← Cable Watch

17 October 2026 · Issue 85

Analysis Highlights Security Risks Following Perth Subsea Cable Damage

A new analysis examines the vulnerability of Australia's primary international communication routes following recent faults. The report argues that reliance on private infrastructure and a lack of dedicated regulation create significant national security risks.

Markdown · Transcript · MP3 · Subscribe

Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (16 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

A post on partnersinpreaching.org argues that the recent damage to the INDIGO West and INDIGO Central subsea communication cables off the coast of Perth highlights a strategic weakness in Australia's digital sovereignty [1]. The author assesses that the cables, which carry 99% of Australia's international communications, are vulnerable to both accidents and intentional sabotage by state actors [1]. The analysis suggests that the current reliance on private infrastructure owned by tech giants, combined with a lack of a dedicated regulatory agency, creates significant national security risks [1].

Baltic Sea Infrastructure Sabotage and Grey Zone Risks

Dr. Antonio Bhardwaj of the Foreign Affairs Forum assesses a 'silent conflict' in the Baltic Sea characterized by a pattern of seabed infrastructure sabotage, including the 2022 Nord Stream ruptures, the October 2023 Balticconnector damage, and November 2024 severings of the Finland-Germany and Lithuania-Sweden cables [5]. The assessment identifies specific incidents involving the tanker Eagle S, which damaged Estlink 2 and four data lines on Christmas Day 2024, and the Fitburg, which was seized by authorities in Finland and Latvia on New Year's Eve 2025 [2, 5]. Bhardwaj argues that the use of a 'shadow fleet' and legal vacuums on the high seas allow for low-cost, deniable harassment of cables and pipelines that carry 95% of international data traffic [5].

In response to these vulnerabilities, NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission in January 2025 to monitor assets using warships, drones, and aircraft [2]. A post on staticbrief.substack.com assesses that Russia's Kaliningrad exclave creates a 'denial architecture' that enables selective stand-off pressure and covert sabotage against sea lines of communication and undersea infrastructure [4]. Furthermore, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of potential Russian escalation before Christmas Eve, citing intelligence regarding risks to infrastructure and following reports of cable damage and GPS interference [3].

Multilateral Cooperation and Surveillance Technologies for Subsea Security

Analyst Pratnashree Basu argues that multilateral cooperation and strategic redundancy are essential to de-risk Indo-Pacific subsea cables from Chinese espionage and deliberate sabotage [6]. The analysis identifies specific projects, including the Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 6, Southeast Asia-Japan 2, Apricot, and Echo cables, as part of a broader effort by nations like Australia, Japan, and the US to diversify routes and bypass Chinese-controlled infrastructure [6].

To protect these assets, maritime operators and governments are increasingly investing in high-performance sonar and acoustic sensors to detect unauthorized divers and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) [8]. Security experts assess these technologies as becoming a standard component of layered security strategies to enhance maritime domain awareness [8]. Additionally, a post on dev.to highlights the deployment of autonomous drones and sensor nets to protect cables and pipelines, noting that operators monitoring these feeds face significant fatigue, which has led to the development of VR training tools for ROV pilots to improve sustained attention [9].

Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Acquisitions

The Syrian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is seeking to establish a regional data corridor through several projects, including the Silk Link terrestrial network and the Ugarit 2 (also referred to as Ebla) submarine cable [10]. The Ugarit 2 is a 240-kilometre link between Tartous and Cyprus involving Unifi Communications, Cyta, Prysmian Group, Elettra, and Nokia [10]. Additionally, the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment reached an agreement with AFR-IX Telecom for the Medusa project, a subsea network linking Mediterranean countries with a partnership with Saudi Arabia’s Salam to extend connectivity to Aqaba, Jordan [10].

In a separate development, Prysmian has completed the acquisition of Xtera Topco through a joint venture with Fincantieri for an enterprise value of $65 million [11]. This acquisition integrates Xtera’s repeater technology and optical engineering with Prysmian’s manufacturing and installation capabilities for the EXA Meridian cable between New Jersey and Brean, UK [11]. Prysmian will manufacture the 6,552 km EXA Meridian cable at its Nordenham, Germany facility, which is doubling production capacity to meet the 2029 service date [11].

