---
date: 2026-10-07
issue: 75
title: SUBCO Proposes Acquisition of Cable Laying Vessel and Survey Drone
standfirst: The move aims to bolster Australia's sovereign maritime capabilities and
  secure repair capacity beyond 2030. SUBCO founder Bevan Slattery expects government
  contributions from Australia and the US to fund the investment.
jurisdictions:
- AU
- US
- INT
- EU
- UA
- DK
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 60 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  **New update**, 7 Oct 12:07 UTC (today): “Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 33 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Update.  
  **New update**, 7 Oct 08:12 UTC (today): “SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (12 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, already on its page when monitoring began 14 Sep; the notice carries no date of its own.  
  Notice: “We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 06 Oct 19:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 07 Oct 06:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.2ms -> 139.1ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 07 Oct 09:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [GROUP_STEP] at 07 Oct 14:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths stepped, median +19.9ms against each path's own floor. 1 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured latency** (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 47 days): Perth to Singapore 191.8ms, up 145.2ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.4ms, up 43.6ms on its 100.5ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.6ms, up 48.1ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in HT, cause cable cut, 3 Oct 13:30 UTC to 4 Oct 18:15 UTC: “Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.”

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 2 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (6 Oct 16:16 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- SUBCO co-CEO Bevan Slattery is considering a US$165 million purchase of a cable laying vessel and a USV [1].
- A former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO assesses that Russia has transitioned to a campaign of undersea cable sabotage [2].
- Elisabeth Braw of the Atlantic Council describes a rise in suspicious undersea cable and pipeline activity in the Baltic Sea [6].
- Microscan plans to invest Rs 350 crore to build a subsea cable landing station in Alibaug to decongest Mumbai [15].

## Today

SUBCO founder and co-CEO Bevan Slattery is considering the purchase of a submarine cable laying vessel and an uncrewed surface vessel (USV) to address the shrinking operator mix of the South Pacific Marine Maintenance Agreement [1]. The proposed cable laying vessel, estimated to cost approximately US$165 million, could be delivered by the end of 2029, with a final investment decision expected by the end of 2026 [1]. The acquisition seeks to provide long-term certainty for laying and repair services in the region while addressing the current lack of a dedicated Australian cable-laying vessel [1].

## Hybrid Warfare and Subsea Infrastructure Sabotage

A former U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO argues that Russia has transitioned to a brazen campaign of escalating provocations, specifically including the sabotage of undersea cables [2]. This assessment characterizes the shift as a move toward undeniable hybrid warfare designed to fracture alliance unity and test collective defense thresholds [2]. Similarly, Elisabeth Braw of the Atlantic Council describes these activities as a 'war of subversion' that has evolved into violent grey-zone acts, noting a rise in suspicious undersea cable and pipeline activity in the Baltic Sea region involving merchant vessels [6].

In response to these threats, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced it is ready to share combat-tested interceptor drones and counter-drone technologies with the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) to protect undersea infrastructure from Russian reconnaissance and sabotage [3]. Meanwhile, the Norwegian PST has warned of increased Russian and Chinese intelligence gathering targeting coastal infrastructure, undersea cables, and oil and gas pipelines [4]. These developments occur as Polish lawmakers draft legislation to prepare for a 'pre-war period' in response to reports of Russian drone strikes and hybrid warfare [5].

## Maritime Security and Undersea Infrastructure Resilience

The 18th international conference on the East Sea/South China Sea opened in Hanoi on October 7, 2026, with approximately 300 delegates from over 30 countries discussing maritime security, specifically addressing risks to undersea cable infrastructure [7]. During a regional workshop in Bengaluru, India, Dr. Ian Montratama of Indo-Pacific Strategic Intelligence (ISI) provided an assessment that Indonesia faces significant challenges in Underwater Domain Awareness (UDA) due to institutional fragmentation and doctrinal gaps, advocating for an integrated ecosystem that connects surface, underwater, and cyber domains [9].

In the United States, the Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (NSWC PCD) has broken ground on a new Subsea & Seabed Warfare (SSW) facility to research and test autonomous unmanned systems and secure communication networks using AI [11]. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Icelandic Foreign Minister Thorgerdur Katrin Gunnarsdottir to discuss growing security threats to undersea cables and shipping lanes in the High North, emphasizing the role of military deterrence in preventing violence from adversaries [10]. Separately, Artiverse reports that cloud providers including Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon are investing in land routes and new systems like Meta's Petal cable and Project Waterworth to mitigate risks to Red Sea cables, where 90% of Europe-Asia data capacity travels [8].

