Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 75 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (15 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 48 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (15 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (27 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (3 days ago); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.
Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …” - Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 22 Oct 11:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 110.8ms -> 136.5ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 22 Oct 14:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 62 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.8ms, up 141.3ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 46.4ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.3ms, up 47.8ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (21 Oct 16:06 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- Global Fishing Watch reports 17 Russian trawlers mapped cables including Atlantic Crossing 1 and Grace Hopper [1].
- The UK Government (DCMS) proposed a White Paper introducing criminal penalties of up to 14 years for subsea infrastructure damage [2].
- Windward assesses that a UK-sanctioned LNG carrier has been sailing in repeated straight lines over the Andaman Sea cable cluster [10].
- Korda confirmed the landing sites for the Auður subsea cable connecting Iceland to Scotland, with construction starting in 2027 [11].
- A post on note.com proposes a 'functional vertical separation' model where governments own physical subsea cable assets [15].
Today
Data from Global Fishing Watch shows 17 Russian trawlers were logged mapping undersea cables connecting the U.S. and Europe, including the Atlantic Crossing 1, TAT-14, Hibernia Express, Shefa-2, Amitie, and Grace Hopper [1]. A senior naval officer and a NATO representative stated these commercial vessels may house ROVs or USVs to map infrastructure with millimeter precision as part of Russian 'gray-zone' warfare [1]. While the report highlights a pattern of over 500 loitering incidents in five years, it does not provide specific dates for the 17 most recent mappings [1].
Legislative and Strategic Responses to Subsea Sabotage
The UK Government (DCMS) published a White Paper proposing a new criminal penalties regime to protect critical subsea infrastructure (CUI) [2]. The proposal includes tougher penalties for intentional, reckless, or negligent damage to undersea cables and pipelines, with potential prison sentences of up to 14 years and unlimited fines [2]. The government also plans to introduce security laws requiring providers to manage risks, report compromises, and implement safeguards for fibre optic sensing technology [2].
Minister for the Armed Forces Louise Sandher-Jones stated in Parliament that while Britain is not at war with Russia, the country faces a campaign of hybrid attacks and sabotage [5]. To counter these threats, the UK is working with Norway under the Lunna House Agreement to protect undersea cables and pipelines in the North Atlantic [5]. Additionally, a report from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggests that offshore wind farms could serve as a force multiplier for maritime security by integrating surveillance and data tracking tools to monitor vulnerable subsea infrastructure [6].
Regional Cooperation and Maritime Domain Action
Philippine diplomat Felipe F. Carino III stated on October 21 that the Philippines is exploring pragmatic cooperation with Taiwan to protect undersea cables and address "gray zone" activities in the Bashi Channel [7]. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration Director General Chang Chung-Lung confirmed Taiwan is open to cooperating with the Philippines on maritime law enforcement and protecting undersea features like cables, following recent severances of cables linking the Matsu Islands to Taipei and the Taiwan main island to the Penghu archipelago [8]. This cooperation aims to secure intercontinental data flows and address regional cyber incidents, which Carino noted account for 60 to 67 percent of cyber incidents in the region [7].
Windward provides an analyst assessment stating that maritime domain action in the Indo-Pacific requires a shared all-source picture to counter "dark fleet" activity, specifically highlighting a UK-sanctioned LNG carrier that has been sailing in repeated straight lines over the Andaman Sea cable cluster west of Phuket since late September 2026 [10]. Windward argues that allies must move beyond fragmented data and AIS self-reporting to shared, fused intelligence that integrates ownership, sanctions, and behavioral history to protect infrastructure like the Andaman Sea cable cluster [10]. Additionally, reports indicate China has constructed a second dedicated mothership at Guangzhou Shipyard International to transport and service submarine-sized uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) capable of reaching Southeast Asian chokepoints and the Indian Ocean [9]. Analysts suggest these assets could be used to disable US and allied sensors in the First Island Chain or serve as part of a "Transparent Ocean" strategy to eliminate US submarine stealth [9].
International Infrastructure Developments and Narratives
Korda has confirmed the landing sites for the Auður subsea cable, which will connect Meðalland on Iceland's south coast to Irvine Bay on the Firth of Clyde in Scotland [11]. The project, which includes a planned service delivery point in Glasgow to route traffic to London, Ireland, continental Europe, and the Nordic region, is scheduled to begin seabed surveys and construction in summer 2027 [11]. Separately, SoleCrypt announced a 40 MW AI campus in Bizerte, Tunisia, scheduled to begin operations in 2028; the facility will be located 3.6 km from the Medusa subsea cable via a routed fiber path [13].
Regarding the security landscape, a report by Responsible Statecraft argues that the narrative of a systematic Russian 'hybrid war' in Europe often relies on weak evidence and vague definitions [12]. The report suggests that while Western leaders frequently attribute incidents like Baltic cable damage to Moscow, many such claims were later retracted or attributed to technical faults, and the few proven sabotage cases represent sporadic, low-impact acts rather than a coordinated war [12].
Infrastructure Resilience and Governance Models
Transcelestial co-founder Rohit Jha describes the use of laser links to provide 'wireless fiber' as a high-bandwidth backup for 5G towers and rapid disaster recovery in areas where traditional trenching is impractical [14]. The technology was used to restore connectivity to 110 Taiwanese villages in under half a day following a typhoon, and the company plans to launch an orbital ring of 40 satellites by 2029 to create a global transporter network for laser-based connectivity [14].
Separately, a post on note.com proposes a 'functional vertical separation' model for national critical infrastructure to balance sovereign security with market discipline [15]. The proposal suggests that governments should directly own physical assets, such as submarine telecommunications cables, via bonds while a National Fund Management Corporation oversees private operating companies to manage the software and operations [15].
