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31 October 2026 · Issue 99

Qcell and Djeliba Leisure Group Sign Fiber Agreement for Tourism Connectivity

The agreement provides high-speed fiber connectivity to five Djeliba properties in The Gambia. The partnership aims to modernize digital services for a sector contributing up to 20 percent of the national GDP.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (30 Oct 16:05 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

Qcell and Djeliba Leisure Group signed a corporate fiber agreement on Friday to provide high-speed connectivity to five properties, including Tamala Beach Resort and Kombo Beach Resort [1]. The agreement will supply an initial combined capacity exceeding 800 megabits per second to improve digital services across The Gambia's tourism sector [1].

Undersea Sensor Development and Maritime Surveillance

The UK Ministry of Defense announced it will lead the development of three advanced undersea payloads, Synthetic Aperture Sonar, a Deployable Anti-Submarine Warfare Sensor, and a Deployable Non-Kinetic Effector, for AUKUS uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) [2]. These systems, expected to be available across AUKUS fleets by 2027, are designed to map the ocean floor, detect threats, and protect critical infrastructure like subsea cables [2]. This project represents the first signature project under AUKUS Pillar II, aiming to integrate autonomous platforms with crewed vessels to extend surveillance and reduce personnel risk [2].

In the Taiwan Strait, China's Ministry of Natural Resources stated that research vessels conducting repeated surveys of seabed topography, water temperatures, and currents between August 10 and August 31, 2026, were performing geological research and resource management [3, 4]. However, Taiwan's National Security Council assessed these movements as coordinated activity to prepare for maritime operations [3, 4]. Analysts note that the gathered marine data is dual-use information that could be utilized for submarine operations, underwater drone deployment, and analysis of undersea cables [3, 4]. Separately, French startup Unseenlabs reported using radio-frequency (RF) satellite data to detect ships in the Strait of Hormuz that were not broadcasting AIS signals, identifying vessels that have intentionally gone dark or are providing false data [5].

Submarine Cable Diagnostics and Infrastructure Security

A technical analysis by MapYourTech details the multi-stage process for locating submarine cable faults, beginning with electrical tests at terminal stations and progressing to optical measurements and at-sea tone tracking [7]. The report explains that different fault types, such as shunt faults or fiber breaks, dictate specific diagnostic methods like COTDR and loop-gain monitoring to help repair ships pinpoint damage and minimize the amount of cable that must be cut [7]. To support this, High Loss Loopback (HLLB) provides a passive optical path within repeaters that reflects light back to the cable station, allowing operators to identify damaged spans and distinguish between amplifier output drops and fiber cuts without active seabed electronics [8].

Regarding infrastructure security, MapYourTech analyzes how submarine ROADM branching units use 'data scrambling', including WSS filtering and delayed-copy self-interference, to protect express trunk traffic from being decoded by branch stations [9]. The analysis notes that these methods are often optical degradation or filtering techniques rather than true encryption, and suggests that OTN payload encryption remains necessary for high-security scenarios [9]. Separately, Paratus Namibia announced it has surpassed 5,000 kilometres of fibre network following a 595-kilometre expansion over the past year [6]. The company, which serves as the landing partner for Google’s Equiano submarine cable, stated the expansion aims to create a more resilient system by combining domestic backhaul with international cable capacity [6].

References

  1. Djeliba Leisure Group, Qcell Sign Fiber Agreement to Strengthen Connectivity in Tourism Sector, Kerr Fatou Online Media House (kerrfatou.com)
    Published: 30 Oct 2026 · kerrfatou.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: ACE · Jurisdictions: GM
  2. UK plans 3 advanced undersea sensor systems for AUKUS submarine fleets (interestingengineering.com)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · interestingengineering.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: XV Excalibur · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US
  3. China Conducts Detailed Surveys in Waters East and South of Taiwan, Likely Accumulating Submarine Operational Data : Global : JKN (news.jkn.co.kr)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · news.jkn.co.kr · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, CN
  4. Nagsagawa ng masusing pagsisiyasat ang Tsina sa silangan at timog na bahagi ng dagat ng Taiwan; posibleng nagtitipon ng datos para sa operasyon ng submarino (news.jkn.co.kr)
    Published: 30 Oct 2026 · news.jkn.co.kr · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: TW, CN
  5. Hidden Ship Activity In The Strait Of Hormuz Dodged Standard Tracking, How Did Satellite Radio Data Catch It? - TechRound (techround.co.uk)
    Published: 30 Oct 2026 · techround.co.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
  6. Paratus Namibia Fibre Network Passes 5,000km After New Expansion (techbooky.com)
    Published: 30 Oct 2026 · techbooky.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Equiano, West Africa Cable System · Jurisdictions: NA, ZA
  7. Fault Location Methods for Submarine Cable Systems, MapYourTech (mapyourtech.com)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · mapyourtech.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
  8. High Loss Loopback (HLLB) in Submarine Cable Repeaters, MapYourTech (mapyourtech.com)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · mapyourtech.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
  9. Data Scrambling in Submarine ROADM Branching Units, MapYourTech (mapyourtech.com)
    Published: 31 Oct 2026 · mapyourtech.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 605 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 8 source(s). Generated 2026-10-31 16:03 UTC.