Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 70 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (10 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 43 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (10 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (22 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 16 Oct (yesterday); the notice carries no date of its own.
Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …” - Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 17:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +23.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 17:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 18:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.7ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 18:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 19:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 19:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 20:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.7ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 20:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 21:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 21:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +22.0ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 21:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 16 Oct 23:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +24.4ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 16 Oct 23:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 00:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.7ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 00:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 01:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 03:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 03:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 04:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.7ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 05:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +25.4ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 05:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 06:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +21.6ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 06:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 07:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +24.0ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 07:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 17 Oct 08:00 UTC — direct paths down to 1 of the 2 this route normally holds. Best path 111.2ms -> 111.1ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 08:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +25.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 08:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 09:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +29.5ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 09:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 10:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 10:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +33.4ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 10:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 17 Oct 13:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +23.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 17 Oct 13:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured latency (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 57 days): Perth to Singapore 191.9ms, up 145.3ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.4ms, up 46.3ms on its 100.1ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.5ms, up 48.0ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (16 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- A post on partnersinpreaching.org assesses that damage to INDIGO West and INDIGO Central highlights strategic weaknesses in Australia's digital sovereignty [1].
- Dr. Antonio Bhardwaj of the Foreign Affairs Forum assesses that a 'shadow fleet' enables deniable sabotage of Baltic Sea infrastructure [5].
- Analyst Pratnashree Basu argues that multilateral cooperation and strategic redundancy are essential to de-risk Indo-Pacific cables from Chinese sabotage [6].
- Prysmian completed the acquisition of Xtera Topco to integrate repeater technology for the EXA Meridian cable between New Jersey and Brean, UK [11].
- Meta is financing the Daraja submarine cable system to connect Mombasa, Kenya, with Salalah, Oman, with a 2026 service date [12].
Today
A post on partnersinpreaching.org argues that the recent damage to the INDIGO West and INDIGO Central subsea communication cables off the coast of Perth highlights a strategic weakness in Australia's digital sovereignty [1]. The author assesses that the cables, which carry 99% of Australia's international communications, are vulnerable to both accidents and intentional sabotage by state actors [1]. The analysis suggests that the current reliance on private infrastructure owned by tech giants, combined with a lack of a dedicated regulatory agency, creates significant national security risks [1].
Baltic Sea Infrastructure Sabotage and Grey Zone Risks
Dr. Antonio Bhardwaj of the Foreign Affairs Forum assesses a 'silent conflict' in the Baltic Sea characterized by a pattern of seabed infrastructure sabotage, including the 2022 Nord Stream ruptures, the October 2023 Balticconnector damage, and November 2024 severings of the Finland-Germany and Lithuania-Sweden cables [5]. The assessment identifies specific incidents involving the tanker Eagle S, which damaged Estlink 2 and four data lines on Christmas Day 2024, and the Fitburg, which was seized by authorities in Finland and Latvia on New Year's Eve 2025 [2, 5]. Bhardwaj argues that the use of a 'shadow fleet' and legal vacuums on the high seas allow for low-cost, deniable harassment of cables and pipelines that carry 95% of international data traffic [5].
In response to these vulnerabilities, NATO launched the Baltic Sentry mission in January 2025 to monitor assets using warships, drones, and aircraft [2]. A post on staticbrief.substack.com assesses that Russia's Kaliningrad exclave creates a 'denial architecture' that enables selective stand-off pressure and covert sabotage against sea lines of communication and undersea infrastructure [4]. Furthermore, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned of potential Russian escalation before Christmas Eve, citing intelligence regarding risks to infrastructure and following reports of cable damage and GPS interference [3].
Multilateral Cooperation and Surveillance Technologies for Subsea Security
Analyst Pratnashree Basu argues that multilateral cooperation and strategic redundancy are essential to de-risk Indo-Pacific subsea cables from Chinese espionage and deliberate sabotage [6]. The analysis identifies specific projects, including the Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe 6, Southeast Asia-Japan 2, Apricot, and Echo cables, as part of a broader effort by nations like Australia, Japan, and the US to diversify routes and bypass Chinese-controlled infrastructure [6].
To protect these assets, maritime operators and governments are increasingly investing in high-performance sonar and acoustic sensors to detect unauthorized divers and uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs) [8]. Security experts assess these technologies as becoming a standard component of layered security strategies to enhance maritime domain awareness [8]. Additionally, a post on dev.to highlights the deployment of autonomous drones and sensor nets to protect cables and pipelines, noting that operators monitoring these feeds face significant fatigue, which has led to the development of VR training tools for ROV pilots to improve sustained attention [9].
Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Acquisitions
The Syrian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology is seeking to establish a regional data corridor through several projects, including the Silk Link terrestrial network and the Ugarit 2 (also referred to as Ebla) submarine cable [10]. The Ugarit 2 is a 240-kilometre link between Tartous and Cyprus involving Unifi Communications, Cyta, Prysmian Group, Elettra, and Nokia [10]. Additionally, the Syrian Telecommunications Establishment reached an agreement with AFR-IX Telecom for the Medusa project, a subsea network linking Mediterranean countries with a partnership with Saudi Arabia’s Salam to extend connectivity to Aqaba, Jordan [10].
