Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 82 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
New update, 29 Oct 04:43 UTC (today): “Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 55 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (2 days ago): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (34 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 28 Oct (yesterday); the notice is headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator.
Notice: “Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …” - Measured route: Perth to Oman [GROUP_STEP] at 28 Oct 17:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths stepped, median +114.9ms against each path's own floor. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 28 Oct 19:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 28 Oct 21:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Australia to Guam [RECOVERY] at 28 Oct 22:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 29 Oct 06:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 108.8ms -> 110.0ms. Single vantage, held two hours. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography). Cleared and raised again 1 time(s) within two hours, the last at 29 Oct 10:00 UTC: one episode.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 29 Oct 13:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 69 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 48.2ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in an unspecified location, cause cable cut, 27 Oct 17:15 UTC to 28 Oct 15:30 UTC: “Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)”
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (28 Oct 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- Seismic activity near Palermo, Italy, severed the SMW-4, SAE-ME-WE-3, and SEA-ME-WE-4 cables [1].
- PTCL announced that AAE-1 repairs between Italy and France will cause internet slowdowns in Pakistan until November 2, 2026 [5].
- Microsoft reported Azure cloud delays in the Middle East due to undersea fiber cuts in the Red Sea [6].
- The China Strategic Risks Institute assesses that Chinese-flagged research vessels show a statistically significant association with time spent near subsea infrastructure [3].
- Analyst Can Kasapoğlu assesses that Iran and Houthi proxies are escalating threats against the Africa-Asia-Europe 1, FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network, and Gulf Bridge International cables [4].
Today
Seismic activity near Palermo, Italy, severed the SMW-4, SAE-ME-WE-3, and SEA-ME-WE-4 undersea cables [1]. France Telecom reported that 82 percent of India's voice traffic was out of service following the breaks, while the Internet Service Providers Association warned of slow connectivity for IT and BPO companies as traffic diverts to Pacific links [1]. Bharti Airtel, Reliance Communications, and Tata Communications have initiated repairs, with Reliance Globalcom dispatching a maintenance ship and Tata Communications leveraging alternate routes [1].
Geopolitical Risks and Sabotage Modeling
A report by the China Strategic Risks Institute, commissioned by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ranked 32 U.S. trans-Pacific cable systems based on a sabotage-risk model [3]. The assessment ranked the TPU (wholly owned by Google) third and the ORCA (wholly owned by Meta) fifth for risk, identifying a statistically significant association between Chinese-flagged research vessels and time spent near subsea infrastructure on the high seas [3]. The model used indicators including route depth, shipping density, and Chinese maritime claims to assess links connecting the US to Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines [3].
In the Middle East, analyst Can Kasapoğlu assesses that Iran and Houthi proxies are escalating maritime threats, with the IRGC specifically threatening to attack the Africa-Asia-Europe 1, FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network, and Gulf Bridge International cables [4]. These threats follow Houthi actions that already caused the MV Rubymar to sink and severed three Red Sea cables [4]. Meanwhile, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has called for a new Arctic strategy centered on the Pan-Arctic submarine cable, which connects southwestern Greenland to mainland Europe and Japan, to secure data flows against Russia's military presence and exclude Chinese manufacturers from the supply chain [2].
Red Sea and AAE-1 Cable Disruptions
PTCL announced that internet speeds in Pakistan may slow during peak hours until November 2, 2026, due to emergency repairs on the AAE-1 international submarine cable [5]. The 25,000-kilometer system, which connects Southeast Asia to Europe via Egypt and lands in Karachi, is undergoing repairs on the section between Italy and France [5]. PTCL stated that users are most likely to notice these slowdowns during evening peak hours when accessing services hosted in European countries [5].
Microsoft reported increased delays for its Azure cloud computing platform in parts of the Middle East starting Saturday due to undersea fiber cuts in the Red Sea [6]. The monitoring organization NetBlocks noted that these submarine cable outages have degraded internet connectivity in several countries, including India and Pakistan [6]. While the specific cause of the cuts was not provided, a wionews.com report noted that the region has seen increased anxiety over cable safety since Houthi rebels began attacking merchant vessels in late 2023 [6].
Subsea Infrastructure Security and Defense
Australia's Naval Seaworthiness Authority (ANSA) issued the first Naval Permit to Operate to the Elysium EPL SEASAT Lightfish autonomous vessel, allowing it to participate in Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2026 [8]. This permit was issued following collaboration between ANSA, the Australian Naval Classification Authority, and the Navy AUKUS Pillar II Subsea/Seabed Warfare project team to establish a regulatory framework for experimental autonomous maritime systems [8]. Meanwhile, reports indicate Australia is increasing defenses for critical subsea cables as the seabed is increasingly viewed as a new dimension for military operations [10].
In Southeast Asia, Indonesian Communication and Digital Affairs Minister Meutya Hafid stated that protecting undersea cables is in the mutual interest of Indonesia and Singapore, noting that most cables connecting Singapore pass through Indonesian waters [7]. The European Commission also announced plans for the Pan-Arctic Cable to connect Europe to Greenland, an initiative intended to create a sovereign route to Asia that bypasses the United States and the high-risk Red Sea corridor [9]. Separately, LS Marine Solution began loading subsea power cables onto its GL2030 vessel in South Korea for Malaysia’s Langkawi project, which aims to connect mainland Malaysia to Langkawi Island by the end of 2026 [11].
