---
date: 2026-10-15
issue: 83
title: PLDT Urges Philippine Government to Streamline Submarine Cable Repair Approvals
standfirst: The telecommunications firm is calling for a faster permit process for
  specialized cable vessels to mitigate infrastructure downtime. The move aims to
  reduce delays caused by multiple permit requirements during emergency repairs.
jurisdictions:
- PH
- DE
- UA
- US
- IR
- EG
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 68 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (8 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 41 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (8 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (20 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 14 Oct (yesterday); the notice carries no date of its own.  
  Notice: “Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. Indigo West remains offline while the fault is being addressed. …”
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 14 Oct 19:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 14 Oct 19:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 14 Oct 20:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 14 Oct 20:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 14 Oct 21:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 14 Oct 21:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 14 Oct 22:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 14 Oct 22:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 14 Oct 23:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 14 Oct 23:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 00:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 00:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 01:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 02:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 02:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 03:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 03:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 04:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 05:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 05:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 06:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 06:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 07:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 07:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 08:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 08:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 10:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 10:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 11:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 11:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 12:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 12:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 13:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 13:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 15 Oct 14:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.2ms -> 137.9ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 15 Oct 14:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 15 Oct 14:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured latency** (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 55 days): Perth to Singapore 191.6ms, up 145.1ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.4ms, up 39.4ms on its 100.1ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.6ms, up 48.2ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in UY, cause cable cut, 13 Oct 19:00 UTC to 14 Oct 00:00 UTC: “Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.” **New since the last brief.**

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (14 Oct 17:58 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- PLDT Inc. is seeking a streamlined approval process from the Philippine government to accelerate emergency repairs on damaged submarine cables [1].
- A post on essentialeurope.substack.com reports that the cargo ship Fitburg was suspected of damaging two cables in the Gulf of Finland [4].
- Allen Zhang of The Heritage Foundation and Taiwanese authorities identify Chinese research vessels conducting seabed mapping near Taiwan as a 'grey-zone' tactic [11].
- Coratia Technologies assesses that India's subsea cable security requires a shift toward inspection capabilities to address four-to-five-month repair turnarounds [7].
- Aventa has acquired Irish Sea Contractors to integrate engineering services with offshore delivery for subsea cable and offshore wind infrastructure [12].

## Today

PLDT Inc. is seeking a streamlined approval process from the Philippine government to accelerate emergency repairs on submarine cable infrastructure damaged by maritime incidents or natural disasters [1]. PLDT Global Corp. CEO Albert V. Villa-Real stated that these cables are critical for financial transactions and AI technologies, while First Vice President Arvin L. Siena noted that specialized vessels currently face multiple permit requirements to enter Philippine waters [1].

## Suspected interference and anchor drag

A post on essentialeurope.substack.com reports that the cargo ship Fitburg was suspected of damaging two cables in the Gulf of Finland on December 31, 2025 [4]. The same post notes that Russian underwater-warfare vessels were intercepted near Norway’s Svalbard archipelago in spring 2026, and highlights the 2022 Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipeline explosions alongside the severing of the Shetland Islands, South of France, Finland to Germany, and Lithuania to Sweden cables [4]. 

CircleID assesses that submarine cables face deliberate sabotage and geological hazards, citing historical precedents such as the HMTS Alert cutting German cables in 1914 and 1939 [3]. The assessment identifies the Taiwan Strait, specifically the Taima No. 2, Taima No. 3, and Taima No. 4 systems, and the Bab al-Mandab Strait as high-risk areas [3]. A post on strategypage.com reports that a German court is set to try Serhii Kuznetsov next week on charges related to the September 2022 Nord Stream pipeline attack, which prosecutors allege was intended to disrupt gas delivery [2].

## Geopolitical Risks and Grey-Zone Tactics in Subsea Infrastructure

Taiwanese authorities and analysts, including Allen Zhang of The Heritage Foundation, have identified a trend of Chinese 'grey-zone' tactics involving research vessels such as the Xiang Yang Hong 06, Tongji, Xiang Yang Hong 22, and Lanhai 201 [11]. These vessels, operated by agencies like the Ministry of Natural Resources, are reportedly conducting seabed mapping and maritime surveys near Taiwan to potentially gather intelligence on submarine topography and undersea cables [11]. In the Arctic, author Rana Foroohar notes that Russia and China are increasing maritime presence to secure new shipping routes and access underwater resources, including cables carrying 95% of intercontinental information flow [10].