In a separate development, Prysmian has completed the acquisition of Xtera Topco through a joint venture with Fincantieri for an enterprise value of $65 million [11]. This acquisition integrates Xtera’s repeater technology and optical engineering with Prysmian’s manufacturing and installation capabilities for the EXA Meridian cable between New Jersey and Brean, UK [11]. Prysmian will manufacture the 6,552 km EXA Meridian cable at its Nordenham, Germany facility, which is doubling production capacity to meet the 2029 service date [11].
Subsea Infrastructure Expansion and Regional Connectivity
Meta, via its subsidiary Edge Network Services Limited, is financing the Daraja submarine cable system to connect Mombasa, Kenya, with Salalah, Oman [12]. The 4,108-kilometer system, which features 24 fiber pairs and is being built by Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN), is expected to enter service in 2026 to provide geographic diversity for Kenya and strengthen Oman's role as a connection point between East Africa, the Middle East, and Asia [12]. In Malaysia, Communications Minister Fahmi Fadzil confirmed the RM2 billion SALAM submarine cable project will feature 10 landing stations across Sarawak, Sabah, and Peninsular Malaysia [13].
Other regional developments include KT Corporation launching an 800 Gbps optical network service in South Korea to connect AI data centers using all-photonic technology [13]. In South Africa, MTN and Huawei completed a 5G-Advanced trial achieving 10.35 Gbps download speeds [13]. Additionally, a post on note.com describes a fictional 2030 proposal for a north-south submarine cable backbone in Japan to connect Akita City to Tsuruga and Otaru, bypassing Tokyo [14].
References
- The Subsea Cable Mystery: What Happened Off Perth's Coast? (2026) (partnersinpreaching.org)
Published: 17 Oct 2026 · partnersinpreaching.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Systems named: INDIGO West, INDIGO Central · Jurisdictions: AU - Beginner's 101 Guide: Silent Sabotage: The Hidden Struggle Under Europe's Seas, Foreign Affairs Forum (faf.ae)
Published: 17 Oct 2026 · faf.ae · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Nord Stream, Finland-Estonia-Sweden data cables, Finland-Germany cable, Lithuania-Sweden cable, Finland-Estonia power cable · Vessels named: Eagle S, Fitburg · Jurisdictions: FI, SE, EE, LV, DE, PL (+3 more) - Tusk warns of possible escalation by Russia before Christmas Eve, Interia (ua.news)
Published: 16 Oct 2026 · ua.news · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: PL, UA, LT, INT - Static Assessments: The Kaliningrad Problem (staticbrief.substack.com)
Published: 16 Oct 2026 · staticbrief.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Vessels named: FGS Sachsen-Anhalt · Jurisdictions: DE, LT, PL, EE, LV, RU (+1 more) - The War Beneath the Waves: How the Baltic Became the Front Line of a Silent Conflict, Foreign Affairs Forum (faf.ae)
Published: 17 Oct 2026 · faf.ae · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Balticconnector, Estlink 2 · Vessels named: Fitburg, FNS Pori · Jurisdictions: INT, FI, RU, LV - Multilateralism key for de-risking Indo-Pacific subsea cables (orfonline.org)
orfonline.org - U.S. Hosts Caribbean Dialogue on Security, Prosperity (miragenews.com)
miragenews.com - Cutting-Edge Underwater Surveillance Technologies Reinforce Maritime Infrastructure Security | Transport Security International Magazine (tsi-mag.com)
Published: 16 Oct 2026 · tsi-mag.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT - The seabed is militarizing - DEV Community (dev.to)
Published: 17 Oct 2026 · dev.to · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT - Syria enters the race to carry the world’s data (noonpost.com)
Published: 17 Oct 2026 · noonpost.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: Silk Link, Ugarit 2, Ebla, Medusa · Jurisdictions: SY, CY, SA, INT - Prysmian Completes Xtera Acquisition (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
subtelforum.com - Daraja: Meta's Submarine Cable Linking Kenya and Oman (cloudnews.tech)
cloudnews.tech - Telecom news: KT, MTN, Huawei, Malaysia’s RM2 Billion SALAM Subsea Cable - TelecomLead (telecomlead.com)
Published: 16 Oct 2026 · telecomlead.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: SALAM · Jurisdictions: MY - Missing Link: Prologue (note.com)
Published: 14 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: speculation · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: JP
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-17 15:13 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
page last checked 2026-10-17 15:13 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-17 13:27 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 16 Oct 07:12 UTC (the page gives no date)
- Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT Start Date: 04 April 2026 16:10 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. …
page last checked 2026-10-17 15:13 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-10-17 (quiet 1d)
Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 191.9ms, +145.3ms on its best sustained 46.6ms; typical path 317.6ms (+117.0ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 149.9ms; queuing 0.6ms; 57 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 26 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.1ms (+46.3ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 57 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 24.6ms; typical path 29.5ms (-0.0ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 24.8ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 57 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.5ms, +48.0ms on its best sustained 96.5ms; typical path 266.6ms (+65.3ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 172.9ms; queuing 0.7ms; 57 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms floor; 12/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 50.6ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 62.6ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 111.0ms against a 85.0ms floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 51.3ms against a 38.3ms floor; 12/67 paths direct (normally 12)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.0ms against a 31.5ms floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 200.6ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.1ms against a 76.7ms floor; 29/106 paths direct (normally 27)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms floor; 46/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 258/296 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-13UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 590 successful fetches in 24h, 37 errors across 16 source(s). Generated 2026-10-17 16:04 UTC.