Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 65 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
Latest update, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (5 days ago): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 38 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.
Latest update, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (5 days ago): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.” - Australia Singapore Cable: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.
Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (17 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 12 Oct (today); the notice carries no date of its own.
New notice: “We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. Indigo West remains offline while the fault is being addressed. …” - Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 11 Oct 19:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 11 Oct 19:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 11 Oct 20:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 11 Oct 20:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 11 Oct 21:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 11 Oct 21:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 11 Oct 22:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 11 Oct 22:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 11 Oct 23:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 11 Oct 23:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 00:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 00:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 01:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 01:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 02:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 02:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 03:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 03:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 04:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 04:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 05:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 05:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 06:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 06:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 07:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.1ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 07:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 08:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 08:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 09:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 09:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 10:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 10:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 11:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 11:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 12:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.3ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 12:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 13:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 13:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 12 Oct 16:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.2ms -> 139.2ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [GROUP_STEP] at 12 Oct 16:00 UTC — 5 of 9 paths stepped, median +43.2ms against each path's own floor. 3 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured route: Sydney to Noumea [RECOVERY] at 12 Oct 16:00 UTC — GROUP_STEP has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- Measured latency (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 52 days): Perth to Singapore 191.6ms, up 145.1ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.0ms, up 43.9ms on its 100.1ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.6ms, up 48.1ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- Elsewhere: Cloudflare Radar lists no outage with a cable cut as its cause, open or ended in the last 3 days, anywhere in the world.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (11 Oct 18:13 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard accused China of blocking a criminal investigation into the Yi Peng 3 regarding the Arelion and C-Lion 1 cable severings [1].
- Elisabeth Braw of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assesses that Russia and China are increasingly employing hybrid attacks to sabotage underwater infrastructure [2].
- Eurasia Review assesses that uneven cyber defenses in Cambodia and Laos leave maritime chokepoints and subsea cables exposed to state-sponsored threats [5].
- Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei stated that Iran threatened to target American-linked undersea communications cables and data centers if war resumes [6].
- IndexBox indicates the global submarine fiber market is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 5.8% from 2026 to 2035 [9].
Today
Swedish Foreign Minister Maria Malmer Stenergard accused China of blocking a criminal investigation into the Yi Peng 3, a ship linked to damage sustained by the Arelion and C-Lion 1 cables [1]. While China permitted observers from several European nations on board, it denied Swedish prosecutors the right to conduct technical investigations or question the crew regarding the November 17 and 18 cable severings [1]. The C-Lion 1 system was reportedly cut approximately 700 kilometres from Helsinki [1].
Hybrid Warfare and Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
In her book 'Undersea War', Elisabeth Braw of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security argues that Russia and China are increasingly employing 'hybrid attacks' to sabotage vital underwater infrastructure [2]. Braw cites specific incidents including the Yi Peng 3 severing cables connecting Sweden to Lithuania and Finland to Germany, as well as Chinese ships cutting the Matsu cables in 2023 [2]. She notes that the 1884 Paris Convention's archaic maritime laws create significant hurdles for holding nations accountable for such acts [2].
While Braw focuses on the threat to global connectivity and energy, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Alexus Grynkewich, has introduced a 'theory of victory' blueprint to defend the alliance against potential attacks [3]. This doctrine involves deploying land forces to breach locations and utilizing a mix of cheap and precision munitions from aircraft and ships to target the infrastructure supporting an invading force [3]. The strategy aims to coordinate a unified response among all 32 NATO members against escalating Russian hybrid warfare and sabotage [3].
Naval Expansion and Regional Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
The German government has agreed to double its purchase of TKMS MEKO A-200 DEU frigates from four to eight hulls to replace the canceled F-126 Niedersachsen-class program [4]. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius also announced a new naval station at the port of Emden to provide a strategic alternative to Wilhelmshaven, moves intended to counter Russian submarine threats and protect critical subsea infrastructure [4].
An analysis by Eurasia Review assesses that uneven cyber defenses across ASEAN nations, specifically gaps in Cambodia and Laos, leave maritime chokepoints and subsea cables exposed to state-sponsored threats from China, Russia, and North Korea [5]. Additionally, Iran's Supreme National Security Council secretary, Maj. Gen. Mohsen Rezaei, stated that Washington's response to Tehran's demands is 'inadequate' and threatened to target American-linked undersea communications cables and data centers if war resumes [6].
Submarine Fiber Market Expansion and Production
SubCom is currently the only U.S. builder of complete submarine cable systems and reached a milestone of deploying one million kilometers of subsea cable in May 2025 [8]. The company operates a 50-acre manufacturing campus in Newington, New Hampshire, where it produces approximately 58,000 kilometers of cable annually [7]. SubCom plans to expand this production to 77,000 kilometers by the end of 2026, with a long-term target of 100,000 kilometers [7].
Market analysis from IndexBox indicates the global submarine fiber market is projected to grow at a compound annual growth rate of 5.8% from 2026 to 2035 [9]. This expansion is driven by hyperscale cloud and content providers, such as Google, Meta, and Microsoft, who are increasingly commissioning private cables to bypass traditional telecommunications consortia [9]. Significant new cable systems are planned across the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Ocean routes to support AI, 5G, and cloud services [9].
