Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 73 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (13 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 46 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (13 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (25 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (yesterday); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.
Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …” - Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 19 Oct 18:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [DIRECT_LOST] at 19 Oct 23:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 6 path(s) were within Sydney to Fiji's physical floor, now none. Best path 37.2ms -> 0.0ms. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [UNREACHABLE] at 19 Oct 23:00 UTC — 6 of 6 paths lost 80% or more of their packets. Single vantage, held two hours. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Sydney to Fiji [RECOVERY] at 20 Oct 03:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. Systems serving this route: Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT (TeleGeography). The measurement cannot say which one moved.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 20 Oct 12:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.1ms -> 137.3ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 20 Oct 14:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 60 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.7ms, up 141.2ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 46.3ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.4ms, up 47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (19 Oct 16:04 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- Swedish authorities opened a preliminary investigation into suspected sabotage of the C-Lion 1 cable in the Baltic Sea [2].
- The Royal Navy demonstrated crewed and autonomous systems to support AUKUS seabed warfare operations at Maritime Big Play [5, 6].
- The DRDO is seeking partners to develop the Underwater Fibre Optic Sensing System to monitor the Bay of Bengal [8].
- The Medusa Submarine Cable System completed its Pre-Laid Shore End installation in Benghazi, Libya [10].
Today
SUBCO has appointed Andrew Bacon as its joint chief information officer and chief information security officer [1]. Bacon, who previously served as a divisional director for cyber security at Macquarie Group, will lead the company's technology and cyber security strategy as it scales to deliver the region's largest subsea infrastructure build [1].
Suspected Interference and Anchor Drag
Swedish authorities have opened a preliminary investigation into suspected sabotage of an underwater cable in the Baltic Sea east of Gotland [2]. The Finnish operator Cinia reported 'some disturbance' on the C-Lion 1 communications cable linking Finland and Germany, though the operator stated that data traffic continues to flow normally [2]. In response to the incident, the European Commission announced increased security requirements, prioritized financing for smart cables, and plans to enforce sanctions against 'hostile actors' and 'shadow fleets' [2].
Separate assessments highlight broader regional vulnerabilities and strategic responses to infrastructure threats. A 2026 National Security Risk Assessment by the National Security Analysts Network (ANV) identifies Curaçao's submarine telecommunications cables as potential targets for sabotage, noting that damage to two landing points on the island could disrupt communications across the Caribbean, specifically affecting Trinidad and Tobago and Puerto Rico [3]. Additionally, IISS analyst Charlie Edwards argues that the EU requires a 'theory of victory' to counter Russia's unconventional warfare, which he identifies as including physical sabotage and damage to undersea cables [4].
AUKUS and Regional Subsea Warfare Developments
The Royal Navy led trials at Maritime Big Play to demonstrate the integration of crewed and autonomous systems, including underwater gliders, drones, and subsea vehicles, to support AUKUS anti-submarine warfare and seabed warfare operations [5, 6]. The event showcased over 40 technologies aimed at establishing shared command-and-control solutions and secure 'stratosphere to seabed' communications among AUKUS partners [5, 6].
Separately, the DRDO is seeking industry partners to develop the Underwater Fibre Optic Sensing System (UFOSS) to monitor the Bay of Bengal and the Ninety East Ridge via seabed sensor nodes [8]. In the Middle East, the IRGC issued a warning regarding seven major internet and commercial data cables under the Strait of Hormuz, though TeleGeography notes these cables primarily serve Gulf countries rather than the majority of Europe-Asia traffic [9]. Analysts Tuneer Mukherjee and Deepshi Grover assess that while high-endurance extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) offer lower costs and risk dispersion for navies, current naval doctrine has not kept pace with the technology regarding human authorization and escalation [7].
International Infrastructure and Regulatory Developments
The Medusa Submarine Cable System has completed its Pre-Laid Shore End (PLSE) installation in Benghazi, Libya [10]. This milestone connects the land-based landing site to the offshore connection point, a step intended to facilitate high-capacity data transmission between North Africa, Europe, and the Middle East [10].
In a separate development, experts at Hyperscalers Convergence Africa 2026 noted that West African nations face significant hurdles in creating a single digital market due to inconsistent licensing and rights-of-way rules [11]. These regulatory gaps create 'no man's land' areas where fiber networks stop at borders, increasing roaming costs and forcing traffic to leave the continent unnecessarily [11].
