---
date: 2026-10-28
issue: 96
title: LS Marine and SK Broadband Sign MOU to Coordinate SJC2 Repairs
standfirst: The agreement establishes a rapid response framework for the SJC2 system
  in high-traffic coastal waters off South Korea. The partnership combines specialized
  vessel access with network monitoring to improve repair preparedness.
jurisdictions:
- KR
- JP
- SG
- TH
- VN
- TW
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 54 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (yesterday): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 81 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 26 Oct 05:22 UTC (2 days ago): “Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (33 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 28 Oct (today); the notice is headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator.  
  **New notice**: “Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …”
- **Measured route**: Australia to Guam [DIRECT_LOST] at 28 Oct 11:00 UTC — direct paths down to 5 of the 13 this route normally holds. Best path 70.5ms -> 70.5ms. 5 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 68 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 45.8ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in an unspecified location, cause cable cut, since 27 Oct 17:15 UTC, still open: “Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)” **New since the last brief.**

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (27 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- AARNet announced that repairs on the Indigo West and ASC cables off Perth will continue into mid-November [7].
- The China Strategic Risks Institute assesses Google’s TPU, Meta’s ORCA, and Verizon’s E2A cables as high-risk for sabotage [2].
- Taiwan's Ocean Affairs Council is developing an autonomous drone swarm system to defend 24 undersea cables from Chinese vessels [8].
- Iranian officials, including Mohsen Rezaei, have threatened to attack undersea internet cables in response to potential U.S. and Israeli airstrikes [10].
- NEQSOL Holding's Digital Silk Way project completed seabed installation for a 380-kilometre Trans-Caspian cable connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan [13].

## Today

LS Marine Solution and SK Broadband signed a memorandum of understanding on October 28, 2026, to coordinate emergency repairs for the SJC2 international submarine telecommunications cable system [1]. The agreement focuses on the 10,500-kilometer cable's shallow coastal waters off Busan, South Korea, where LS Marine Solution will provide specialized vessels like the Segyero and technical expertise while SK Broadband manages network monitoring and materials [1]. This arrangement aims to establish a rapid response framework for potential faults in areas with heavy vessel traffic [1].

## Subsea Infrastructure Security and Sabotage Risk Assessments

The China Strategic Risks Institute identifies Google’s TPU project, Meta’s ORCA cable, and the Verizon co-owned E2A cable as high-risk infrastructure for potential sabotage in waters near Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines [2]. This assessment attributes the risk to shallow-water shipping lanes, territorial claims, and the deployment of seabed-mapping research vessels by China [2]. A subsequent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that expanding military submarine fleets and dual-use cable-cutting technologies further increase these risks [2].

To counter these threats, NATO is increasing surveillance of critical undersea infrastructure through enhanced air and naval patrols in the North and Baltic Seas, including the establishment of a specialized cell at NATO Headquarters in Brussels [4]. The U.S. Marine Corps is deploying approximately four dozen recon and intel specialists to the Baltic Sea to support NATO's Enhanced Vigilance Activity Baltic Sentry operation, providing surveillance to protect undersea internet cables and gas pipelines [3]. In the private sector, Tampnet and Starboard Maritime Intelligence have partnered to integrate Distributed Acoustic Sensing (DAS) and State of Polarisation (SoP) data into an AI-powered platform to create a live threat map for detecting both accidental and intentional threats [6].

## Perth, Singapore Cable Repairs

AARNet announced that repairs on the Indigo West and ASC subsea cables off Perth, which carry the majority of Australia's international communications to Asia and Europe, will continue into mid-November [7]. Repairs on Indigo West are scheduled to begin on 25 October with an early November completion, while ASC repairs are set to start on 3 November with a mid-November completion [7]. AARNet stated that customers may experience higher latency until services are progressively restored [7].

## Maritime Surveillance and Infrastructure Threats

Taiwan's Ocean Affairs Council is developing an autonomous system to coordinate drone swarms for maritime surveillance and defense against Chinese 'grey-zone' tactics [8]. Working with National Cheng Kung University, the council has completed simulations of two 10-unit drone fleets and is moving toward flight trials using Western-made drones to protect 24 undersea cables from Chinese vessels [8]. Meanwhile, staff from the 8th Theater Sustainment Command assessed that a Chinese government oceanographic vessel conducted an unapproved incursion into Palau’s exclusive economic zone in July 2026 [9]. The authors argue that because the vessel failed to provide the six months' notice required by UNCLOS, any bathymetric mapping or sensor deployment constitutes a violation of international law, noting that such fleets frequently loiter near strategic undersea communication cables [9].

