---
date: 2026-10-30
issue: 98
title: India Identifies Maritime Security and AI as UNSC Priorities
standfirst: India's Permanent Representative to the UN announced strategic priorities
  for its 2028, 2029 non-permanent UN Security Council candidature. The focus centers
  on leveraging technology to enhance maritime domain awareness.
jurisdictions:
- IN
- INT
- EU
- TW
- US
- CN
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 56 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (3 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (35 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 28 Oct (2 days ago); the notice is headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator.  
  Notice: “Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 29 Oct 17:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [GROUP_STEP] at 30 Oct 09:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths stepped, median +19.1ms against each path's own floor. 1 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Fiji [DIRECT_LOST] at 30 Oct 11:00 UTC — direct paths down to 2 of the 6 this route normally holds. Best path 37.2ms -> 37.1ms. 3 of 6 paths stepped with it. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 30 Oct 11:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 30 Oct 13:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 108.8ms -> 136.1ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 70 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 48.2ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in an unspecified location, cause cable cut, 27 Oct 17:15 UTC to 28 Oct 15:30 UTC: “Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)”

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (29 Oct 16:05 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- A USCC report assesses that China views the seabed as a 'sixth operational dimension' and could potentially sever systems including TPU, ORCA, E2A, TPE, PLCN, NCP, and FASTER [3].
- Mango Teleservices Ltd reported that full internet capacity was restored following damage to the SMW3, SMW4, and FLAG systems between Italy and Egypt [13].
- The UK government is consulting on new legislation to replace the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 with modern security obligations for subsea cable infrastructure [11].
- General Luciano Portolano identified the Svalbard Islands as critical nodes for Mediterranean security, noting one of two seabed cables there was severed in 2022 [14].

## Today

India's Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Harish Parvathaneni, stated that maritime security and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are key priorities for the country's 2028, 2029 non-permanent UN Security Council candidature [1]. Parvathaneni emphasized using technology to improve maritime domain awareness and safety while advocating for developing countries to have access to these tools [1]. This announcement comes as India competes against Tajikistan for the sole Asia-Pacific Group seat in the June 2027 elections [1].

## Grey Zone Threats and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

A report commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) assesses Chinese 'gray zone' threats to trans-Pacific subsea cables, identifying the First Island Chain as highly vulnerable [3]. The USCC claims China views the seabed as a 'sixth operational dimension' and utilizes Military-Civil Fusion to develop deep-sea capabilities, such as the Fendouzhe submersible and HSU-001 UUV, to potentially sever systems including TPU, ORCA, E2A, TPE, PLCN, NCP, and FASTER [3]. The report warns that simultaneous disruptions could increase latency by 700 to 900+ milliseconds, though the author notes that many vulnerabilities may stem from U.S. regulatory policies that have fractured the global supply chain [3].

Separate assessments highlight broader systemic risks to undersea and terrestrial infrastructure from hybrid warfare and kinetic strikes. Analyst Rachel Rizzo argues that NATO must establish clear thresholds for 'sub-Article 5' hybrid warfare, which she identifies as including the sabotage of infrastructure like the Baltic Sea undersea cable [2]. Similarly, Philippe Lefevre assesses that the UK is vulnerable to low-tech land sabotage and undersea sabotage designed to exhaust the population and delay military supplies [5]. These reports, alongside UNIDR assessments of kinetic strikes on data centers and satellite ground stations in Europe and the Middle East, underscore the increasing treatment of digital infrastructure as a strategic military target [4].

## Undersea Infrastructure Protection and Maritime Surveillance

Saab unveiled 'Ocean Barrier' on October 28, an integrated underwater surveillance architecture designed to detect and track threats to ports, naval bases, and offshore installations [8]. The system uses a modular three-layer architecture to consolidate sensor data into a single operational picture, though it is not yet fully mature and is expected to be commercially available in the fourth quarter of 2027 [8]. Meanwhile, Ireland and the UK have introduced a new subsea cable security protocol [9].

In the Pacific, the Pacific Center for Island Security (PCIS) hosted a forum on October 23 where experts analyzed China's use of maritime militia and research ships for hydrographic mapping and intelligence gathering [7]. The forum also highlighted the expansion of deep-sea mining lease areas around the Mariana Trench from 35.5 million to 69.1 million acres [7]. Additionally, Infleqtion demonstrated its Tiqker optical atomic clock during the Maritime Big Play Pacific military exercises to test precise timing for navigation and communications in subsea and seabed warfare scenarios, providing a reference independent of GPS [6].

## International Infrastructure Security and Regulatory Trends

The UK government is consulting on new legislation to replace the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 with modern security obligations for subsea cable infrastructure [11]. The proposal would require providers to manage security risks, notify the government of compromises, and inform users of significant risks, with non-compliance penalties potentially reaching £10 million or 10% of worldwide revenue [11]. Additionally, the government is seeking views on a registration framework and national security direction powers to compel urgent actions during acute risks [11].

In the Mediterranean, Mango Teleservices Ltd reported that full internet capacity was restored following damage to three submarine cable systems, SMW3, SMW4, and FLAG, between Italy and Egypt [13]. Meanwhile, Italy's Chief of the Defence Staff, General Luciano Portolano, identified the Arctic and Antarctica as strategically vital for defending Mediterranean security and infrastructure, noting that polar regions house critical submarine cables and data transmission nodes [14]. Portolano specifically highlighted the Svalbard Islands as critical nodes, noting that one of two seabed cables there was severed in January 2022 [14].

## Also noted

- A USCC report warns that trans-Pacific undersea cables face severe vulnerabilities from Chinese military strategy and industry [15].

