---
date: 2026-10-27
issue: 95
title: Papua New Guinea Launches Cybersecurity Bill to Secure Digital Infrastructure
standfirst: The new legislation establishes a National Cyber Security Center to monitor
  infrastructure and mandate incident reporting. The framework aims to secure digital
  payments and e-visas for international travelers.
jurisdictions:
- PG
- AU
- 'NO'
- DE
- CN
- SG
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 53 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  **New update**, 27 Oct 04:53 UTC (today): “SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.”
- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 80 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 26 Oct 05:22 UTC (yesterday): “Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (32 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (8 days ago); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.  
  Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …”
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 67 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 48.2ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (26 Oct 21:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- Australia, the UK, and the US announced a trilateral project to develop underwater drone technology by 2027 to protect subsea cables [7].
- Samuel Bashfield of La Trobe University assesses that Chinese Coast Guard harassment is forcing developers to reroute projects like TalayLink and Asia Connect [3, 7].
- Windward identified two OFAC-sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers drifting near corridors for the AAE-1, 2Africa, FALCON, GBI, IMEWE, and SeaMeWe-4 cables [9].
- The FCC approved GCI Holdings LLC’s acquisition of indirect control over Quintillion Subsea Operations, connecting Prudhoe Bay to Nome [11].
- Meta announced plans for Petal, a 7,000-kilometer transoceanic cable system connecting the US and France, scheduled for 2029 [13].

## Today

Papua New Guinea has launched the Cybersecurity Bill 2026 to secure digital travel processes and infrastructure [1]. The initiative, led by the Department of Information and Communications Technology, establishes a National Cyber Security Center to monitor infrastructure and mandates 24-hour incident reporting [1]. The security framework is intended to support the Coral Sea Cable System connecting Port Moresby to Sydney and the Kumul Submarine Cable Network [1].

## Maritime Security and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The Norwegian Maritime Authority detained the Chinese-owned heavy-lift vessel Ya Qing Hai Yang (IMO 1021570) after it was found sailing under a false Guatemalan flag without valid certificates [2]. The vessel remained in the Vesterålen archipelago for over 10 days, an area near the Svalbard undersea cable system, while the German Navy replenishment ship Berlin (A1411) conducted repeated passes nearby [2]. Meanwhile, a Strategy Review analysis notes that while most seabed damage is caused by accidents, insurers may soon exclude sabotage from coverage, and a 2025 SubOptic Association study warns that two-thirds of cable repair ships will reach their end of life by 2040 [4].

Geopolitical competition is driving infrastructure rerouting, with companies like Google and Meta moving cables such as TalayLink, Echo, Asia Connect, and the Pacific Light Cable Network to avoid Chinese maritime chokepoints [3]. Samuel Bashfield of La Trobe University assesses that Chinese coastguard vessels harass maintenance teams and impose burdensome licensing on non-Chinese projects in the South China Sea [3]. In response, the US, Australia, and the UK are developing underwater drone technology by 2027 to protect these cables [3].

## Subsea Infrastructure Security and Regional Cooperation

Australia, the UK, and the US have announced a trilateral project to develop underwater drone technology by 2027 specifically to protect subsea cables [7]. This move follows reports from research fellow Samuel Bashfield that Chinese Coast Guard harassment and onerous permitting requirements are forcing developers to reroute major projects, such as Google’s TalayLink, the Asia Connect Cable System, and the Pacific Light Cable Network, away from the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca [7]. Concurrently, the Australian-led Exercise Dugong commenced off the east coast of New South Wales this month, involving the Royal Australian Navy, Royal New Zealand Navy, and US Navy to practice tactics for identifying and neutralizing underwater threats [6].

In the Indian Ocean and Gulf regions, security efforts are diversifying through both diplomatic and operational channels. Government representatives from Bangladesh, Maldives, Mauritius, Oman, South Africa, and Sri Lanka met in Colombo for a workshop hosted by Australia’s Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre (CCRC) to establish policy and regulatory frameworks for cable protection and maritime access [5]. Meanwhile, Windward identified two OFAC-sanctioned, Iran-linked tankers drifting for 73 and 115 hours respectively in September and October 2026 near corridors for the AAE-1, 2Africa, FALCON, GBI, IMEWE, and SeaMeWe-4 cables [9]. These movements occurred shortly before an October 19 statement by IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi regarding potential threats to seven major internet cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz [9].