U.S.-Caribbean Partnership and Subsea Infrastructure
Dr. Isaac Newton argues that Caribbean nations must proactively shape the agenda of their partnership with the United States rather than reacting to U.S. initiatives [12]. While the U.S. announced $175.8 million for undersea cable infrastructure and other security and healthcare initiatives, Newton notes that Caribbean leaders were reportedly not consulted beforehand on the meeting's priorities [12]. He suggests that CARICOM should establish a negotiating framework to coordinate regional positions to ensure these investments deliver measurable local benefits [12].
Also noted
- An Iranian army official warned the U.S. and Israel against 'miscalculation' regarding renewing attacks on Tehran this week [13].
- Iran's Supreme National Security Council secretary explicitly named Gulf AI data centers, undersea fiber-optic cables, and US-linked cloud infrastructure as targets [14].
- A post on katemckenna28.substack.com discusses the 'Ground Zero - Black Sea Lessons for Ireland's Maritime Security' [15].
References
- SUBCO brings in joint CIO and CISO (itnews.com.au)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · itnews.com.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: AU, ID, INT - Sweden probes Baltic Sea cable sabotage as fears of Russian ‘hybrid warfare’ grow (wionews.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · wionews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, investigation, analysis, precedent · Systems named: C-Lion 1, Estlink 2 · Jurisdictions: SE, FI, DE, EE, INT - Dutch Security Assessment Warns Sabotage of Curaçao's Undersea Cables Could Disrupt Communications Across Caribbean (curacaochronicle.com)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · curacaochronicle.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NL, CW, TT, PR - NATO has a theory of victory, the EU needs one for Russia’s unconventional war on Europe (IISS)
Published: not dated by the source · iiss.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: EU, RU - Royal Navy leads AUKUS trials of crewed and autonomous systems to track enemy submarines (defence-industry.eu)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: XV Excalibur · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US - AUKUS Maritime Big Play Puts Autonomous Systems to the Test in San Diego (oceannews.com)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · oceannews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: XV Excalibur · Jurisdictions: AU, GB, US - The Dark Ocean Equation: Structuring a Hybrid Undersea Naval Force (orfonline.org)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · orfonline.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: Anduril Dive-LD · Jurisdictions: INT, US, CN, RU, GB · Also reported by: eurasiareview.com - DRDO Plans Underwater Sensor Network in Indian Ocean (en.channeliam.com)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · en.channeliam.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Systems named: Underwater Fibre Optic Sensing System (UFOSS) · Jurisdictions: IN - Iran threatens 'world's internet' in terrifying 'reminder to the enemy' (mirror.co.uk)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · mirror.co.uk · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: IR, INT - Medusa Submarine Cable System Completes Shore-End Installation in Libya - TechAfrica News (techafricanews.com)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · techafricanews.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: policy · Systems named: Medusa Submarine Cable System · Jurisdictions: LY, INT - West Africa Wants A Single Digital Market. Its Borders Are Getting In The Way (africa.hyperscalers.news)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · africa.hyperscalers.news · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: AF, INT - U.S.-Caribbean Partnership: Who Sets The Agenda, Who Holds The Power And Who Benefits? (newsamericasnow.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · newsamericasnow.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: US, TW, INT - Iranian army official warns US, Israel against 'miscalculation' (foxnews.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · foxnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, INT - Iran Installs Missile-Program Veteran as Defense Chief, Puts $2T Gulf AI Network in Crosshairs (techtimes.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · techtimes.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, INT - Ground Zero - Black Sea Lessons for Ireland's Maritime Security (katemckenna28.substack.com)
Published: 20 Oct 2026 · katemckenna28.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment (the document's own framing, not the publisher's standing) · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Systems named: transatlantic undersea cables · Vessels named: Yantar, Admiral Grigorovich, Vezhen · Jurisdictions: IE, GB, INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-20 15:11 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
page last checked 2026-10-20 15:10 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-20 13:48 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
page last checked 2026-10-20 15:11 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 4d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.7ms, +141.2ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 315.9ms (+115.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 149.9ms; queuing 0.4ms; 60 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 30 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.8ms (+46.3ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 134.1ms; queuing 0.4ms; 60 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.8ms; typical path 29.5ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.2ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 60 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.4ms, +47.9ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.3ms (+64.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 154.7ms; queuing 0.5ms; 60 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 51.1ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 61.6ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 108.2ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 50.3ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 10/64 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 196.2ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 27/106 paths direct (normally 27)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 47/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 251/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-13UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 617 successful fetches in 24h, 30 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-10-20 16:05 UTC.