## References

1. [India Says AI, Maritime Security Key Priorities For Its UNSC Candidature for 2028, 29](https://www.etvbharat.com/en/international/india-says-ai-maritime-security-key-priorities-for-its-unsc-candidature-enn26103000815) (etvbharat.com)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · etvbharat.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, INT · Also reported by: ianslive.in
2. [NATO Cannot Afford Ambiguity In The Face Of Russia’s Hybrid Warfare, Analysis](https://www.eurasiareview.com/30102026-nato-cannot-afford-ambiguity-in-the-face-of-russias-hybrid-warfare-analysis/) (eurasiareview.com)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · eurasiareview.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Vessels named: Eagle S · Jurisdictions: INT, EU
3. [Beneath the Surface: Assessing the U.S.-China Strategic Clash Over Trans-Pacific Subsea Cables](https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/nv/insights/beneath-the-surface) (Submarine Networks)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: TPU, ORCA, E2A, TPE, PLCN, NCP (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: TW, US, CN, JP, PH
4. [SPECIAL FEATURE | Data centers in the crosshairs: Wars in Europe and the Middle East reveal vulnerabilities](https://w.media/special-feature-data-centers-in-the-crosshairs-wars-in-europe-and-the-middle-east-reveal-vulnerabilities/) (W.Media)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · w.media · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, BH, RU, UA, INT
5. [Britain is bracing for the wrong war - by Philippe Lefevre](https://britainsworld.org.uk/p/the-memorandum-55-2026) (britainsworld.org.uk)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · britainsworld.org.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: INT, GB
6. [Infleqtion Demonstrates Timing and Navigation Capabilities During the Maritime Big Play Pacific Military Exercise | Middletown Life](https://lifestyle.middletownlifemagazine.com/story/796525/infleqtion-demonstrates-timing-and-navigation-capabilities-during-the-maritime-big-play-pacific-military-exercise) (lifestyle.middletownlifemagazine.com)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · lifestyle.middletownlifemagazine.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: RV Merlin, XV Excalibur, RJ100 Airborne Technology Demonstrator · Jurisdictions: AU, US, GB
7. [PCIS Forum Balances U.S. - China Geopolitics with Micronesian Human Security | Marianas Press](https://marianaspress.com/news/article/pcis-forum-balances-us-china-geopolitics-with-micronesian-human-security) (marianaspress.com)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · marianaspress.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, AU, INT
8. [Saab Unveils Ocean Barrier as NATO Seeks Stronger Protection for Undersea Infrastructure - Defence Matters](https://defencematters.eu/saab-ocean-barrier-undersea-infrastructure-nato-security) (defencematters.eu)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · defencematters.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
9. [Ireland and UK Introduce New Subsea Cable Security Protocol](https://afloat.ie/port-news/undersea-cables/item/73568-ireland-and-uk-introduce-new-subsea-cable-security-protocol) (afloat.ie)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · afloat.ie · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IE, GB
10. [Trouble is Brewing Under the Ice: The PRC’s Use of Science to Gain Military Advantage in the Arctic](https://sofsupport.org/trouble-is-brewing-under-the-ice-the-prcs-use-of-science-to-gain-military-advantage-in-the-arctic) (sofsupport.org)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 29 Oct 2026 · sofsupport.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: CN, US, INT
11. [A (sub)sea change: the UK government consults on new legislation to protect critical undersea digital infrastructure, Phoebe McGibbon, James Cook](https://thelens.slaughterandmay.com/post/102o6ug/a-subsea-change-the-uk-government-consults-on-new-legislation-to-protect-criti) (thelens.slaughterandmay.com)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · thelens.slaughterandmay.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: GB
12. [Submarine Telecoms Industry Report 2026, 2027, OUT NOW!](https://subtelforum.com/submarine-telecoms-industry-report-2026-2027-out-now/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 29 Oct 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: INT
13. [Mango restores internet capacity](https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-68169) (thedailystar.net)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · thedailystar.net · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, repair · Systems named: SMW3, SMW4, FLAG · Jurisdictions: IT, EG, INT
14. [From weather forecasts to hypersonic missiles to the Russian fleet on the Kola Peninsula: why the Arctic is strategically important for defence](https://en.ilsole24ore.com/art/from-forecasts-weather-hypersonic-missiles-the-russian-fleet-the-kola-peninsula-why-the-arctic-is-strategic-defence-AJw1xvxB) (en.ilsole24ore.com)
   Published: 29 Oct 2026 · en.ilsole24ore.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: IT, NO, FI, RU
15. [USCC report warns China threatens trans-Pacific cables - Newsy Today](https://newsy-today.com/uscc-report-warns-china-threatens-trans-pacific-cables) (newsy-today.com)
   Published: 30 Oct 2026 · newsy-today.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: TPE, PLCN, NCP, FASTER · Jurisdictions: US, CN, TW, JP, PH

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `27 Oct 04:53 UTC` Update: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-30 15:12 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-30 13:34 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 28 Oct 02:13 UTC (headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-30 15:13 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 17 documents, last 2026-10-29 (quiet 2d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.6ms (+115.9ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 144.2ms; queuing 0.5ms; 70 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 182.3ms (+48.2ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 132.9ms; queuing 0.5ms; 70 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.4ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 70 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 265.4ms (+64.4ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 182.9ms; queuing 0.7ms; 70 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 10/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 52.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 63.1ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 109.6ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 51.9ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/61 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.9ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 4/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.4ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.5ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 23/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.8ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 201/289 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-27` unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 601 successful fetches in 24h, 30 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-30 16:05 UTC.</sub>
