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13 October 2026 · Issue 81

Megaport Launches Automated Infrastructure Platform in Portugal to Expand Connectivity

The expansion establishes new on-ramps in Lisbon for private compute, network, and storage services. The move leverages Portugal's proximity to major submarine cable landings to strengthen European connectivity.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (12 Oct 18:10 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

Megaport Limited has launched its automated infrastructure platform in Portugal, establishing new on-ramps in Lisbon [1]. The expansion provides local enterprises and service providers with access to over 1,200 enabled data centers worldwide [1]. This development aims to strengthen Megaport's European connectivity hub by leveraging Portugal's digital economy and submarine cable infrastructure [1].

Infrastructure Vulnerability and Sabotage Risks

A post on voiceofthesea.substack.com claims that global internet infrastructure is shifting from covert tapping to active physical sabotage, specifically citing the use of a deep-sea cable-cutting device with a 150mm diamond-coated blade [3]. The post reports that the Shunxin-39 damaged cables near Taiwan in January 2025 and notes multiple cuts in the Baltic Sea since 2022 [3]. The author argues that adversaries can weaponize these dependencies to isolate countries or freeze markets, while a Business Insider documentary highlights the strategic importance of these networks to national security and global commerce [4].

In response to these risks, Iceland has launched 'Korda,' a state-owned enterprise to centrally manage three submarine cables and national emergency networks to defend against sabotage and natural disasters [5]. Additionally, Ooredoo signed a dark fibre agreement with iQ Networks and ITPC to develop a land-sea hybrid corridor through Iraq to bypass high-risk Red Sea chokepoints [5]. In the Philippines, tech veteran Fernando Contreras Jr. argues that the country must prioritize expanding its submarine cable network and diversifying landing stations to address common points of failure in areas like Batangas, Cavite, and La Union [2].

Subsea Infrastructure Security and Route Diversification

The Philippine Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and the Marcos administration launched the second iteration of the National Cybersecurity Plan (NCSP) via Executive Order No. 58 [7]. The plan includes a strategy to secure submarine cable infrastructure in coordination with the Philippine Coast Guard and Australia’s Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre [7]. In Japan, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) is providing a ¥100 billion sovereign cable vessel fund and JBIC risk capital to dismantle the Tokyo, Shima duopoly [8]. This initiative, which includes the Communications and Information network Association of Japan (CIAJ) selecting SoftBank, IPS, and Shikoku Electric as subsidy recipients, aims to develop landing stations and branching units in Tomakomai, Wakayama, and Anan to support the Candle Subsea Cable System and the East Asia to North America (E2A) submarine cable system [8].

Maritime security exercises in the Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia also highlighted infrastructure protection, with a U.S. Navy destroyer, the USS Paul Ignatius, conducting live-fire drills with Swedish and Finnish personnel [10]. The trilateral exercise involved firing at unmanned surface targets to practice protecting undersea cables and vital regional infrastructure from potential threats [10]. Additionally, the Andaman Dialogues 2027 has been identified as a forum focusing on subsea cable resilience [9].

Nokia Divestment of Private Wireless Unit

Nokia has agreed to sell its Enterprise Campus Edge (ECE) private wireless unit to the private equity firm Aurelius for an undisclosed sum [11]. The deal, which is expected to close in the first half of 2027, involves a unit serving approximately 900 customers in sectors including manufacturing and mining [11]. Nokia stated the sale is intended to sharpen its portfolio and redirect resources toward areas of greater long-term value [11].

Henox Crest Coastal Submarine Cable Network

Henox IT and Data Centers, in partnership with APTelecom, announced the development of Henox Crest [12]. This high-capacity coastal submarine cable system is designed to connect Gujarat, Mangaluru, Kochi, Chennai, and Visakhapatnam to create carrier-neutral landing hubs [12]. The project aims to reduce India's dependence on its current two-gateway international internet capacity by providing a distributed backbone for AI, cloud, and hyperscale data centers [12]. Henox Crest will also offer onward connectivity to the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and the United States to strengthen national digital resilience and geographic diversity [12].

Also noted

References

  1. SubOptic | Radial Path (SubOptic)
    Published: 12 Oct 2026 · suboptic.org · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Jurisdictions: PT, AU
  2. PH needs more undersea cables, not just faster Internet - tech exec (newsbytes.ph)
    newsbytes.ph
  3. THE SEABED WAR: The Internet Runs Through Cables on the Ocean Floor...And the Spies Are Cutting Them... READ FOR FREE (voiceofthesea.substack.com)
    Published: 12 Oct 2026 · voiceofthesea.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Vessels named: USS Halibut, USS Jimmy Carter, Shunxin-39 · Jurisdictions: TW, INT
  4. Exploring the Sole Internet Submarine Cable Manufacturer in America, HadNews.com (hadnews.com)
    Published: 12 Oct 2026 · hadnews.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: US, INT
  5. Subsea Daily News#20 (note.com)
    Published: 11 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: official_statement (the claim it relays, not the publisher) · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Systems named: FIG Subsea Cable · Jurisdictions: IS, IQ, INT
  6. SUBCO announces 850km Sydney-Melbourne fibre route (W.Media)
    w.media
  7. LIST: The Marcos administration's cybersecurity efforts (rappler.com)
    Published: 13 Oct 2026 · rappler.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: PH, AU
  8. CIAJ Selects SoftBank, IPS, and Shikoku Electric Under Japan MIC’s Subsea Route Diversification Program (Submarine Networks)
    submarinenetworks.com
  9. Andaman Dialogues 2027 puts subsea cable resilience in focus (voicendata.com)
    voicendata.com
  10. US Navy 10,140-Ton Destroyer Fires Live Rounds At Uncrewed Targets In The Gulf Of Bothnia (Marine Insight)
    marineinsight.com
  11. Eurobites: Nokia sells private wireless unit to Aurelius (Light Reading)
    lightreading.com
  12. Henox Crest Plans Coastal Submarine Cable Network in India (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
    subtelforum.com
  13. European Coast Guards Test Joint Response To Multiple Maritime Emergencies (Marine Insight)
    marineinsight.com
  14. Iran hardliners back threats to strike Persian Gulf digital infrastructure (iranintl.com)
    iranintl.com
  15. Iran's new strategy: Targeting oil shuttles to control the Strait of Hormuz (theweek.in)
    theweek.in

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.

Collection: 591 successful fetches in 24h, 32 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-10-13 18:08 UTC.