Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 85 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 29 Oct 04:43 UTC (3 days ago): “Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 58 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (5 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (37 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 1 Nov (today); the notice is headed 1 Nov 06:00 UTC by the operator.
New notice: “Update: 01/11/2026 17:00 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Please be advised that restoration activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault are continuing. The repair team is currently carrying out further testing and investigation as part of the repair works. The restoration schedule remains subject to the outcome of these activities, weather conditions and operational requirements. Indigo West remains offline while repair activities continue. …” - Measured route: Australia to Guam [DIRECT_LOST] at 31 Oct 23:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 13 path(s) were within Australia to Guam's physical floor, now none. Best path 70.5ms -> 141.8ms. 14 of 23 paths stepped with it. 4 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [DIRECT_LOST] at 01 Nov 05:00 UTC — direct paths down to 2 of the 6 this route normally holds. Best path 37.2ms -> 37.0ms. 3 of 6 paths stepped with it. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Australia to Guam [RECOVERY] at 01 Nov 10:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [RECOVERY] at 01 Nov 13:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 72 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.4ms, up 140.8ms on its 46.6ms baseline, up 96.0ms since the last brief; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 45.8ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline, up 57.4ms since the last brief.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (31 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Today
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a series of reports and a documentary focused on securing subsea cables in the Indo-Pacific [1]. The analysis highlights vulnerabilities exposed by Chinese vessel activity and recommends that the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines pool resources to diversify infrastructure [1]. CNAS also advises Taiwan to physically harden its networks and develop non-Starlink satellite options to maintain connectivity during a crisis [1].
Man-made infrastructure failures and hybrid warfare risks
A post on note.com argues that Japan lacks sufficient preparedness for prolonged man-made infrastructure failures, specifically highlighting the risk of Russia or China damaging undersea cables [2]. The post notes that while 70-80% of the 150-200 annual cable faults are accidental, caused by fishing gear or ship anchors, recent incidents near Taiwan in January 2025 and in the Baltic Sea since November 2024 have raised national security concerns regarding 'hybrid warfare' tactics [3]. The author suggests that because intentional damage can disrupt global finance and government communications without direct military conflict, individuals and communities should develop manual backups to maintain essential functions if digital systems remain offline for weeks [2, 3].
Black Sea Maritime Security and Infrastructure
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is scheduled to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul on October 31 to discuss Black Sea security and bilateral cooperation [5]. The talks will address Turkish proposals to protect civilian commercial vessels in the Black Sea and efforts to restore energy infrastructure [5]. While the meeting focuses on the broader conflict and peace talks, it highlights Türkiye's role in seeking a maritime security agreement to protect commercial interests in the region [5].
Data Localisation and Infrastructure Readiness
The National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) reported that only 59% of surveyed financial institutions are expected to meet the January 1, 2027, deadline for local storage of critical financial data [6]. While 79% of digital infrastructure providers are prepared to accommodate these new workloads, many institutions face implementation hurdles regarding budgeting, contracting, and system migration [6]. The findings, presented during a joint regulatory dialogue in Lagos involving the CBN and NITDA, highlight significant gaps in infrastructure deployment and regulatory coordination that could impact compliance by the 2027 deadline [6].
References
- Sharper: Securing Critical Infrastructure (cnas.org)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · cnas.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, PH, JP, US, INT - Preparedness for natural disasters has become established. But what if man-made infrastructure failures are prolonged? (note.com)
Published: 29 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: JP, RU, CN, TW, INT - What happens to the world if submarine cables are cut ? Communication infrastructure and national security (note.com)
Published: 31 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, INT - [New Release] The Night Tokyo Cut Us Off, We Hardwired the Undersea Cable., Announcement of the Novel 'Protocol of the Isolated Node' (Chapter 1 Free Full Text) (note.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 30 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: speculation · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, SG - Zelenskyy to visit Erdogan in Istanbul for Black Sea security, Ukraine peace talks (turkiyetoday.com)
Published: 30 Oct 2026 · turkiyetoday.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: UA, TR, RU - Only 59% ready for data localisation January deadline, NITDA (nannews.ng)
Published: 31 Oct 2026 · nannews.ng · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: NG
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
29 Oct 04:43 UTCIdentified: Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.26 Oct 05:22 UTCIdentified: Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.
page last checked 2026-11-01 15:14 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
27 Oct 04:53 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
page last checked 2026-11-01 15:13 UTC · https://www.gslstatus.com/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-11-01 13:24 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 1 Nov 07:12 UTC (headed 1 Nov 06:00 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 01/11/2026 17:00 AEDT Start Date: 04/04/2026 16:10 AEDT Please be advised that restoration activities for the Indigo West Segment 1A fault are continuing. The repair team is currently carrying out further testing and investigation as part of the repair works. The restoration schedule remains subject to the outcome of these activities, weather conditions and operational requirements. Indigo West remains offline while repair activities continue. …
page last checked 2026-11-01 15:14 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 17 documents, last 2026-10-29 (quiet 4d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.4ms, +140.8ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 315.6ms (+139.8ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 143.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 72 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 2 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 182.3ms (+45.8ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 132.9ms; queuing 0.5ms; 72 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.5ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.4ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 72 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.9ms (+64.7ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 181.0ms; queuing 0.6ms; 72 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 11/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 51.4ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 64.1ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 143.1ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 0/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 52.9ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/61 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.0ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.4ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 23/100 paths direct (normally 28)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 41/65 paths direct (normally 49)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 5/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.6ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 200/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-27unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 587 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 8 source(s). Generated 2026-11-01 16:01 UTC.