Also noted
- The Telegraph reports that Russia is using fishing trawlers to spy on key British undersea cables [16].
- gbnews.com reports that Vladimir Putin has deployed more than 500 Russian civilian fishing trawlers to spy on British critical undersea cables [17].
- NATO intelligence is tracking dozens of suspected Russian commercial fishing boats carrying out espionage missions in waters around Britain to map UK undersea cables [18].
References
- 17 Russian trawlers logged mapping undersea cables connecting the US and Europe, over 500 incidents of Russian vessels loitering over critical communications cables reported in under 5 years | Tom's ... (tomshardware.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Atlantic Crossing 1, TAT-14, Hibernia Express, Shefa-2, Amitie, Grace Hopper · Jurisdictions: INT, AU, NZ, ID, SG, TW - Govt sets out new UK rules to protect subsea internet cables from sabotage - ISPreview UK (ispreview.co.uk)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · ispreview.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT, GB - Bangkok Post - US-backed Southeast Asia data cable taking shape (bangkokpost.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 22 Oct 2026 · bangkokpost.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: MViSTA · Jurisdictions: TH, MY, VN, SG - Strategic Assessment: The EU’s Arctic Subsea Cable Initiative, Greenland’s Geopolitics, and the Bering Strait Chokepoint (Submarine Networks)
Not cited in the text · Published: 22 Oct 2026 · submarinenetworks.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: Pan-Arctic Subsea Cable, Far North Fiber, Polar Connect · Jurisdictions: EU, GL, DK, CA, JP, RU (+1 more) - Britain is not at war with Russia, says minister (ukdefencejournal.org.uk)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · ukdefencejournal.org.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, NO - Offshore wind farms can enhance maritime security, report says | The National (thenationalnews.com)
Published: 21 Oct 2026 · thenationalnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: US, NO, BE, PL, GB, ID (+1 more) - Philippines eyes closer cooperation with Taiwan to protect cables - Taipei Times (taipeitimes.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · taipeitimes.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: PH, TW, INT · Also reported by: straitstimes.com, 1027wbow.com, chinatechnews.com, mezha.net - Taiwan Open to Cooperating With Philippines on Undersea Cable Protection - Domino Theory (dominotheory.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · dominotheory.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security, analysis · Systems named: Matsu Islands to Taipei cables, Taiwan’s main island to the Penghu archipelago cable · Vessels named: Kinmen, Sarangani, Haiyang Dizhi Ba Hao, Neptune · Jurisdictions: TW, PH, CN - China’s new drone mothership targets US undersea edge - Asia Times (asiatimes.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · asiatimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: USNS Zeus, USS Jimmy Carter · Jurisdictions: TW, JP, PH, ID, CN, US (+1 more) - Maritime Domain Action in the Indo-Pacific, Windward (Windward blog)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · windward.ai · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: Andaman Sea cable cluster · Jurisdictions: ID, MY, TH, IN, GB, CN (+1 more) - Auður Confirms Iceland and Scotland Landing Sites (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · subtelforum.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Auður · Jurisdictions: IS, GB - Russia’s Hybrid War in Europe: Persistent Amplification and Hidden Motives - En.ImArabic (en.imarabic.com)
Published: 21 Oct 2026 · en.imarabic.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: precedent, analysis · Systems named: Baltic cables · Jurisdictions: INT - SoleCrypt unveils 40 MW AI campus in Bizerte, Tunisia (W.Media)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · w.media · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Medusa · Jurisdictions: TN, EU - Disaster Recovery & Networks in Space (TeleGeography blog)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · resources.telegeography.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: TW, SG, INT - A Study on Balancing Sovereign Security of Critical National Infrastructure with Market Discipline (note.com)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: JP - Telegraph: Russia uses fishing trawlers to spy on UK's key undersea cables (en.vijesti.me)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · en.vijesti.me · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: Atlantic Crossing 1, TAT-14, Hibernia Express, Shefa-2, Grace Hopper · Vessels named: Ship A, Ship B, Ship C · Jurisdictions: GB, US, DE, NL, INT · Also reported by: independent.co.uk - Vladimir Putin 'spying on UK with HUNDREDS of fishing trawlers' with Britain at risk 'day one' of Nato conflict (gbnews.com)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · gbnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis, vessel_activity · Systems named: Atlantic Crossing 1, Hibernia Express, Grace Hopper, Amitié · Vessels named: Ship A, Ship B, Ship C · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, US, FR, ES, NO - Putin's fishing boats map UK undersea cables, NATO analysis finds - Brit Brief (britbrief.co.uk)
Published: 22 Oct 2026 · britbrief.co.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Systems named: Atlantic Crossing 1, Shefa-2 · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-22 15:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
page last checked 2026-10-22 15:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-22 13:51 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
page last checked 2026-10-22 15:09 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 6d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.8ms, +141.3ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 315.8ms (+116.9ms per probe against its own history, 19 probes); ocean crossing 150.4ms; queuing 0.6ms; 62 days of history; clean crossing (19 probe(s), 23 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.2ms (+46.4ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.5ms; queuing 0.5ms; 62 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.8ms; typical path 29.4ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.6ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 62 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.3ms, +47.8ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.3ms (+64.5ms per probe against its own history, 20 probes); ocean crossing 173.6ms; queuing 0.6ms; 62 days of history; clean crossing (20 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 49.3ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 63.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 129.4ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 1/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 52.4ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 7/61 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.7ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.1ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 26/106 paths direct (normally 27)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 50/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.4ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 3/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 249/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-13UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 611 successful fetches in 24h, 43 errors across 15 source(s). Generated 2026-10-22 16:06 UTC.