---
date: 2026-10-06
issue: 74
title: Converge Reroutes Traffic via Bifrost and SEA-H2X After Singapore Link Cut
standfirst: Converge ICT Solutions Inc. maintained connectivity during a submarine
  cable severance by utilizing diverse international routes. The incident highlights
  the role of multi-system redundancy in mitigating regional outages.
jurisdictions:
- PH
- SG
- ID
- TW
- US
- CN
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Situation

- **Australia Singapore Cable**: first update on the page 23 Sep, per Vocus.  
  Latest update, 25 Sep 07:45 UTC (11 days ago): “Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. …”
- **INDIGO West**: open since 8 Aug, 59 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.  
  Latest update, 21 Sep 05:49 UTC (15 days ago): “Scheduled to repair the fault on Indigo West off the coast of Perth has completed. Unfortunately the existing shunt fault on Indigo West in Singapore has deteriorated into a full cable break and services remain down. Repairs off Singapore is expected to be on 16 Oct 2026 until 26 Oct 2026.”
- **Australia Singapore Cable**: open since 4 Sep, 32 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Identified.  
  Latest update, 4 Sep 06:49 UTC (32 days ago): “We observed short flaps occurring on the ASC submarine cable system at 04/09/2026 03:50:33 UTC. However a hard down event followed at 04/09/2026 06:19:12 UTC Due to the Indigo West cable system also being offline for shunt fault repairs, traffic will take a longer path which will result in higher latency between Australia and Singapore. We are waiting for further information from Vocus regarding this outage. Information received will be shared via our status page.”
- **INDIGO Central**: notice posted by Superloop, first seen 5 Oct (yesterday); the notice carries no date of its own.  
  Notice: “There was a brief service disruption affecting the Indigo Central link due to instability, which has since recovered. Our team is investigating the cause and continuing to monitor the link closely. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.”
- **INDIGO West**: notice posted by Superloop, already on its page when monitoring began 14 Sep; the notice carries no date of its own.  
  Notice: “We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.”
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 05 Oct 18:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 05 Oct 23:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.2ms -> 155.8ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [UNREACHABLE] at 06 Oct 02:00 UTC — 2 of 4 paths lost 80% or more of their packets. 1 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [RECOVERY] at 06 Oct 04:00 UTC — DIRECT_LOST has cleared: two consecutive hours back to normal. 0 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Sydney to Noumea [DIRECT_LOST] at 06 Oct 12:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 6 path(s) were within Sydney to Noumea's physical floor, now none. Best path 22.3ms -> 65.6ms. 8 of 8 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Gondwana-1 (TeleGeography).
- **Measured route**: Perth to Oman [DIRECT_LOST] at 06 Oct 13:00 UTC — every direct path is gone: 2 path(s) were within Perth to Oman's physical floor, now none. Best path 111.2ms -> 139.2ms. 2 of 4 paths stepped with it. 2 independent vantages. The only system leaving Australia for this destination is Oman Australia Cable (OAC) (TeleGeography).
- **Measured latency** (RIPE Atlas, best measured path over 24 hours against each route's best sustained floor over 46 days): Perth to Singapore 191.8ms, up 145.3ms on its 46.6ms floor; Sydney to Japan 100.4ms, up 46.5ms on its 100.5ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 144.5ms, up 48.1ms on its 96.5ms floor.
- **Elsewhere**: Cloudflare Radar lists an outage in HT, cause cable cut, 3 Oct 13:30 UTC to 4 Oct 18:15 UTC: “Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.” **New since the last brief.**

<sub>No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. No operator has posted an update or a new notice on these since the last brief (5 Oct 16:03 UTC). Lines marked Elsewhere are Cloudflare Radar's own outage annotations, from anywhere in the world, with the cause as Radar labels it; this archive attributes nothing to anyone. Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.</sub>

## Executive summary

- Converge ICT Solutions CEO Dennis Anthony Uy stated the company avoided outages by rerouting traffic after a submarine link cut to Singapore [1].
- The Philippine Coast Guard deployed the BRP Teresa Magbanua to disrupt the JIA HAI KE 7, which the Philippines claims was spoofing its location near cable corridors [3].
- IPS, Inc. announced its board approved a share offering to fund a landing station and branch for the Candle submarine cable system in Japan [7].
- Hodi founder Jérôme Le Grognec reported a 50% growth in clients as businesses migrate to a pan-African cloud hosting model [8].