## International Infrastructure and Regulatory Developments

Niger officially launched a fiber-optic link with Algeria on October 5, 2026, connecting northern Niger to Algeria through the Agadez-Assamaka corridor [12]. This project is part of the Trans-Saharan Fiber Optic Backbone, which aims to reduce Niger's digital isolation by diversifying terrestrial routes to international networks, including the Medusa submarine cable and various other systems like ACE and Equiano [12]. In Tanzania, the Minister for Communication and Information Technology issued the Cybercrimes (Protection of Critical Information Infrastructure) Order, 2026, which designates 25 categories of computer systems as critical information infrastructure (CII) [14]. This order requires owners to register with the National Registry for Critical Information Infrastructure (NRCII) and submit self-assessment reports by December 19, 2026, imposing mandatory obligations on data localisation, risk management, and disaster recovery [14].

## Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Connectivity Hubs

Private connectivity firm Microscan plans to invest Rs 350 crore to build a subsea cable landing station in Alibaug, approximately 95 kilometers from Mumbai [15]. Founder and managing director Sandeep Donde stated the project aims to decongest the Versova region, where 15 of 17 international cables are concentrated within a 6-kilometer stretch [15]. The facility will connect to Microscan's underground fiber network and the company is currently in talks with Henox IT and Data Centers, Singapore’s Datawave, and a London-based global subsea telecom operator [15].

In the Indo-Pacific, Darwin is emerging as a strategic interconnection point as Google and Inligo Networks submit applications to connect the Bosun and Asia Connect Cable System (ACC-1) to infrastructure in Fannie Bay [17]. These projects, alongside the Unite Cable System, Hawaiki Nui 1, and Project Waterworth, aim to link Australia to South-East Asia and the US mainland, though analyst Marvin Tan notes that major infrastructure for these cables is not expected to be fully operational until 2029 or 2030 [17]. Meanwhile, the Philippines is hosting the 44th ASEAN Ministers on Energy Meeting to develop a Submarine Power Cable Framework for the ASEAN Power Grid, which includes a planned high-voltage direct-current subsea cable connecting Palawan to Kudat in Sabah, Malaysia [16]. Additionally, Blackstone announced a US$ 30 billion investment in Japan's AI data centers over the next three to five years, with significant expansion shifting toward Osaka due to lower land prices and faster power grid connection times [18].

## Also noted

- A commentary on CNA reports that Singapore's new Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) operate 'below the threshold of war' [19].
- South Korea’s Jangbogo-N attack submarine programme could expand underwater surveillance, raising stakes for China and North Korea [20].

