Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 76 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (16 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 49 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (16 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (28 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (4 days ago); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.
Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …” - Measured route: Perth to Singapore [DIRECT_LOST] at 22 Oct 19:00 UTC — direct paths down to 6 of the 12 this route normally holds. Best path 50.8ms -> 52.3ms. 4 independent vantages. Systems serving this route: INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 22 Oct 21:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 23 Oct 08:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 110.1ms -> 110.0ms. Single vantage, held two hours. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 63 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.6ms, up 141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 46.4ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (22 Oct 16:06 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- Australian defense officials and scientists announced the testing of modular payloads on uncrewed vessels during Exercise Maritime Big Play [1].
- The UK government published a whitepaper proposing new security laws to modernize protections for international data traffic [4].
- The Al Habtoor Research Centre assesses that Iran poses a threat to subsea fiber-optic cables in the Arabian Gulf by October 2026 [5].
- PISCES Cable System Limited submitted an application to Ireland for a cable landfall at Ballyloughane Strand [12].
- Liberty Networks' Carmine Sorrentino stated that optical fiber does not have a technical limit at 25 years [13].
Today
Australian defense officials and scientists announced that new modular payloads, including sea mines, supply caches, and ALTIUS uncrewed aerial vehicles, are being tested on uncrewed vessels during Exercise Maritime Big Play [1]. These capabilities are being deployed from the Ghost Shark, Speartooth, and BlueBottle autonomous systems developed under the AUKUS Pillar II construct [1]. The Royal Australian Navy, Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG), and Australian defense industry partners collaborated on these technologies to enhance undersea warfare and seabed security [1].
UK and Regional Security Legislation and Threat Assessments
The UK government has published a whitepaper proposing new security and resilience laws to replace the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885, aiming to modernize protections for infrastructure carrying 99% of the UK's international data traffic [4]. The proposed legislation would increase prison sentences for intentional damage from five to 14 years and grant ministers the power to order operators to disable services during national security emergencies, with non-compliance potentially resulting in fines of up to £17m or 10% of global turnover [3, 4]. Analysts Katja Bego and Alasdair Wilkie note that the concentration of systems like Google’s Grace Hopper and Amitie in specific seaside locations creates catastrophic vulnerabilities to Russian 'grey-zone' warfare [2].
In the Middle East, the Al Habtoor Research Centre assesses that Iran poses a threat to target subsea fiber-optic cables and cloud hubs in the Arabian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz by October 2026 [5]. The centre's analysis suggests a four-pillar framework to counter this sabotage, including maritime bypass routes, terrestrial 'land bridges', multi-orbit satellite networks, and 'digital islanding' protocols [5]. Separately, a commentary piece highlights the Nord Stream pipeline attacks as a precedent for the vulnerability of offshore infrastructure to sabotage by actors ranging from high-tech criminals to Chinese trawlers [6].
AUKUS and NATO Initiatives for Subsea Infrastructure Security
The AUKUS Pillar II partnership is advancing seabed security through the 'Maritime Big Play Pacific' demonstration in the Southern California operating area from October 5 to October 25, 2026 [7]. The Royal Navy is leading the anti-submarine warfare component, which utilizes uncrewed surface vessels, underwater gliders, and subsea vehicles to test integrated combat operations and seabed warfare [7]. Australian Defense Minister Pat Conroy stated that AUKUS cooperation currently prioritizes shared sensors and payloads over specific platforms [10].
Simultaneously, NATO's Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI)-Network met in Rostock, Germany, on October 20-21, 2026, to coordinate security strategies against hybrid threats to undersea assets [11]. The meeting included infrastructure operators and partners from the Indo-Pacific to discuss data sharing and rapid response [11]. In the Black Sea, the Mine Countermeasures Task Group Black Sea is expanding its mission to monitor undersea cables and gas pipelines, a mandate Rear Admiral Kiril Mihaylov stated addresses rising infrastructure damage [9]. Additionally, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the protection of subsea telecommunications, electricity, and data cables in the Black Sea following attacks on civilian merchant vessels [8].
International Infrastructure Development and Maintenance
PISCES Cable System Limited has submitted an application to Ireland's Maritime Area Regulatory Authority for maritime consent to establish a cable landfall at Ballyloughane Strand in Galway Bay [12]. The proposed PISCES system will feature 16 fiber pairs connecting Galway to Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez in France, Sopelana in Spain, and Carcavelos in Portugal, with an anticipated deployment in 2028 [12]. This project, a joint venture between Orange, Equitix, and MDM supported by the European Union's Connecting Europe Facility, is intended to provide network operators with additional geographic routing options and diversify Ireland's international links [12].
