expertise-supports-natos-undersea-defence-capabilities) (defence-industry.eu)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Blekinge-class, A26 · Jurisdictions: SE, INT
16. [Navy veteran taps AI solution to counter sea drone threat](https://www.tradewindsnews.com/technology/navy-veteran-taps-ai-solution-to-counter-sea-drone-threat/2-1-2066820) (tradewindsnews.com)
   Published: 01 Nov 2026 · tradewindsnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: FR, INT
17. [Indra showcases Prisma-S naval radar and underwater surveillance advances at Euronaval](https://news.europawire.eu/indra-showcases-prisma-s-naval-radar-and-underwater-surveillance-advances-at-euronaval/eu-press-release/2026/11/02/12/15/15/185520/) (news.europawire.eu)
   Published: 02 Nov 2026 · news.europawire.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT · Also reported by: asdnews.com
18. [When Submarine Cables Are Cut, Can Japan's Digital Society Operate on Its Own?---The 'Loss of Technical Autonomy' Driven by Outsourcing and Invisible Infrastructure Dependency](https://note.com/mie_656/n/ndb24895258c9?hl=en) (note.com)
   Published: 31 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: JP, US, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `29 Oct 04:43 UTC` Identified: Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-02 15:14 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `27 Oct 04:53 UTC` Update: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-02 15:10 UTC · https://www.gslstatus.com/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-02 13:28 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 1 Nov 23:09 UTC (headed 1 Nov 23:00 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 02/11/2026 10:00 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Restoration activities for the INDIGO West Segment 1A fault continue to progress. During ongoing testing, additional cable defects were identified and are being addressed as part of the repair process. INDIGO West remains offline while repair activities continue. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-11-02 15:14 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-11-02 (quiet 1d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.6ms (+129.0ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 73 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 3 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.7ms (+45.7ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 132.9ms; queuing 0.5ms; 73 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.6ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 73 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 266.5ms (+65.8ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 180.8ms; queuing 0.6ms; 73 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 10/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.8ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.0ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 64.1ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 135.8ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 52.9ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/61 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.3ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.4ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 23/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 195/283 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-27` unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 578 successful fetches in 24h, 47 errors across 22 source(s). Generated 2026-11-02 16:04 UTC.</sub>