Regional Infrastructure and Regulatory Developments
EonFibre has launched 'Zone Direct,' a connectivity service designed to help hyperscalers and data centre developers assess infrastructure in six New Zealand zones, including North Waikato and Central Otago [10]. The service provides network design and connectivity briefs based on EonFibre's assets, specifically the Aqualink, Tasman Global Access, Hawaiki, Southern Cross, Southern Cross NEXT, and Honomoana cable systems [10]. EonFibre CEO Richard Mooney stated the initiative aims to help investors understand how capacity reaches customers in Australia, Asia, and the United States during early site selection [10].
In India, the Department of Telecommunications and TRAI have introduced major regulatory reforms, including a new digital authorisation system to replace the unified licence and the National Frequency Allocation Plan 2025 [11]. The Indian government is also offering tax holidays for foreign cloud providers using Indian data centres while pushing for 6G research partnerships with institutions like IIT Bombay [11]. These shifts signal a transition toward a digital infrastructure ecosystem focused on 6G, AI, and satellite communications [11].
References
- Sweden accuses China of blocking probe of ship linked to Baltic Sea cables damage (wionews.com)
wionews.com - Russia and China are targeting vital underwater cables in terrifying ways that could send us back to the Dark Ages, a new book reveals (nypost.com)
nypost.com - NATO’s Top Commander Reveals Blueprint For Defeating Attack (newsweek.com)
newsweek.com - Germany's Navy Rebuilds, Doubling Frigate Order and Adding New Base (The Maritime Executive)
Published: 12 Oct 2026 · maritime-executive.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security · Jurisdictions: DE, INT - The Indo-Pacific Cyber Patchwork: Why ASEAN’s Cyber Resilience Matters For NATO - Analysis - Eurasia Review (eurasiareview.com)
Published: 12 Oct 2026 · eurasiareview.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: SG, MY, KH, LA, TW, INT - Hormuz Response ’Inadequate,’ Threatens to Hit Undersea Cables, AI Centers if War Resumes (breitbart.com)
breitbart.com - How SubCom in New Hampshire Quietly Builds the Cables That Link the World's Data - TechEBlog (techeblog.com)
Published: 12 Oct 2026 · techeblog.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT - The Internet's Undersea Tollbooth, and You Can't Buy It (ainvest.com)
ainvest.com - Submarine Fiber Market To 2035: Hyperscale Data Demand Drives Expansion - News and Statistics - IndexBox (indexbox.io)
Published: 12 Oct 2026 · indexbox.io · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT - EonFibre launches connectivity offer for NZ data centre zones (W.Media)
w.media - Changing Dynamics: Regulatory reforms, 6G ambitions and satcom mark a shift in sector priorities (indianinfrastructure.com)
indianinfrastructure.com
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
7 Oct 12:07 UTCIdentified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
page last checked 2026-10-12 17:10 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
7 Oct 08:12 UTCUpdate: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.7 Oct 04:54 UTCUpdate: Repairs on Indigo West are scheduled for between the 16-26th of October. ASC is scheduled shortly after on the 4th of November. GSL will continue to route traffic on the best alternative paths to Singapore. Please note these timelines are subject to weather conditions, permits and condition of cables.
page last checked 2026-10-12 17:10 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- Australia Singapore Cable · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
25 Sep 07:45 UTCUpdate: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
page last checked 2026-10-12 13:49 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 12 Oct 00:10 UTC (the page gives no date)
- We continue to monitor the Indigo West cable system fault and continue to work with the relevant teams regarding the ongoing restoration activities. There have been no changes to the current repair plan. The Segment 1A repair window remains scheduled to commence on 25 October 2026 and complete by 03 November 2026, subject to weather conditions and other operational factors. Indigo West remains offline while the fault is being addressed. …
page last checked 2026-10-12 17:10 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/
1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 14 documents, last 2026-09-26 (quiet 17d)
Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — best path 191.6ms, +145.1ms on its best sustained 46.6ms; typical path 275.8ms (+72.3ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 150.0ms; queuing 0.5ms; 52 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 65 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — best path 100.0ms; typical path 181.9ms (+43.9ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 133.9ms; queuing 0.5ms; 52 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — best path 26.7ms; typical path 34.5ms (+0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.6ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 52 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — best path 144.6ms, +48.1ms on its best sustained 96.5ms; typical path 223.3ms (+43.8ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 173.0ms; queuing 0.6ms; 52 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.
Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):
- Australia to Guam — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms floor; 13/24 paths direct (normally 13)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Dili to Australia — best 49.6ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured
Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System - Melbourne to Tasmania — best 9.6ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8)
Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2 - Perth to Jakarta — best 202.3ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) - Perth to Oman — best 99.4ms against a 85.0ms floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2)
Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route - Perth to Singapore — best 191.7ms against a 38.3ms floor; 0/67 paths direct (normally 11)
INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC) - Sydney to Fiji — best 37.7ms against a 31.5ms floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT - Sydney to Hawaii — best 189.3ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured
Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki - Sydney to Honiara — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route - Sydney to Japan — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms floor; 28/100 paths direct (normally 25)
Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S) - Sydney to New Zealand — best 23.5ms against a 21.1ms floor; 47/65 paths direct (normally 50)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable - Sydney to Noumea — best 22.2ms against a 19.3ms floor; 4/9 paths direct (normally 6)
Gondwana-1 · only system on this route - Sydney to Port Moresby — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3)
Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1) - Sydney to US West Coast — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 280/302 paths direct (normally 283)
Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour
A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.
Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:
2026-10-03HT — NETWORK — Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.
Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.
Collection: 590 successful fetches in 24h, 29 errors across 10 source(s). Generated 2026-10-12 18:10 UTC.