---
date: 2026-10-25
issue: 93
title: UK Government Proposes New Legislation to Secure Undersea Infrastructure
standfirst: A new White Paper outlines plans to modernize legal protections for subsea
  telecoms cables and pipelines. The government is seeking private sector and maritime
  consultation on the proposals.
jurisdictions:
- GB
- GR
- CY
- SA
- FR
- INT
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 79 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  **New update**, 26 Oct 05:22 UTC (today): “Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 52 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (19 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (31 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (7 days ago); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.  
  Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 24 Oct 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 25 Oct 13:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 109.2ms -> 145.1ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 25 Oct 23:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 26 Oct 10:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 108.8ms -> 108.8ms. Single vantage, held two hours. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured corridor** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 66 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 48.2ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (24 Oct 16:06 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- The UK government published a White Paper proposing legislative reforms to protect undersea infrastructure carrying 99% of its international data [1].
- Oleksiy Dushka assesses that Russia is using civilian fishing vessels to map undersea cables near the UK for potential sabotage [3].
- Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officials threatened to target seven undersea cables in the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global commerce [5, 6].
- Bulk Infrastructure proposed Project Leif Erikson, a $620 million cable system to connect Norway to Canada while bypassing the United States [9].

## Today

The UK government has published a White Paper titled ‘Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience: Proposals for modernising the UK’s legislation’ to address risks from accidents and sabotage [1]. The proposals aim to reform legislation protecting infrastructure that carries 99% of the UK’s international data traffic and approximately three-quarters of its gas supply [1]. The government is currently seeking consultation from private sector owners, maritime and fishing organisations, and technology providers [1].

## Suspected Interference and Anchor Drag

A report by journalist Oleksiy Dushka on 24tv.ua assesses that Russia is conducting a large-scale intelligence campaign using civilian fishing vessels to map undersea cables near the United Kingdom [3]. Dushka's assessment suggests these activities are intended to facilitate potential sabotage that could paralyze international financial systems and blind NATO's intelligence exchange [3]. While the report links these actions to a broader shift toward hybrid warfare, it does not name specific cable systems or provide evidence of a confirmed breach.

## Iranian Threats to Strait of Hormuz Subsea Cables

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officials have threatened to target seven undersea internet cables in the Strait of Hormuz to disrupt global commerce and deter U.S. military action [5]. A post on devotedmovement.substack.com reports that Iranian armed forces chief of staff Ali Abdollahi stated the Strait of Hormuz will only reopen if Washington accepts Tehran's demands, specifically detailing plans to cut cables along the Gulf floor [6]. While Iran claims its economy is less reliant on the internet and has established an alternative line with Oman, analysts warn that such actions could lead to a Pyrrhic victory by inviting international retaliation and naval intervention [5].

Separate reporting on mablong.substack.com highlights the broader vulnerability of the 'Undersea Kingdom,' citing specific incidents of subversion such as the Yi Peng 3 severing two data cables in November 2024 and the Eagle S damaging the Estlink 2 power cable and four data cables in December 2024 [4]. The post argues that the ability to sever a country's undersea communications can effectively blind it, framing seabed infrastructure security as a critical issue for national resilience [4].

## Regional Infrastructure Development and Sovereign Routing

Bulk Infrastructure has proposed Project Leif Erikson, a $620 million undersea cable project spanning 2,800 miles to connect Norway to Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Canada [9]. The project is currently in the planning and funding stage, requiring official approval from Canada and the European Union, and aims to create a 'sovereign cable system' that bypasses the United States to reduce Canada's reliance on U.S.-connected fiber-optic routes [9]. Meanwhile, leaders of 10 regional organizations, including the Hampton Roads Alliance, issued a statement asserting that the region is implementing the 'Hampton Roads Playbook' to attract private investment in defense, energy, aerospace, and logistics [8]. This strategy has already resulted in $1.37 billion in investments from LS GreenLink and LS Cable & System for a submarine cable plant and copper product manufacturing in Chesapeake [8].