## Today

Converge ICT Solutions Inc. CEO Dennis Anthony Uy stated that the company avoided internet outages following a submarine link cut to Singapore last Friday [1]. The company rerouted traffic through the Bifrost Cable System and the Southeast Asia-Hainan-Hong Kong Express Cable System (SEA-H2X) to maintain service while other telecommunications providers and the University of the Philippines Diliman Network Helpdesk reported disruptions [1].

## Maritime Activity and Infrastructure Security

The Philippine Coast Guard deployed its largest vessel, the 97-metre BRP Teresa Magbanua, and an aircraft to disrupt the JIA HAI KE 7, a Chinese-flagged survey ship loitering 37 nautical miles northwest of Itbayat Island [3]. The Philippines claims the privately owned vessel was spoofing its location near undersea cable corridors, and a China Coast Guard vessel arrived to shield the JIA HAI KE 7 during the encounter [3]. While the Philippine Coast Guard issued radio challenges and used a rigid-hull inflatable boat to circle the survey ship, the specific nature of the data collection or its impact on local cable systems remains unconfirmed [3].

In a separate context, German intelligence head Martin Jaeger described a 'shadow war' involving sabotage and cyber-attacks by Russia along Europe's eastern border [2]. NATO is responding with 'active defence' doctrines and operations like Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry to protect infrastructure and deter incursions in the Arctic, Baltic Sea, and near Kaliningrad [2]. These measures aim to eliminate the 'grey area' where minor acts of sabotage might go unpunished [2].

## Submarine Cable Security and Infrastructure Trends

US lawmakers are currently pushing for more stringent security rules regarding submarine cable infrastructure [4]. Meanwhile, a post on dev.to highlights the strategic importance of these cables, noting they carry approximately 95% of intercontinental data traffic and are increasingly owned by cloud giants like Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon [6]. The post identifies specific geopolitical chokepoints, including the Red Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and Guam, while noting risks from surveillance, sabotage, and accidental damage [6].

In Africa, Dolphin Telecoms has signed a 10-year energy-as-a-service agreement with Grid Crux Energy Solutions to provide solar power to its cable landing station in Lagos [5]. This project will provide over 144 megawatt-hours of clean energy annually to support the Africa Coast to Europe submarine cable, establishing a model for integrating renewable energy into critical digital infrastructure to reduce reliance on diesel generation [5].

## Regional Infrastructure Expansion and Data Sovereignty

IPS, Inc. announced on October 5, 2026, that its board approved a public share offering of 1,263,500 new shares to fund a landing station and branch for the Candle submarine cable system in Wakayama Prefecture, Japan [7]. The offering, underwritten by Mizuho Securities, seeks to raise up to ¥5.49bn to support the project through March 2030 [7]. The Candle system is an 8,000km route connecting Japan to Singapore via Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, with IPS joining a consortium that includes Meta Platforms, SoftBank, TM Technology Services, and PT XLSmart Telecom Sejahtera [7].

Separately, Hodi founder Jérôme Le Grognec reported a 50% growth in clients over nine months in 2026 as businesses in countries including South Africa and Kenya migrate from on-premises IT to a pan-African cloud hosting model [8]. Le Grognec stated the strategy focuses on local hosting and high security standards to keep African data within the continent [8].