In the Middle East, Iranian officials, including Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei, have threatened to attack undersea internet cables and other critical infrastructure in response to potential U.S. and Israeli airstrikes [10]. U.S. officials stated that military forces are prepared to launch major operations against Iran within 96 hours of an order from President Trump, with three aircraft carriers and an amphibious readiness group deploying to the region [10].

## International Infrastructure and Repair Developments

Subsea Commercial Services Ltd (SCS) has secured global commercial exclusivity for Dead Reckoning Engineering’s (DRE) Reusable Subsea Cable Mould Kits [11]. This partnership allows operators to manufacture and repair micro-circular subsea cable assemblies in-house and offshore, which SCS claims will reduce reliance on specialist manufacturers and minimize costly downtime by enabling field repairs at the point of need [11]. In the German North Sea, grid operator 50Hertz has selected Fugro to perform seabed surveys and unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal for the LanWin3 and LanWin6 projects [12]. These surveys are intended to clear routes for high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cables connecting offshore wind farms to the German electricity grid [12].

NEQSOL Holding's Digital Silk Way project has completed seabed installation for a 380-kilometre Trans-Caspian subsea cable connecting Aktau, Kazakhstan, to Sumgayit, Azerbaijan [13]. NEQSOL Holding's Kirill Rubinski and AzerTelecom's Emil Masimov stated the project aims to provide South Asian markets with an alternative route to Europe to mitigate risks from high-traffic bottlenecks like the Red Sea [13]. While the Caspian crossing adds a new path, the project's value depends on establishing commercial partnerships and onward connections to make the full route usable for operators [13]. Separately, Virgin Media O2 is rolling out 2Gbit/s 'Gig2' services over its existing DOCSIS-based hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) network across England [14].

## Data Center and Infrastructure Security Trends

A post on note.com argues that JESCO Holdings (1434) is positioned as a growth stock due to its expansion into security for data centers, defense facilities, and national infrastructure [15]. The author notes a 19% year-on-year sales increase in the company's high-margin telecommunications system sector for the fiscal year ending August 2026, suggesting a shift in market valuation from a traditional construction firm toward a security and infrastructure stock [15].

## Also noted

- Ars Technica reports that subsea cable projects owned by US companies such as Google and Meta face significant risks from deep-sea sabotage in the Pacific [16].