Subsea Infrastructure Expansion and Regional Connectivity

Meta, via its subsidiary Edge Network Services Limited, is financing the Daraja submarine cable system to connect Mombasa, Kenya, with Salalah, Oman [12]. The 4,108-kilometer system, which features 24 fiber pairs and is being built by Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN), is expected to enter service in 2026 to provide geographic diversity for Kenya and strengthen Oman's role as a connection point between East Africa, the Middle East, and Asia [12]. In Malaysia, Communications Minister Fahmi Fadzil confirmed the RM2 billion SALAM submarine cable project will feature 10 landing stations across Sarawak, Sabah, and Peninsular Malaysia [13].

Other regional developments include KT Corporation launching an 800 Gbps optical network service in South Korea to connect AI data centers using all-photonic technology [13]. In South Africa, MTN and Huawei completed a 5G-Advanced trial achieving 10.35 Gbps download speeds [13]. Additionally, a post on note.com describes a fictional 2030 proposal for a north-south submarine cable backbone in Japan to connect Akita City to Tsuruga and Otaru, bypassing Tokyo [14].

References

  1. The Subsea Cable Mystery: What Happened Off Perth's Coast? (2026) (partnersinpreaching.org)
    Published: 17 Oct 2026 · partnersinpreaching.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Systems named: INDIGO West, INDIGO Central · Jurisdictions: AU
  2. Beginner's 101 Guide: Silent Sabotage: The Hidden Struggle Under Europe's Seas, Foreign Affairs Forum (faf.ae)
    Published: 17 Oct 2026 · faf.ae · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Nord Stream, Finland-Estonia-Sweden data cables, Finland-Germany cable, Lithuania-Sweden cable, Finland-Estonia power cable · Vessels named: Eagle S, Fitburg · Jurisdictions: FI, SE, EE, LV, DE, PL (+3 more)
  3. Tusk warns of possible escalation by Russia before Christmas Eve, Interia (ua.news)
    Published: 16 Oct 2026 · ua.news · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: PL, UA, LT, INT
  4. Static Assessments: The Kaliningrad Problem (staticbrief.substack.com)
    Published: 16 Oct 2026 · staticbrief.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Vessels named: FGS Sachsen-Anhalt · Jurisdictions: DE, LT, PL, EE, LV, RU (+1 more)
  5. The War Beneath the Waves: How the Baltic Became the Front Line of a Silent Conflict, Foreign Affairs Forum (faf.ae)
    Published: 17 Oct 2026 · faf.ae · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Balticconnector, Estlink 2 · Vessels named: Fitburg, FNS Pori · Jurisdictions: INT, FI, RU, LV
  6. Multilateralism key for de-risking Indo-Pacific subsea cables (orfonline.org)
    orfonline.org
  7. U.S. Hosts Caribbean Dialogue on Security, Prosperity (miragenews.com)
    miragenews.com
  8. Cutting-Edge Underwater Surveillance Technologies Reinforce Maritime Infrastructure Security | Transport Security International Magazine (tsi-mag.com)
    Published: 16 Oct 2026 · tsi-mag.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT
  9. The seabed is militarizing - DEV Community (dev.to)
    Published: 17 Oct 2026 · dev.to · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
  10. Syria enters the race to carry the world’s data (noonpost.com)
    Published: 17 Oct 2026 · noonpost.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Silk Link, Ugarit 2, Ebla, Medusa · Jurisdictions: SY, CY, SA, INT
  11. Prysmian Completes Xtera Acquisition (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
    subtelforum.com
  12. Daraja: Meta's Submarine Cable Linking Kenya and Oman (cloudnews.tech)
    cloudnews.tech
  13. Telecom news: KT, MTN, Huawei, Malaysia’s RM2 Billion SALAM Subsea Cable - TelecomLead (telecomlead.com)
    Published: 16 Oct 2026 · telecomlead.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: SALAM · Jurisdictions: MY
  14. Missing Link: Prologue (note.com)
    Published: 14 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: speculation · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: JP

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 590 successful fetches in 24h, 37 errors across 16 source(s). Generated 2026-10-17 16:04 UTC.