## References

1. [SUBCO eyes cable laying ship and survey drone](https://www.itnews.com.au/news/subco-eyes-cable-laying-ship-and-survey-drone-629451?utm_source=feed&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=iTnews+) (iTnews, telco)
   itnews.com.au · Also reported by: Submarine Telecoms Forum
2. [Russia’s Hybrid War Has Entered a Dangerous New Phase](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russia/russias-hybrid-war-has-entered-dangerous-new-phase) (foreignaffairs.com)
   foreignaffairs.com
3. [Ukraine Offers Interceptor Drones and Air Defense Technology to JEF](https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/ukraine-offers-interceptor-drones-and-air-defense-technology-to-jef-23150) (united24media.com)
   Published: 06 Oct 2026 · united24media.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: seabed_security, policy · Jurisdictions: UA, DK, EE, FI, IS, LV (+2 more)
4. [Russian ‘activity’ doubled off Norway](https://www.newsinenglish.no/2026/10/06/russian-activity-doubled-off-norway/) (newsinenglish.no)
   newsinenglish.no
5. [NATO’s Eastern Flank Makes Plans for Wartime Footing](https://www.newsweek.com/natos-eastern-flank-makes-plans-for-wartime-footing-12524002) (newsweek.com)
   newsweek.com
6. [It really is a war of subversion - New Eastern Europe](https://neweasterneurope.eu/2026/10/07/it-really-is-a-war-of-subversion) (neweasterneurope.eu)
   Published: 07 Oct 2026 · neweasterneurope.eu · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security, precedent · Jurisdictions: INT
7. [18th international conference on East Sea/South China Sea opens in Ha Noi](https://en.nhandan.vn/18th-international-conference-on-east-seasouth-china-sea-opens-in-ha-noi-post167441.html) (en.nhandan.vn)
   Published: 06 Oct 2026 · en.nhandan.vn · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: VN, PH, AU, CA, TW, INT · Also reported by: en.vietnamplus.vn
8. [The Internet’s Next Great Detour Is Taking Shape - Artiverse](https://www.artiverse.ca/the-internets-next-great-detour-is-taking-shape/) (artiverse.ca)
   artiverse.ca
9. [ISI Joins Regional Workshop on Maritime Domain Awareness in the Indo-Pacific](https://isi-indonesia.com/post/isi-joins-regional-workshop-on-maritime-domain-awareness-in-the-indo-pacific) (isi-indonesia.com)
   Published: 07 Oct 2026 · isi-indonesia.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, seabed_security · Jurisdictions: ID, AU, IN, JP, INT
10. [Iceland 'sits at center' of regional defense questions as threats grow: Rubio](https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/iceland-sits-at-center-of-regional-defense-questions-as-threats-grow-rubio/4079707) (aa.com.tr)
   aa.com.tr
11. [NSWC PCD breaks ground on cutting-edge facility for autonomous innovation](https://www.dvidshub.net/news/542371/nswc-pcd-breaks-ground-cutting-edge-facility-autonomous-innovation) (dvidshub.net)
   dvidshub.net
12. [Landlocked Niger Adds Algeria Fiber Route to Reduce Digital Isolation](https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-digital/0610-59497-landlocked-niger-adds-algeria-fiber-route-to-reduce-digital-isolation) (ecofinagency.com)
   ecofinagency.com
13. [CaribNOG Heads to Curaçao This Week](https://www.curacaochronicle.com/post/unknown/caribnog-heads-to-curacao-this-week) (curacaochronicle.com)
   curacaochronicle.com
14. [Tanzania: Regulatory Update on Critical Information Infrastructure](https://www.polity.org.za/article/tanzania-regulatory-update-on-critical-information-infrastructure-2026-10-07) (polity.org.za)
   polity.org.za
15. [Microscan To Invest Rs 350 Crore For Alibaug Cable Station](https://www.whalesbook.com/news/English/telecom/Microscan-To-Invest-Rs-350-Crore-For-Alibaug-Cable-Station/6ac5e7f35aacb956d08edf02) (whalesbook.com)
   whalesbook.com · Also reported by: economictimes.indiatimes.com
16. [ASEAN Power Grid: What’s in it for the Philippines?](https://newsline.ph/asean-power-grid-whats-in-it-for-the-philippines/) (newsline.ph)
   newsline.ph
17. [Why Darwin could become 'a major interconnection point' for global data](https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-10-07/fannie-bay-subsea-cables-development-northern-territory-darwin/107235602) (ABC News (Australia))
18. [Japan Rising!](https://w.media/japan-rising/) (W.Media)
   w.media
19. [Commentary: ‘Below the threshold of war’ is where Singapore’s new navy patrol vessels operate - CNA](https://channelnewsasia.com/commentary/singapore-navy-opv-offshore-patrol-vessels-maritime-threats-6435941) (channelnewsasia.com)
   Published: 07 Oct 2026 · channelnewsasia.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: seabed_security, analysis · Vessels named: NewNew Polar Bear · Jurisdictions: SG, FIN, EST, INT
20. [South Korea’s Nuclear Submarine Push Raises Stakes for China and North Korea](https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/south-korea-nuclear-submarines-china-north-korea/) (defencesecurityasia.com)
   defencesecurityasia.com

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `7 Oct 12:07 UTC` Identified: Shunt Fault Repairs have been delayed to; Start Time: Oct 25, 2026 01:00 UTC End Time: Nov 3, 2026 23:59 UTC
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-07 16:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Update, open since 4 Sep
  - `7 Oct 08:12 UTC` Update: SUBCO has advised Indigo West's repair has been rescheduled to October 25th - November 3rd.
  - `7 Oct 04:54 UTC` Update: Repairs on Indigo West are scheduled for between the 16-26th of October. ASC is scheduled shortly after on the 4th of November. GSL will continue to route traffic on the best alternative paths to Singapore. Please note these timelines are subject to weather conditions, permits and condition of cables.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-07 16:08 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-07 13:23 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, on the page when monitoring began 14 Sep 21:44 UTC (the page gives no date)
  - We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-07 16:09 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-09-26 (quiet 12d)

**Measured path state** (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **191.8ms, +145.2ms on its best sustained 46.6ms**; typical path 273.6ms (+72.3ms per probe against its own history, 21 probes); ocean crossing 152.6ms; queuing 0.6ms; 47 days of history; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 63 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.9ms (+43.6ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 134.9ms; queuing 0.5ms; 47 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 26.5ms; typical path 34.4ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.5ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 47 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.6ms, +48.1ms on its best sustained 96.5ms**; typical path 222.8ms (+38.8ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 157.5ms; queuing 0.6ms; 47 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in `cablewatch segments`.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.5ms against a 52.0ms floor; 13/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 51.1ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.2ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 63.7ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 119.2ms against a 85.0ms floor; 2/4 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 52.4ms against a 38.3ms floor; 11/67 paths direct (normally 11) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.2ms against a 31.5ms floor; 6/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 189.4ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.2ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms floor; 25/106 paths direct (normally 25) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.3ms against a 21.1ms floor; 50/65 paths direct (normally 50) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 65.6ms against a 19.3ms floor; **0/8 paths direct (normally 6)** <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 277/302 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under `uncovered`.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-03` HT — NETWORK — Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 604 successful fetches in 24h, 27 errors across 7 source(s). Generated 2026-10-07 16:20 UTC.</sub>