## International Infrastructure and Regulatory Developments

The FCC approved GCI Holdings LLC’s $310 million acquisition of indirect control over Quintillion Subsea Operations on October 20, 2026 [11]. The approval includes conditions for GCI to provide non-discriminatory wholesale access and honor existing pricing for the 1,176-mile submarine system connecting Prudhoe Bay, Utqiagvik/Barrow, Wainwright, Point Hope, Kotzebue, and Nome [11]. In Belize, the Toledo Institute for Development and Environment (TIDE) stated that the proposed Trans Americas Fiber System (TAFS) TAM-1 cable through the Sapodilla Cayes Marine Reserve is expected to have minimal environmental impact as the route avoids sensitive habitats like coral reefs [12].

An analysis by allAfrica.com and africanarguments.org warns of a critical shortage of subsea repair vessels in Sub-Saharan Africa, noting the region relies on a single 44-year-old vessel to maintain systems including MainOne, WACS, ACE, SAT-3, SEACOM, and EASSy [10]. The report highlights that current repair capacity may be insufficient to handle simultaneous faults on new systems like Via Africa and the ReuNION Cable, citing a 2024 incident where the C.S Sovereign took over a month to repair the ACE cable [10].

## Hyperscaler Infrastructure Expansion and Market Trends

Meta has announced plans for Petal, a 7,000-kilometer transoceanic cable system connecting the US and France [13]. The system is designed to carry 1 petabit per second and is scheduled to enter service in 2029, with partners including NEC, Sumitomo Electric, and Orange [13]. Other systems noted in the market include the I-2SEA cable (IN, MY, SG), Google's America-India Connect (IN, SG, ZA, AU), the 2Africa capacity activation in AE, and the I-AM system (JP, MY, SG, KR) [13].

Openpr.com reports that these projects highlight a trend of hyperscalers increasingly financing and shaping subsea infrastructure to meet international data capacity demands [13]. The report also notes that communication cables are being complemented by a growing demand for subsea power cables to support offshore renewable energy [13].

## Also noted

- PRESDA published an overview of submarine internet cables, covering optical technology, installation, ownership, and global routes [14].

