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1 November 2026 · Issue 100

CNAS Report Urges Allied Cooperation to Secure Indo-Pacific Subsea Cables

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a series of reports and a documentary highlighting vulnerabilities in regional undersea infrastructure. The analysis calls for a shared database of cable-cutting incidents and increased physical hardening of networks.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (31 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Today

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) released a series of reports and a documentary focused on securing subsea cables in the Indo-Pacific [1]. The analysis highlights vulnerabilities exposed by Chinese vessel activity and recommends that the U.S., Japan, and the Philippines pool resources to diversify infrastructure [1]. CNAS also advises Taiwan to physically harden its networks and develop non-Starlink satellite options to maintain connectivity during a crisis [1].

Man-made infrastructure failures and hybrid warfare risks

A post on note.com argues that Japan lacks sufficient preparedness for prolonged man-made infrastructure failures, specifically highlighting the risk of Russia or China damaging undersea cables [2]. The post notes that while 70-80% of the 150-200 annual cable faults are accidental, caused by fishing gear or ship anchors, recent incidents near Taiwan in January 2025 and in the Baltic Sea since November 2024 have raised national security concerns regarding 'hybrid warfare' tactics [3]. The author suggests that because intentional damage can disrupt global finance and government communications without direct military conflict, individuals and communities should develop manual backups to maintain essential functions if digital systems remain offline for weeks [2, 3].

Black Sea Maritime Security and Infrastructure

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is scheduled to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul on October 31 to discuss Black Sea security and bilateral cooperation [5]. The talks will address Turkish proposals to protect civilian commercial vessels in the Black Sea and efforts to restore energy infrastructure [5]. While the meeting focuses on the broader conflict and peace talks, it highlights Türkiye's role in seeking a maritime security agreement to protect commercial interests in the region [5].

Data Localisation and Infrastructure Readiness

The National Information Technology Development Agency (NITDA) reported that only 59% of surveyed financial institutions are expected to meet the January 1, 2027, deadline for local storage of critical financial data [6]. While 79% of digital infrastructure providers are prepared to accommodate these new workloads, many institutions face implementation hurdles regarding budgeting, contracting, and system migration [6]. The findings, presented during a joint regulatory dialogue in Lagos involving the CBN and NITDA, highlight significant gaps in infrastructure deployment and regulatory coordination that could impact compliance by the 2027 deadline [6].

References

  1. Sharper: Securing Critical Infrastructure (cnas.org)
    Published: 28 Oct 2026 · cnas.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, PH, JP, US, INT
  2. Preparedness for natural disasters has become established. But what if man-made infrastructure failures are prolonged? (note.com)
    Published: 29 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: JP, RU, CN, TW, INT
  3. What happens to the world if submarine cables are cut ? Communication infrastructure and national security (note.com)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, INT
  4. [New Release] The Night Tokyo Cut Us Off, We Hardwired the Undersea Cable., Announcement of the Novel 'Protocol of the Isolated Node' (Chapter 1 Free Full Text) (note.com)
    Not cited in the text · Published: 30 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: speculation · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: JP, SG
  5. Zelenskyy to visit Erdogan in Istanbul for Black Sea security, Ukraine peace talks (turkiyetoday.com)
    Published: 30 Oct 2026 · turkiyetoday.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: UA, TR, RU
  6. Only 59% ready for data localisation January deadline, NITDA (nannews.ng)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · nannews.ng · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: NG

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 587 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 8 source(s). Generated 2026-11-01 16:01 UTC.