Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 72 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (12 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 45 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (12 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (24 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 19 Oct (today); the notice is headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator.
New notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …” - Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 18 Oct 17:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.7ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography). Cleared and raised again 8 time(s) within two hours, the last at 19 Oct 01:00 UTC: one episode.
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 18 Oct 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 19 Oct 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [GROUP_STEP] at 19 Oct 08:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths stepped, median +19.9ms against each path's own floor. 1 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 19 Oct 10:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 19 Oct 11:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.1ms -> 137.2ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured corridor (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors, best path over 24 hours; baseline is the corridor's best sustained path over 59 days): Perth to Singapore best path 187.9ms, up 141.3ms on its 46.6ms baseline; Sydney to Japan best path 100.4ms, typical path up 46.4ms per probe against its own history; Sydney to Singapore best path 144.2ms, up 47.7ms on its 96.5ms baseline.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (18 Oct 16:02 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- The Australian Government unveiled modular payloads for the Ghost Shark XL AUV to enhance undersea infrastructure protection [1].
- Jack Lindstrom assesses that China is using 'shadow fleets' and anchor dragging to map seafloors for potential cable sabotage [3].
- Bulk co-founder Peder Nærbø claims Project Leif Erikson will create a sovereign cable system bypassing U.S. infrastructure [12].
- Meta announced the 2Africa system is complete, offering capacities up to 180 Tbps across 33 countries [14].
Today
The Australian Government has unveiled modular payloads for the Ghost Shark XL autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), featuring 12 deployable sea mines, logistics caches, and Altius uncrewed aerial vehicle swarms [1]. Minister for Defence Industry Pat Conroy confirmed these payloads will also be integrated into Speartooth uncrewed underwater vehicles and BlueBottle uncrewed surface vessels, with testing scheduled for Exercise Maritime Big Play Pacific in San Diego this month [1]. This development is part of a broader $5.8 billion investment over the next decade intended to enhance undersea warfare and the protection of critical undersea infrastructure [1].
Gray-zone tactics and anchor dragging
Analyst Jack Lindstrom assesses that China is evolving its maritime strategy toward 'gray-zone' warfare by utilizing military-civil fusion to conduct unconventional operations, including the use of UUVs and research vessels to map the seafloor for potential sabotage of the Baltic and Taiwan cable systems [3]. Lindstrom's assessment highlights how China and Russia employ 'shadow fleets' and anchor dragging to create kinetic conflict with plausible deniability, citing the Eagle S dragging its anchor for 66 miles in the Gulf of Finland in December 2024 and the Yi Peng 3 dragging its anchor for nearly 300 kilometers in November 2024 [3].
In the Philippines, a research vessel was recently intercepted near cable corridors connecting the country to Northeast Asia [2]. While the Philippines seeks to become a regional digital hub, PLDT CEO Albert Villa-Real and other analysts warn that fragmented oversight across over a dozen agencies and slow repair approvals for the Apricot Cable System and Jupiter Cable System could hinder these ambitions [2].
Geopolitical Strategy and Technological Advancements in Undersea Infrastructure Protection
The European Union is planning a sovereign submarine cable linking Greenland to Europe, with potential extensions to Canada, Japan, and South Korea [8]. To secure this infrastructure against sabotage and hybrid threats, the EU intends to create an Arctic Cable Hub for monitoring and protection, while also establishing an Industrial Maritime Value Chains Alliance to pool icebreaker capabilities [8]. Meanwhile, research by Farhana Rashid identifies the Bay of Bengal as a new frontier for digital competition and argues that Bangladesh must integrate cable protection with maritime domain awareness to ensure digital resilience [7].
In the realm of technical monitoring and defense, Openserve is integrating AI and fibre sensing technology into its Network Operations Centre to distinguish between normal vibrations and potential damage to systems including Equiano, SAT-3/WASC, South Africa Far East, WACS, EASSy, Africa Coast to Europe, and MainOne [11]. This initiative aims to provide predictive maintenance to prevent outages similar to the 2024 cable breaks off Côte d’Ivoire [11]. Separately, the Korea Institute of Geoscience and Mineral Resources (KIGAM) successfully tested a coastal seismic survey technology using an unmanned surface vehicle (USV) to image structures more than 200 meters below the seabed off Hwajin Beach [9].
Project Leif Erikson Transatlantic Link
Norwegian company Bulk is seeking a majority partner to fund and build Project Leif Erikson, a $620 million transatlantic undersea cable system stretching over 2,800 miles from southern Norway to Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Canada [12]. Bulk co-founder Peder Nærbø claims the project will create a 'sovereign cable system' designed to improve Canada's infrastructure resilience by providing a direct data link between Canada and Europe that bypasses the United States [12]. The system is intended to provide secure, high-capacity data transmission for hyperscale markets and AI, while reducing Canada's reliance on U.S. infrastructure [12].
Network Resilience and Subsea Capacity Expansion
During the INNOG 9 session at APNIC 62, Sumon Ahmed Sabir analyzed hidden external dependencies that emerge during submarine cable outages [13]. Ashutosh Zutshi provided an assessment of the concentration of sub-sea infrastructure in Mumbai and Chennai, while Dr. Devesh Tyagi advocated for an IPv6-first architecture to support edge and AI workloads [13].
Regarding capacity, Meta announced on 17 November 2025 that the 2Africa system is complete, reaching 45,000 km in length and offering capacities up to 180 Tbps on main trunks across 33 countries [14]. Other major systems mentioned include Equiano (144 Tbps), PEACE (192 Tbps), and the planned Africa-1 (96 Tbps) [14]. While these systems aim to reduce latency for cloud and banking services, the Africa Data Centres Association and Rising Advisory report that reliable power supply has become the primary constraint for new data center sites [14].