## References

1. [PNG Launches Cybersecurity Bill 2026 for Safe Travel](https://nomadlawyer.org/papua-new-guinea-cybersecurity-bill-2026-secure-digital-payments-e-visas) (nomadlawyer.org)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · nomadlawyer.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Coral Sea Cable System, Kumul Submarine Cable Network · Jurisdictions: PG, AU
2. [Chinese Heavy-Lift Ships Remain Off Northern Norway as German Navy Vessel Patrols Area](https://en.highnorthnews.com/politics/chinese-heavy-lift-ships-remain-off-northern-norway-as-german-navy-vessel-patrols-area/1123156) (en.highnorthnews.com)
   Published: 23 Oct 2026 · en.highnorthnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, seabed_security · Systems named: Svalbard undersea cable system · Vessels named: Ya Qing Hai Yang, IMO 1021570, Jian Yang Cheng He, IMO 9813137, Berlin, A1411 · Jurisdictions: NO, DE, CN
3. [From Chips to the Seabed: US-China Rivalry Targets the Internet’s Arteries - En.ImArabic](https://en.imarabic.com/from-chips-to-the-seabed-us-china-rivalry-targets-the-internets-arteries) (en.imarabic.com)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · en.imarabic.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Systems named: TalayLink, Echo, Asia Connect, Pacific Light Cable Network · Jurisdictions: AU, SG, ID, TW, US, CN (+2 more)
4. [[Arctic Maritime Strategy] The Economics of North Atlantic Security: Energy, Infrastructure and Defense Investment | Strategy Review, The Economy](https://economy.ac/review/2026/10/202610300274) (economy.ac)
   Published: 25 Oct 2026 · economy.ac · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, policy · Systems named: SHEFA-2 · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, IE, IS, FO, INT
5. [Representatives from South Asia and the Indian Ocean strengthen cooperation on secure and resilient subsea cables | Cable Connectivity & Resilience Centre](https://www.ccrc.gov.au/news-and-media/representatives-south-asia-and-indian-ocean-strengthen-cooperation-secure-and-resilient-subsea-cables) (Cable Connectivity & Resilience Centre, news and media)
   Published: not dated by the source · ccrc.gov.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: AU, BD, MV, MU, OM, ZA (+3 more)
6. [Divers sharpen safety skills](https://www.2st.com.au/local-news/locals/image-abis-taylor-johnson/) (2st.com.au)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · 2st.com.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, NZ, US
7. [The Geopolitical Battle for Asia-Pacific Undersea Cables - World Today News](https://world-today-news.com/the-geopolitical-battle-for-asia-pacific-undersea-cables) (world-today-news.com)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · world-today-news.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Systems named: TalayLink, Asia Connect Cable System, Pacific Light Cable Network · Jurisdictions: AU, SG, ID, TW, US, GB (+3 more)
8. [Some Gulf states are talking to Iran about a new regional security plan](https://www.irishtimes.com/world/2026/10/27/some-gulf-states-are-talking-to-iran-about-a-new-regional-security-plan/) (irishtimes.com)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 27 Oct 2026 · irishtimes.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, SA, INT
9. [Iran's subsea cable threats put unusual tanker movements under scrutiny - SAFETY4SEA](https://safety4sea.com/irans-subsea-cable-threats-put-unusual-tanker-movements-under-scrutiny) (safety4sea.com)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · safety4sea.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: AAE-1, 2Africa, FALCON, Gulf Bridge International, GBI, IMEWE (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: IR, OM, QA, KW, BH, AE (+1 more)
10. [Africa: Laying On Thin Water - the Looming Danger of Sub-Saharan Africa's Subsea Repair Vessel Deficit - allAfrica.com](https://allafrica.com/stories/202610270062.html) (allafrica.com)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · allafrica.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Systems named: Via Africa, ReuNION Cable, MainOne, West Africa Cable System (WACS), Africa Coast to Europe (ACE), South Atlantic-3 (SAT-3) (+2 more) · Vessels named: Léon Thévenin, C.S Sovereign · Jurisdictions: TW, INT · Also reported by: africanarguments.org
11. [FCC Clears GCI’s Quintillion Acquisition](https://subtelforum.com/fcc-clears-gci-s-quintillion-acquisition/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   Published: 27 Oct 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Quintillion · Jurisdictions: US
12. [A Proposed Submarine Cable Through the Sapodilla Cayes: Should There Be Concern?](https://greaterbelize.com/a-proposed-submarine-cable-through-the-sapodilla-cayes-should-there-be-concern) (greaterbelize.com)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · greaterbelize.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Trans Americas Fiber System (TAFS) TAM-1 · Jurisdictions: BZ
13. [Submarine Cable Systems Market: Meta's Planned Petal Cable Targets 1 Petabit per Second](https://www.openpr.com/news/4672837/submarine-cable-systems-market-meta-s-planned-petal-cable) (openpr.com)
   Published: 26 Oct 2026 · openpr.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Petal, I-2SEA, America-India Connect, 2Africa, I-AM · Jurisdictions: US, FR, IN, SG, MY, JP (+4 more)
14. [Undersea Cables: How the World Connects | PRESDA](https://presda.com/articles/undersea-cables-hidden-network-connecting-world) (presda.com)
   Published: 22 Oct 2026 · presda.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Systems named: TAT-1, TAT-8 · Jurisdictions: INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `27 Oct 04:53 UTC` Update: SUBCO has provided an update on Indigo West: The repair vessel has arrived at the fault location and began setup for electroding and Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) inspection of the cable damage. Repair operations are underway and we will provide further updates as they become available.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-27 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `26 Oct 05:22 UTC` Identified: Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-27 15:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-27 13:45 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-27 15:09 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 11d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.6ms (+117.0ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.0ms; queuing 0.4ms; 67 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 10 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 182.3ms (+48.2ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; 67 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.6ms; typical path 29.5ms (+0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.4ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 67 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 265.4ms (+64.5ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 164.1ms; queuing 0.6ms; 67 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 48.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 9.5ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 61.9ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 123.5ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 50.6ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 8/58 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 30/100 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 50/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 248/289 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 610 successful fetches in 24h, 35 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-27 16:03 UTC.</sub>