In the Caribbean, Liberty Networks stated that subsea infrastructure serves as a foundation for digital development and argued that optical fiber does not have a technical limit at 25 years [13]. Carmine Sorrentino, VP & Chief Commercial Officer, characterized the 25-year mark as a financial amortization convention rather than a physical limit, noting that systems can be modernized through maintenance and equipment upgrades [13]. The company cited the modernization of MAYA-1.2 and the addition of the MANTA system as examples of maintaining and expanding a network that includes ARCOS-1, CFX, ECFS, and PCCS [13].
Also noted
- British authorities fear the decommissioning of the country's only cable repair vessel [14].
- A post on southasiamonitor.org argues that India and Japan should conduct regular stress tests involving scenarios such as disruptions to strategic endurance [15].
- A post on telanganatoday.com argues that rising geopolitical threats expose vulnerabilities in India's undersea cable security [16].
References
- Advanced Australian undersea capabilities tested at major AUKUS exercise in the US (psnews.com.au)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · psnews.com.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Ghost Shark, Speartooth, BlueBottle · Jurisdictions: AU, US, GB, NZ - The English seaside towns at risk of Russian sabotage ...Middle East (eng.pressbee.net)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · eng.pressbee.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: Grace Hopper, Amitie · Jurisdictions: GB - Emergency powers planned to protect UK's undersea cables - BBC News (bbc.co.uk)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · bbc.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Vessels named: Yantar · Jurisdictions: GB, RU · Also reported by: bbc.com - UK to introduce new laws to protect subsea cable systems (telecomtv.com)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · telecomtv.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB - Securing the Arabian Gulf’s Subsea Cables: The Iranian Threat, Defence Options, and Digital Resilience - Al Habtoor Research Centre (habtoorresearch.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · habtoorresearch.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: IR, OM, AE, IQ, INT - Defending Seabed Pipelines and Cables, by Daily Editorials | Creators Syndicate (creators.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · creators.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Nord Stream · Vessels named: U.S. Corsair unmanned surface vessels · Jurisdictions: DE, UA, US, IR, EG, IN (+1 more) - AUKUS Maritime Demonstration Tests Allied Naval Interoperability | TheDefenseWatch.com (thedefensewatch.com)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · thedefensewatch.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: AU, US, GB - European Parliament Urges Consideration of EU Naval Mission Following Attacks on Black Sea Shipping (news.europawire.eu)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · news.europawire.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: BG, RO, TR, INT · Also reported by: navaltoday.com - Mine Countermeasures Task Group Black Sea to Monitor Underwater Infrastructure (militarnyi.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · militarnyi.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: BG, RO, TR, UA, INT - China is leading the charge in the race for underwater drones (en.ilsole24ore.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · en.ilsole24ore.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: Tansuo San Hao, USS Delaware · Jurisdictions: AU, CN, US, NO - NATO Undersea Infrastructure Network Focuses on Security (miragenews.com)
Published: 21 Oct 2026 · miragenews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT, DE · Also reported by: oceannews.com - PISCES Seeks MARA Consent for Galway Landfall (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: PISCES · Jurisdictions: IE, FR, ES, PT - SubOptic | Radial Path (SubOptic)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · suboptic.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: MAYA-1.2, MANTA, ARCOS-1, CFX, ECFS, PCCS (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: INT - No Replacement: Britain Fears Decommissioning of Unique Cable Repair Vessel - Pravda EN (news-pravda.com)
Published: 23 Oct 2026 · news-pravda.com · Publisher: republishes other outlets, not independent corroboration · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: CS Sovereign · Jurisdictions: GB, RU - India and Japan’s Next Security Challenge Is Strategic Endurance (southasiamonitor.org)
Published: 21 Oct 2026 · southasiamonitor.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IN, JP - Opinion: India’s undersea cable security gap, what China got right (telanganatoday.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · telanganatoday.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: I-2SEA Submarine Cable System · Vessels named: Tianyi Linghangzhe · Jurisdictions: IN, CN, INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-23 15:11 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
page last checked 2026-10-23 15:09 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-23 13:41 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
page last checked 2026-10-23 15:11 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 7d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.6ms, +141.0ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 315.7ms (+117.0ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 150.2ms; queuing 0.6ms; 63 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 16 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 180.4ms (+46.4ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.5ms; queuing 0.5ms; 63 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s), 3 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 63 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.2ms (+64.5ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 176.3ms; queuing 0.6ms; 63 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 50.3ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 63.4ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 119.6ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 52.4ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 7/61 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.2ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 26/106 paths direct (normally 27)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 50/65 paths direct (normally 49)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.4ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 251/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Collection: 640 successful fetches in 24h, 31 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-10-23 16:07 UTC.