## References

1. [LS Marine, SK Broadband Strengthen SJC2 Repairs](https://subtelforum.com/ls-marine-sk-broadband-strengthen-sjc2-repairs/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair, policy · Systems named: SJC2 · Vessels named: Segyero · Jurisdictions: KR, JP, SG · Also reported by: telecompaper.com
2. [Google and Meta Pacific Subsea Cables Face High Sabotage Risk - Archynewsy](https://archynewsy.com/google-and-meta-pacific-subsea-cables-face-high-sabotage-risk) (archynewsy.com)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · archynewsy.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: TPU project, ORCA cable, E2A cable · Jurisdictions: TW, JP, PH, US, KR
3. [US Marines join NATO mission in the Baltic Sea to protect undersea cables from sabotage as Russia continues to lurk, 'around four dozen' recon and intel specialists deployed to deter seabed threats ...](https://tomshardware.com/tech-industry/us-marines-join-nato-mission-in-the-baltic-sea-to-protect-undersea-cables-from-sabotage-as-russia-continues-to-lurk-around-four-dozen-recon-and-intel-specialists-deployed-to-deter-seabed-threats) (tomshardware.com)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: FI, SE, INT
4. [DVIDS - Video - Sabotage at sea: How NATO protects critical undersea infrastructure mastersubs](https://www.dvidshub.net/video/977068/sabotage-sea-nato-protects-critical-undersea-infrastructure-mastersubs) (dvidshub.net)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · dvidshub.net · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: INT
5. [Russian Civilian Vessels Identified Monitoring Transatlantic Submarine Cables | Kantan.News](https://kantan.news/news/russian-civilian-vessels-identified-monitoring-transatlantic-submarine-cables) (kantan.news)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 27 Oct 2026 · kantan.news · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: seabed_security, vessel_activity · Jurisdictions: INT
6. [DPA Magazine | New partnership to advance “unprecedented” subsea cable protection](https://www.dpaonthenet.net/article/216968/New-partnership-to-advance-unprecedented-subsea-cable-protection.aspx) (dpaonthenet.net)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · dpaonthenet.net · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
7. [AARNet says Perth, Singapore cable repairs will run into mid November · Best Effort](https://besteffort.au/editions/2026-10-26/aarnet-says-perth-singapore-cable-repairs-will-run-into-mid-november-f251) (besteffort.au)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · besteffort.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair, fault, analysis · Systems named: Indigo West, ASC · Jurisdictions: AU, SG
8. [Taiwan working on autonomous drone swarms to counter China’s increasingly aggressive grey-zone military tactics, island has already completed flight simulations, now working towards flight trials ...](https://tomshardware.com/tech-industry/drones/taiwan-working-on-autonomous-drone-swarms-to-counter-chinas-increasingly-aggressive-grey-zone-military-tactics-island-has-already-completed-flight-simulations-now-working-towards-flight-trials-over-maritime-areas) (tomshardware.com)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: TW, CN
9. [China’s Illicit Incursion Into Palau’s Exclusive Economic Zone Raises Legal Concerns - Eurasia Review](https://eurasiareview.com/28102026-chinas-illicit-incursion-into-palaus-exclusive-economic-zone-raises-legal-concerns) (eurasiareview.com)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · eurasiareview.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: Xiang Yang Hong-01, Ji Di · Jurisdictions: AU, TW, INT
10. [Apocalyptic Scenario: Iran Is Threatening To Attack Oil Producing Facilities, Undersea Internet Cables, Desalination Plants And The Dimona Nuclear Reactor](https://mycharisma.com/most-recent/apocalyptic-scenario-iran-is-threatening-to-attack-oil-producing-facilities-undersea-internet-cables-desalination-plants-and-the-dimona-nuclear-reactor/) (mycharisma.com)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · mycharisma.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: USS Theodore Roosevelt, USS George Washington, USS George H.W. Bush, USS Makin Island, USS Boxer · Jurisdictions: IR, IL, US, INT
11. [Scottish subsea companies partner to take underwater cable repair capability offshore - Aberdeen Business News](https://aberdeenbusinessnews.co.uk/scottish-subsea-companies-partner-to-take-underwater-cable-repair-capability-offshore/) (aberdeenbusinessnews.co.uk)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · aberdeenbusinessnews.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair · Jurisdictions: INT
12. [Fugro selected by 50Hertz to secure the seabed for two offshore wind connection projects](https://www.ideal-investisseur.fr/en/stock-news/fugro-selected-by-50hertz-to-secure-the-seabed-for-two-offshore-wind-connection-projects/27975.html) (ideal-investisseur.fr)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · ideal-investisseur.fr · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: LanWin3, LanWin6 · Jurisdictions: DE
13. [What Digital Silk Way Could Mean for South Asia](https://www.ibtimes.sg/what-digital-silk-way-could-mean-south-asia-95616) (ibtimes.sg)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · ibtimes.sg · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, precedent · Systems named: SEA-ME-WE-4, IMEWE, SEA-ME-WE-5 · Vessels named: Rubymar · Jurisdictions: PK, KZ, AZ, INT
14. [Eurobites: Virgin Media O2 rolls out 2Gbit/s service over cable](https://www.lightreading.com/cable-technology/eurobites-virgin-media-o2-rolls-out-2gbit-s-service-over-cable) (Light Reading)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · lightreading.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
15. [JESCO Holdings (1434): A Security and Defense Stock for Data Centers!?](https://note.com/buffekk/n/n15c7cdae03b0?hl=en) (note.com)
   Published: 28 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: JP
16. [China’s snooping around Pacific undersea cables raises risks for Big Tech](https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2026/10/google-and-meta-subsea-cables-among-most-at-risk-from-sabotage-in-pacific/) (arstechnica.com)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · arstechnica.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: TW, CN, US, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `27 Oct 04:53 UTC` Update: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-28 15:12 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `26 Oct 05:22 UTC` Identified: Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-28 15:13 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-28 13:30 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 28 Oct 02:13 UTC (headed 25 Oct 23:30 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 26/10/2026 10:30 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West Segment 1A fault and coordinate with the relevant teams on restoration activities. Loading of the required spare cable and jointing equipment has been completed, and the repair vessel is currently awaiting customs clearance prior to departure for the repair site. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-28 15:13 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 16 documents, last 2026-10-28 (quiet 1d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.5ms (+82.3ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 149.7ms; queuing 0.6ms; 68 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 11 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 182.3ms (+45.8ms per probe against its own history, 17 probes); ocean crossing 133.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 68 days of history; clean crossing (17 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.6ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 24.6ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 68 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 265.0ms (+46.8ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 184.4ms; queuing 0.6ms; 68 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 5/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 49.2ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.0ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 61.8ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 40 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 128.4ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 50.6ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/61 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.3ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.0ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.5ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 22/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 43/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.4ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 2/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 135.9ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 208/289 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-27` unspecified — NETWORK — Damage to two international fiber optic links on Route Nationale 1 caused a complete outage on Digicel Haiti (AS27653)

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 598 successful fetches in 24h, 30 errors across 12 source(s). Generated 2026-10-28 16:04 UTC.</sub>
