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9 October 2026 · Issue 77

Project Marinus Enters Next Phase of Subsea and Terrestrial Works

TasNetworks and the Tasmanian Government have announced the commencement of the next phase of the Marinus Link and North West Transmission Developments. The project aims to integrate Tasmanian renewable energy into the National Electricity Market.

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Situation

No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (8 Oct 16:20 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.

Executive summary

Today

TasNetworks and Premier Jeremy Rockliff announced the start of the next phase of Project Marinus, which includes the 345-kilometre Marinus Link interconnector [1]. The project will feature 255 kilometres of undersea cables and 90 kilometres of underground cables to provide a 1,500MW capacity between North West Tasmania and Victoria's Latrobe Valley [1]. Construction on Stage 1 of the North West Transmission Developments is scheduled to begin in August 2026 [1].

Gray-zone tactics and maritime security assessments

A Futures Lab analysis from Csis.org assesses that the People's Republic of China (PRC) utilizes 'dual-use' civilian research vessels, specifically the Xiang Yang Hong 06 and the Ke Xue, to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) near critical undersea infrastructure [4]. The analysis indicates these vessels used seabed-mapping systems and underwater gliders to collect oceanographic data between 2020 and 2025, with a sharp increase in activity in 2024, which the report suggests provides the PRC with intelligence to potentially sabotage infrastructure [4]. Separately, a report in Taiwan News argues that China is using 'gray-zone' tactics, including law enforcement patrols and survey activities, to establish a presence east of Taiwan that could potentially sabotage undersea cable routes [3].

In Europe, German BND President Martin Jäger assessed that the Baltic Sea has become a zone of 'sub-threshold' confrontation involving damaged telecommunications and power cables, such as the Balticconnector gas pipeline [5]. To counter these risks, the EU funded emergency repairs totaling 60 million euros between February and June 2026, while NATO launched Baltic Sentry in January 2025 to monitor critical infrastructure [5]. Regarding broader maritime cooperation, Jonathan Berkshire Miller of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory proposes that Canada and Japan establish a bilateral working group to coordinate forensic standards for attributing grey-zone incidents and maintain a standby repair fleet [2].

Maritime Surveillance and Subsea Infrastructure Security

Exail has introduced the Neptis uncrewed maritime surveillance system, which utilizes a 'system of systems' approach involving Oryx-family uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) to monitor sea lines of communication, ports, and subsea cables [9]. To counter threats from Chinese research vessels and submarine modernization, analyst Rahul Sarkar assesses that India is developing a layered architecture that integrates the Underwater Fiber Optic Sensing System (UFOSS) for persistent seabed sensing with mobile platforms like Project 17A frigates and Survey Vessel Large ships [10].

Security assessments in the region highlight a shift toward episodic, local maritime control where adversaries may use drones and precision strikes to create maritime killing zones, necessitating distributed formations and electromagnetic deception to protect coastal infrastructure [6]. Furthermore, analyst Eric Ang argues that ASEAN's current disaster management frameworks are insufficient for maritime crises that simultaneously degrade the communications and navigation infrastructure required for response efforts [8]. A report on firstpost.com also claims that China is developing technology specifically designed to cut through hard cables [7].

Infrastructure Resilience and Global Connectivity

ITU Deputy Secretary-General Tomas Lamanauskas warned of a 'digital pandemic' where disruptions to submarine cables, which carry over 99% of international data traffic, could impact global finance and healthcare [12]. A post on note.com clarifies that restored internet communication following a submarine cable failure does not signify a physical repair, but rather that traffic has been rerouted to alternative paths [11]. While rerouting maintains connectivity, the post notes it may result in increased latency or data loss, and the physical repair of the Red Sea submarine cable remains a separate process that can take one to three weeks depending on logistics and environmental factors [11].

Regional Connectivity and Power Grid Integration

OFN and iQ Networks have signed an agreement to purchase multiple dark fiber pairs for transit connectivity across Iraq [13]. This arrangement complements OFN’s landing agreement for the Fiber in Gulf (FIG) subsea cable system with the Iraqi Telecommunications and Post Company (ITPC), creating a corridor linking the Gulf, Asia, and Iraq to Türkiye and Europe [13].

Separately, Philippine Energy Secretary Sharon Garin announced efforts to accelerate a project linking the electricity networks of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines via high-voltage submarine cables [14]. The initiative aims to facilitate electricity trading and serve as a gateway to the ASEAN Power Grid, a move the Philippines is pursuing following a national energy emergency declared due to Middle East supply disruptions [14].

Also noted

References

  1. Project Marinus marks the start of next phase of works (felix.net)
    felix.net
  2. Jonathan Berkshire Miller on Subsea Cable Security & Canada-Japan Defence Cooperation, Global Defense Insight (defensetalks.com)
    Published: 09 Oct 2026 · defensetalks.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, policy, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: CA, JP, INT
  3. China’s gray-zone push east of Taiwan needs joint response (taiwannews.com.tw)
    taiwannews.com.tw
  4. China’s Weaponization of Dual-Use Research Vessels for Undersea Data Dominance (csis.org)
    csis.org
  5. Baltique : où commence la guerre ? (european-security.com)
    european-security.com
  6. Not like the old days: modern sea control will be episodic and local (ASPI, The Strategist)
    aspistrategist.org.au
  7. ‘China Developing Tech to Cut Through Hard Cables’: Why India Is Building Defences|Sagarmanthan 2026 (firstpost.com)
    firstpost.com
  8. ASEAN’s crisis plans end where the coastline begins (Lowy Institute, The Interpreter)
    lowyinstitute.org
  9. Exail Introduces Neptis Uncrewed Maritime Surveillance System (Naval News)
    navalnews.com
  10. OPINION | India’s expanding underwater domain awareness (theweek.in)
    theweek.in
  11. Even if communication is restored, the submarine cable may still be under repair (note.com)
    Published: 06 Oct 2026 · note.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent · Systems named: Red Sea submarine cable · Vessels named: KDDI Cable Ship · Jurisdictions: INT
  12. ITU’s Tomas Lamanauskas on Inclusive AI, Digital Pandemic and India’s Role at UN (southasianherald.com)
    southasianherald.com
  13. Iraq Emerges as New Gateway for Gulf-Europe Connectivity - Subsea Cables (subseacables.net)
    Published: 08 Oct 2026 · subseacables.net · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy · Systems named: Fiber in Gulf (FIG) · Jurisdictions: IQ, QA, OM, AE, BH, SA (+2 more)
  14. Philippines seeks to speed up four-nation power grid amid energy risks (operativmm.az)
    Published: 08 Oct 2026 · operativmm.az · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: PH, BN, ID, MY, SG
  15. In Helping Ukraine, We Protect Ourselves (RUSI commentary)
    rusi.org
  16. Two if by Sea: The Convergence Reshaping Maritime Power (oodanetwork.substack.com)
    Published: 08 Oct 2026 · oodanetwork.substack.com · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: INT

Standing status

Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.

Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.

Incident threads:

Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.

Every cable route leaving the mainland (measured hourly, no model involved):

A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under uncovered.

Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:

Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.

Collection: 599 successful fetches in 24h, 29 errors across 8 source(s). Generated 2026-10-09 17:02 UTC.