In the Middle East, Iranian security official Mohsen Rezaei warned that over $2 trillion in digital infrastructure, including communications cables, could be targeted in a conflict with the United States [8]. This follows confirmed drone strikes on Amazon Web Services facilities in the UAE and Bahrain that caused physical damage and permanent data loss [8]. Meanwhile, Coratia Technologies assesses that India's subsea cable security requires a shift toward inspection capabilities to identify faults from anchoring and fishing, as the country currently faces a four-to-five-month repair turnaround and lacks domestic repair vessels [7].

## Subsea Infrastructure Supply Chain and Data Assets

Aventa has acquired Irish Sea Contractors, a Wexford-based marine contractor with 40 years of experience in fiber-optic and power cable projects across Ireland, the UK, and mainland Europe [12]. The acquisition includes the DNV-qualified AERSUB repair solution and aims to integrate engineering services with offshore delivery to reduce operational interfaces for subsea cable and offshore wind infrastructure [12]. Separately, Subsea Commercial Services Ltd (SCS) secured global commercial exclusivity for Dead Reckoning Engineering's (DRE) Reusable Subsea Cable Mould Kits [13]. These kits allow operators to manufacture micro-circular assemblies and perform field repairs in-house, which SCS claims will reduce project delays and costs by decreasing reliance on specialist manufacturers for low-volume cable production [13]. 

GeoTel has released a dataset detailing undersea communication cables and landing stations, including ownership, length, and service readiness [14]. The data is intended to help service providers identify access control points, develop emergency contingency plans, and analyze cable vulnerabilities to optimize network planning and assess national security risks [14].

## India AI Data Center Policy Framework

NITI Aayog’s Frontier Tech Hub has proposed a policy framework to manage the expansion of AI data centers across India [15]. The proposal recommends that state governments mandate grid readiness checks, 20- to 30-year water assessments, and measurable economic criteria to manage the strain on resources caused by hyperscale facilities [15]. The framework aims to link government subsidies to verifiable milestones, including local job creation and green energy adoption, to balance India's growth as a global AI compute hub with environmental sustainability [15].

## Also noted

- A post on theweek.in reports that over 95% of international data and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions travel via undersea cables [16].