## References

1. [Proposals for new legislation to strengthen the security and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) - GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/proposals-for-new-legislation-to-strengthen-the-security-and-resilience-of-critical-undersea-infrastructure-cui) (gov.uk)
   Published: 22 Oct 2026 · gov.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB
2. [Undersea Cable Surveys in the Eastern Mediterranean set to Resume](https://en.politis.com.cy/news/politics/1057261/undersea-cable-surveys-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-set-to-resume) (en.politis.com.cy)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 24 Oct 2026 · en.politis.com.cy · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis · Systems named: GSI cable · Vessels named: Abeille Marengo, KOBI RUEGG · Jurisdictions: GR, CY, SA, FR
3. [Russia Is Looking for NATO's Weak Spot, While Trump Is Preparing a Major Deal: What Does This Mean for Ukraine?](https://24tv.ua/en/russia-may-strike-at-nato-what-weak-spot-has-russian-intelligence_n3166837) (24tv.ua)
   Published: 24 Oct 2026 · 24tv.ua · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, INT
4. [From my Bookshelf: Elisabeth Braw’s ‘The Undersea War’](https://mablong.substack.com/p/from-my-bookshelf-elisabeth-braws) (mablong.substack.com)
   Published: 25 Oct 2026 · mablong.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Balticconnector, Estlink 2 · Vessels named: NewNew Polar Bear, Yi Peng 3, Eagle S · Jurisdictions: AU, INT, FI, SE
5. [What Might Happen If Iran Makes Good on Threats to Sever Undersea Cables - Middle East Forum](https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/what-might-happen-if-iran-makes-good-on-threats-to-sever-undersea-cables) (meforum.org)
   Published: 24 Oct 2026 · meforum.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: IR, QA, US, INT
6. [Previously on Gilead: Department of Love Briefing](https://devotedmovement.substack.com/p/previously-on-gilead-department-of-122) (devotedmovement.substack.com)
   Published: 25 Oct 2026 · devotedmovement.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, INT
7. [What would happen if Iran attacks submarine cables beneath the Strait of Hormuz? | The Business Standard](https://tbsnews.net/videos/tbs-world/what-would-happen-if-iran-attacks-submarine-cables-beneath-strait-hormuz-1581551) (tbsnews.net)
   Not cited in the text · Published: 24 Oct 2026 · tbsnews.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, INT
8. [Column: ODU named our opportunities. The region has a plan to capture them., The Virginian-Pilot](https://pilotonline.com/2026/10/24/column-odu-named-our-opportunities-the-region-has-a-plan-to-capture-them) (pilotonline.com)
   Published: 24 Oct 2026 · pilotonline.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT, US
9. [2,800 Mile Undersea Data Cable Plan Leaves The US Out In The Cold - SlashGear](https://www.slashgear.com/2296109/norwegian-undersea-data-cable-no-us-connection/) (slashgear.com)
   Published: 24 Oct 2026 · slashgear.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Project Leif Erikson · Jurisdictions: CA, NO, INT

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `26 Oct 05:22 UTC` Identified: Latest update regarding the subsea cable fault on Indigo West cable. Repair vessel has now been mobilised and began transit to the repair site. Repairs are expected to commence on 25 Oct 2026 and ETR is on 3 Nov 2026.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-26 20:14 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `7 Oct 08:12 UTC` Update: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-26 20:14 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-26 19:30 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
  - Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-26 20:14 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 10d)

**Measured corridors** (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline**; typical path 315.7ms (+117.6ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 66 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 21 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.4ms (+48.2ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.8ms; queuing 0.5ms; 66 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.5ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.2ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 66 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline**; typical path 265.1ms (+64.4ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 154.5ms; queuing 0.5ms; 66 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 48.9ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.0ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 61.8ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 135.0ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 50.6ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 8/61 paths direct (normally 12) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.2ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 31/106 paths direct (normally 28) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 47/65 paths direct (normally 49) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 249/289 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 605 successful fetches in 24h, 24 errors across 7 source(s). Generated 2026-10-26 21:02 UTC.</sub>