Also noted
- A U.S. Marine Corps unit will work with the Finnish Navy to improve maritime surveillance in the Gulf of Finland under NATO’s Baltic Sentry activity [15].
- HMS Prince of Wales has deployed to the North Atlantic with more than 1,200 personnel to strengthen NATO readiness and protect critical infrastructure [16].
References
- Australia unveils sea mines, logistics cache and drone swarm payloads for Ghost Shark XL AUV (defenceconnect.com.au)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · defenceconnect.com.au · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Ghost Shark, Speartooth, BlueBottle · Jurisdictions: AU · Also reported by: navaltoday.com - Philippines' Subsea Cable Laws Face Scrutiny Amid Digital Hub Ambitions (kucoin.com)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · kucoin.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: Apricot Cable System, Jupiter Cable System · Jurisdictions: PH, SG, HK, JP, US, AU - China's Unconventional Naval Warfare Capabilities are Evolving (The Maritime Executive)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · maritime-executive.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Systems named: Baltic, Taiwan · Vessels named: Type 095, COSCO · Jurisdictions: CN, TW, INT - The Indo-Mediterranean’s digital fault line: why subsea cables remain untouched, for now (decode39.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 18 Oct 2026 · decode39.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, SA, INT - Cable repairs: The case for a British sovereign capability (britainsworld.org.uk)
Not cited in the text · Published: 19 Oct 2026 · britainsworld.org.uk · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: CS Sovereign, RFA Proteus · Jurisdictions: GB, INT - Deterring Russia in the Arctic: Is it Credible? (en.highnorthnews.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 19 Oct 2026 · en.highnorthnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: NO, FI, SE, RU, INT - The Invisible Battlefield Beneath The Sea: Undersea Cables, Critical Infrastructure And The New Geopolitics Of Maritime Power (bipss.org.bd)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · bipss.org.bd · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: BD, INT - EU eyes Arctic cable linking Greenland to Europe amid growing security threats | Euronews (euronews.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · euronews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Far North Fibre · Jurisdictions: EU, GL, CA, JP, KR, IS (+1 more) - Korea Tests Unmanned Boats to Image Geology 200 Meters Beneath the Seabed - Seoul Economic Daily (en.sedaily.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · en.sedaily.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: KR - Australia to arm underwater drones with sea mines and aerial UAVs - Pravda Australia (au.news-pravda.com)
Not cited in the text · Published: 19 Oct 2026 · au.news-pravda.com · Publisher: republishes other outlets, not independent corroboration · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: Ghost Shark, Speartooth, BlueBottle · Jurisdictions: AU - Openserve turns to AI to predict undersea cable, network faults (itweb.co.za)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · itweb.co.za · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Systems named: Equiano, SAT-3/WASC, South Africa Far East cable, West Africa Cable System (WACS), EASSy, Africa Coast to Europe (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: ZA, CI, INT - Norwegian undersea cable builder pitches 2,800-mile transatlantic data link between Canada and Europe to bypass the US, Canadian majority partner sought to help fund and build new $620 million fiber ... (tomshardware.com)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · tomshardware.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Project Leif Erikson, Topez · Jurisdictions: CA, NO, INT - INNOG 9 at APNIC 62: Building resilient infrastructure for the next Internet (APNIC blog)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · blog.apnic.net · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Jurisdictions: IN, BD - Africa's subsea cables in 2026: 2Africa, Equiano, PEACE and (safeguard.sh)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · safeguard.sh · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy · Systems named: 2Africa, Equiano, PEACE, Africa-1, WACS, ACE (+1 more) · Jurisdictions: EG, KE, ID, TW, INT - U.S. Marine Corps to strengthen Gulf of Finland maritime surveillance under NATO’s Baltic Sentry (defence-industry.eu)
Published: 19 Oct 2026 · defence-industry.eu · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMAS Sydney · Jurisdictions: FI, SE, DK, INT - UK Aircraft Carrier Deploys to Arctic and North Atlantic (thebritisheye.com)
Published: 18 Oct 2026 · thebritisheye.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Dauntless · Jurisdictions: INT
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-19 15:08 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
page last checked 2026-10-19 15:07 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-19 13:25 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 19 Oct 00:13 UTC (headed 12 Oct 00:00 UTC by the operator)
- Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
page last checked 2026-10-19 15:08 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 3d)
Measured corridors (RIPE Atlas traceroute between fixed anchors over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 187.9ms, +141.3ms on its 46.6ms baseline; typical path 316.3ms (+115.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 150.2ms; queuing 0.5ms; 59 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 27 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 180.7ms (+46.4ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; 59 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.7ms; typical path 29.5ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 25.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 59 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.2ms, +47.7ms on its 96.5ms baseline; typical path 265.6ms (+64.8ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 162.0ms; queuing 0.6ms; 59 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. A corridor's baseline is its best sustained path over the days of history shown, a different figure from a route's physical floor below. As data: https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/corridors.json.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms physical floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 49.5ms against a 7.1ms physical floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.2ms against a 5.9ms physical floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 61.9ms against a 29.5ms physical floor; 43 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 115.8ms against a 85.0ms physical floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 50.8ms against a 38.3ms physical floor; 11/64 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.1ms against a 31.5ms physical floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 194.7ms against a 80.0ms physical floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms physical floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms physical floor; 23/106 paths direct (normally 27)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms physical floor; 49/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.2ms against a 19.3ms physical floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.6ms against a 26.9ms physical floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms physical floor; 252/289 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in https://cablewatch.liminallayers.com/data/coverage.json.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-13UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 595 successful fetches in 24h, 28 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-10-19 16:04 UTC.