## References

1. [PLDT seeks faster approvals for submarine cable repairs - BusinessWorld Online](https://bworldonline.com/corporate/2026/10/15/787226/pldt-seeks-faster-approvals-for-submarine-cable-repairs) (bworldonline.com)
   Published: 15 Oct 2026 · bworldonline.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: PH · Also reported by: tradersunion.com
2. [On Point: Defending Seabed Pipelines and Cables](https://www.strategypage.com/on_point/20261014222811.aspx) (strategypage.com)
   strategypage.com · Also reported by: patriotpost.us
3. [Submarine Cable Resilience Faces Growing Threats From Aging Fleets and Concentrated Ownership](https://circleid.com/posts/submarine-cable-resilience-faces-growing-threats-from-aging-fleets-and-concentrated-ownership) (circleid.com)
   Published: 13 Oct 2026 · circleid.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Taima No. 2, Taima No. 3, Taima No. 4 · Vessels named: HMTS Alert · Jurisdictions: TW, CN, INT
4. [The growing threat beneath Europe’s seas - by Ruben Cober](https://essentialeurope.substack.com/p/the-growing-threat-beneath-europes) (essentialeurope.substack.com)
   Published: 14 Oct 2026 · essentialeurope.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Systems named: Shetland Islands cable, South of France cable, Finland to Germany cable, Lithuania to Sweden cable · Vessels named: Fitburg · Jurisdictions: INT, DE, FI, SE, NO, UK (+1 more)
5. [HMS Protector: Critical British warship out of action as it suffers double engine failure at sea](https://gbnews.com/news/hms-protector-british-warship-action-double-engine-failure-sea) (gbnews.com)
   Published: 13 Oct 2026 · gbnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, seabed_security · Vessels named: HMS Protector, HMS Endurance, HMS Prince of Wales, HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Dragon · Jurisdictions: GB, RU, US, NO, AR
6. [Former top commander issues chilling 'Russia is at war with Nato today' warning](https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/2257348/russia-already-war-nato-today-former-top-commander-warns) (express.co.uk)
   express.co.uk · Also reported by: mirror.co.uk
7. [India’s Subsea Cable Security Starts With Inspection, Not Just Repair Ships | Coratia Technologies](https://coratia.com/blog/indias-subsea-cable-security-starts-with-inspection-not-just-repair-ships) (coratia.com)
   Published: 13 Oct 2026 · coratia.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, seabed_security · Systems named: SMW4, IMEWE · Vessels named: JalaSimha, Navya · Jurisdictions: IN, EG, SG, AE
8. [The AI Boom Has a $2 Trillion Physical Security Problem Investors May Be Overlooking](https://coinpaper.com/37296/the-ai-boom-has-a-2-trillion-physical-security-problem-investors-may-be-overlooking) (coinpaper.com)
   Published: 14 Oct 2026 · coinpaper.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Jurisdictions: IR, AE, SA, KW, QA, INT
9. [Gustavo de Arístegui: Geopolitical Analysis of 14 October](https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/gustavo-aristegui/gustavo-aristegui-geopolitical-analysis-of-14-october/20261014180000229855.html) (atalayar.com)
   atalayar.com
10. [Aboard an icebreaker, a writer got a closer look at the Arctic's 'Sea Change'](https://npr.org/transcripts/nx-s1-6001592) (npr.org)
   Published: 14 Oct 2026 · npr.org · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: USS Healy · Jurisdictions: RU, CN, US, CA, INT
11. [Research ships & seabed surveys: Inside China’s grey-zone tactics against Taiwan](https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/research-ships-seabed-surveys-inside-chinas-grey-zone-tactics-against-taiwan/articleshow/134944662.cms) (timesofindia.indiatimes.com)
   Published: 14 Oct 2026 · timesofindia.indiatimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Vessels named: Xiang Yang Hong 06, Tongji · Jurisdictions: TW, CN
12. [Aventa Acquires Irish Sea Cable Services Provider](https://subtelforum.com/aventa-acquires-irish-sea-cable-services-provider/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   subtelforum.com
13. [SCS Secures Commercial Exclusivity of DRE Subsea Cable Mold Kits](https://marinetechnologynews.com/news/secures-commercial-exclusivity-subsea-666748) (marinetechnologynews.com)
   Published: 14 Oct 2026 · marinetechnologynews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: repair · Jurisdictions: INT
14. [Submarine Cables & Landings | GeoTel](https://www.geo-tel.com/products/datasets/submarine-cables-landings/) (geo-tel.com)
   geo-tel.com
15. [UPSC CURRENT AFFAIRS, 15 OCTOBER 2026](https://www.insightsonindia.com/2026/10/15/upsc-current-affairs-15-october-2026/) (insightsonindia.com)
   insightsonindia.com
16. [The invisible war: How autonomous drone swarms are redrawing the tech map - The Week](https://www.theweek.in/news/defence/2026/10/15/the-invisible-war-how-autonomous-drone-swarms-are-redrawing-the-tech-map.html) (theweek.in)
   theweek.in

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `7 Oct 12:07 UTC` Identified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-15 15:08 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `7 Oct 08:12 UTC` Update: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-15 15:07 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-15 13:23 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 14 Oct 03:13 UTC (the page gives no date)
  - Update: 12/10/2026 11:00 AEDT We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. Indigo West remains offline while the fault is being addressed. …
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-15 15:08 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 14 documents, last 2026-09-26 (quiet 20d)

**Measured path state** (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **191.6ms, +145.1ms on its best sustained 46.6ms**; typical path 275.5ms (+72.2ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 151.2ms; queuing 0.7ms; 55 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 49 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 178.5ms (+39.4ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 134.0ms; queuing 0.5ms; 55 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 26.7ms; typical path 34.5ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 55 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.6ms, +48.2ms on its best sustained 96.5ms**; typical path 224.2ms (+37.2ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 173.4ms; queuing 0.6ms; 55 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s), 1 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in `cablewatch segments`.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms floor; 13/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 50.6ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.3ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 62.3ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 111.9ms against a 85.0ms floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 51.3ms against a 38.3ms floor; 12/67 paths direct (normally 11) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.6ms against a 31.5ms floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 189.3ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.4ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms floor; 27/94 paths direct (normally 25) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms floor; 46/65 paths direct (normally 50) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 22.3ms against a 19.3ms floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 281/296 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under `uncovered`.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-13` UY — REGIONAL — Fiber optic cuts on ANTEL's (AS6057) national backbone caused a near-total loss of its HTTP request traffic in eastern Uruguay.

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 602 successful fetches in 24h, 31 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-15 16:04 UTC.</sub>