Regional Infrastructure and Investment Trends
Singapore's Energy Market Authority chief Puah Kok Keong announced that Singapore will use its 2027 chairmanship to advance the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) [12]. The initiative aims to establish a framework for regional submarine power cables and improve cross-border renewable energy trading to address legal and regulatory challenges [12]. Meanwhile, a report by dbr.donga.com notes that the global submarine cable market is projected to reach USD 9.87 billion by 2031 as AI data center demand drives massive private investment [13]. This shift is reflected in projects like Meta's 7,000 km 'PETAL' cable between the US and France and Google's $1 billion trans-Pacific network linking the US and Japan [13].
Also noted
- A post on theweek.in argues that subsea telecom cables have become a 'new Achilles' heel' as the Iran war serves as a nursery for asymmetric warfare and new ways of warfighting [14].
- Australia and the U.S. are testing how underwater drones could keep warships moving through mined sea lanes [15].
- Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis addressed the UN to place maritime security on the global agenda [16].
- Ireland's Minister for Defence Helen McEntee confirmed that a new subsea cable incident reporting protocol between Ireland and the UK has been established [17].
References
- Indian IT services to be hit as undersea cables break down - The Economic Times (economictimes.indiatimes.com)
Published: 29 Oct 2026 · economictimes.indiatimes.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: fault, repair, precedent · Systems named: SMW-4, SAE-ME-WE-3, SEA-ME-WE-4, FLAG EUROPE ASIA, i2i · Jurisdictions: IN, IT, INT - Ursula Von Der Leyen Urges Europe To Rethink Arctic Strategy With Pan-Arctic Submarine Cable: what 8 outlets left out | NewsCord (newscord.org)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · newscord.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Pan-Arctic submarine cable · Jurisdictions: EU, GL, CA, RU, US, JP - Google, Meta Cable Projects Rank Third and Fifth in U.S. Sabotage-Risk Model | TokenPost (tokenpost.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · tokenpost.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: TPU, ORCA, Trans-Pacific Express, E2A · Jurisdictions: US, TW, JP, PH, CN - Iran’s Maritime Threat And The Conflict In Yemen, Analysis (eurasiareview.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · eurasiareview.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Africa-Asia-Europe 1, FLAG Alcatel-Lucent Optical Network, Gulf Bridge International · Vessels named: MV Rubymar · Jurisdictions: IR, YE, SA, AE, BH, KW (+2 more) - Emergency Submarine Cable Repairs May Slow Internet In Pakistan: PTCL - UrduPoint (urdupoint.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · urdupoint.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, repair, policy · Systems named: AAE-1 · Jurisdictions: PK, IT, FR - Internet disruption in Middle East, Asia after ‘undersea fibre cuts’ in Red Sea (wionews.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · wionews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, analysis · Jurisdictions: ID, TW, INT - Indonesia: Protecting undersea cables is in both countries’ interests | Lianhe Zaobao (zaobao.com.sg)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · zaobao.com.sg · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: ID, SG - Lightfish Wins Naval Permit, Clearing Way for Expansion (miragenews.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · miragenews.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: SEASAT Lightfish · Jurisdictions: AU - As US ties fray, Europe plans first undersea cable link to Greenland - Ars Technica (arstechnica.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · arstechnica.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Pan-Arctic Cable · Jurisdictions: EU, GL, CA, JP, KR, US · Also reported by: ua.news - ‘Seabed is becoming a battlefield’: Australia ramps up defences for critical subsea cables (theaustralian.com.au)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · theaustralian.com.au · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: AU - LS Marine Solution Begins Subsea Cable Installation for Malaysia’s Langkawi Project (Telecom Review Asia)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · telecomreviewasia.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Langkawi project · Vessels named: GL2030 · Jurisdictions: MY, KR - Singapore Targets ASEAN Power Grid Progress During 2027 Chairmanship (Telecom Review Asia)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · telecomreviewasia.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: SG, ID, MY, TH, LA - Data moves through undersea optical fiber... Over 99% of intercontinental transmission relies on it (dbr.donga.com)
Published: 27 Oct 2026 · dbr.donga.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: PETAL · Vessels named: Segyero · Jurisdictions: KR, US, FR, JP, AU, TH (+1 more) - OPINION | Subsea telecom cables: World’s new Achilles’ heel? (theweek.in)
Published: 29 Oct 2026 · theweek.in · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: SMW4, IMEWE, MAREA, Juno, Fastnet, Petal (+4 more) · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, TW, ID, SG, AU (+1 more) - Australia and U.S. Test How Underwater Drones Could Keep Warships Moving Through Mined Sea Lanes. (armyrecognition.com)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · armyrecognition.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMAS Yarra, HMNZS Matataua · Jurisdictions: AU, NZ, US, INT - Mitsotakis at the UN: Greece Puts the New Battle for Maritime Security on the Global Agenda (pagenews.gr)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · pagenews.gr · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GR, EU, INT - Govt, UK set up protocol to report subsea cable incidents (rte.ie)
Published: 28 Oct 2026 · rte.ie · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IE, GB
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
29 Oct 04:43 UTCIdentified: Repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage with an ETR on 3 Nov 2026. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.26 Oct 05:22 UTCIdentified: Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.
page last checked 2026-10-29 15:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
27 Oct 04:53 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
page last checked 2026-10-29 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-29 13:48 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 28 Oct 02:13 UTC (headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …
page last checked 2026-10-29 15:09 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 16 documents, last 2026-10-28 (quiet 2d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 315.6ms (+117.6ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 144.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; 69 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 7 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 182.3ms (+48.2ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 133.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; 69 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.5ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 69 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.3ms (+64.7ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 183.1ms; queuing 0.7ms; 69 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 10/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 51.0ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 9.8ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 62.9ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 128.2ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 51.8ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/61 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 36.9ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.4ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 24/100 paths direct (normally 28)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 42/65 paths direct (normally 49)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.4ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 202/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-27unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 612 successful fetches in 24h, 35 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-10-29 16:05 UTC.