## References

1. [Converge’s subsea cables spare Filipinos from internet outage | Philstar.com](https://philstar.com/business/2026/10/06/2561137/converges-subsea-cables-spare-filipinos-internet-outage) (philstar.com)
   Published: 06 Oct 2026 · philstar.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: fault, analysis · Systems named: Bifrost Cable System, Southeast Asia-Hainan-Hong Kong Express Cable System · Jurisdictions: PH, SG, ID, TW, US, CN
2. [The ‘shadow war’ denounced by Berlin is already on Europe’s border](https://www.ilfoglio.it/en/world/2026/10/06/news/the-shadow-war-denounced-by-berlin-is-already-on-europes-border--409713) (ilfoglio.it)
   ilfoglio.it
3. [Philippines sends largest ship, aircraft to drive away Chinese vessel in waters near Taiwan - AOL](https://aol.com/articles/philippines-sends-largest-ship-aircraft-054827000.html) (aol.com)
   Published: 01 Oct 2026 · aol.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: vessel_activity, seabed_security · Vessels named: BRP Teresa Magbanua, JIA HAI KE 7 · Jurisdictions: PH, TW, CN
4. [US lawmakers push tougher submarine cable security rules](https://capacityglobal.com/news/us-lawmakers-push-tougher-submarine-cable-security-rules/) (capacityglobal.com)
   capacityglobal.com
5. [Grid Crux signs 10-year deal to power Dolphin Telecoms](https://punchng.com/grid-crux-signs-10-year-deal-to-power-dolphin-telecoms/) (punchng.com)
   punchng.com
6. [Subsea Backbone: The Geopolitics and Engineering of Fiber-Optic Transoceanic Cables - DEV Community](https://dev.to/njenga_nganga_00063bc67/subsea-backbone-the-geopolitics-and-engineering-of-fiber-optic-transoceanic-cables-4j06) (dev.to)
   Published: 05 Oct 2026 · dev.to · Publisher: self-published, not an official or analyst source · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis · Jurisdictions: INT
7. [IPS Funds Candle Branch and Wakayama Landing](https://subtelforum.com/ips-funds-candle-branch-and-wakayama-landing/) (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
   subtelforum.com
8. [“I want this cloud to belong to Africa” (Jérôme Le Grognec, Hodi)](https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-digital/0510-59457-i-want-this-cloud-to-belong-to-africa-jerome-le-grognec-hodi) (ecofinagency.com)
   ecofinagency.com

---

## Standing status

**Operator incident timelines** (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Vocus — ASC repair update · first update on the page 23 Sep
  - `25 Sep 07:45 UTC` Update: Vocus continues to progress restoration and repair activities following the Australia Singapore Cable (ASC) fault. Layer 2 Ethernet services restored via the Perth to Singapore path through Jakarta remain operational, and Internet traffic continues to be managed across alternate paths where this delivers the best customer experience. Traffic originating from Perth on ASC towards Port Hedland, Christmas Island and Anyer, Indonesia remains stable and operational. Temporary restoration measures remain in place for affected services between Australia and Singapore. We continue to work with partners in Jakarta to manage intermittent instability associated with third-party network infrastructure. The new 100G path between Japan and Guam is in service, providing additional capacity to support Internet traffic into Asia and Europe and reducing reliance on longer alternate paths. This additional capacity further strengthens the temporary restoration arrangements in place while the permanent ASC repair progresses. Testing completed from the Perth and Singapore landing stations continues to indicate a cable break within Indonesian waters, approximately 615 km from the Singapore landing station. Restoring services remains our highest priority, and Vocus continues to work closely with our marine repair partner and relevant authorities to progress the repair program. As previously noted, Vocus agreed to sequence the repair of Indigo West ahead of ASC to provide the best overall restoration outcome for customers. Repairing ASC requires the affected section of the system to be powered down, which would temporarily remove capacity currently supporting restored services via Jakarta and place additional demand on alternate Internet paths. Restoring Indigo West first provides an additional diverse path between Australia and Asia, allowing affected customer services and Internet traffic to be rerouted before ASC is taken offline for its permanent repair. Planning for the marine repair operation continues. The repair vessel will depart Singapore on 11 October, and the Indigo West repair is expected to be completed around 24 October. The vessel is then expected to transit to the ASC repair location, with marine repair activities for ASC planned to start around 25 October. Based on the current repair schedule, completion of the ASC repair remains targeted for 4 November. Additional contingency has been incorporated into the marine program should conditions affect the planned repair activities. A key dependency of the repair remains completion of the required Indonesian operational permits and clearances. Documentation and approval activities are progressing with the relevant authorities and are part of the pre-repair program. Subsea cable repairs are complex and remain subject to a number of factors outside Vocus' direct control. The current schedule is dependent on permitting and regulatory approvals, completion of the preceding Indigo West repair, vessel movements, local sea and weather conditions, and the condition of the cable once recovered. While every effort will be made to complete the work within the planned timeframe, these dates may change if operational conditions require. Vocus will continue to closely monitor temporary restoration paths and available international capacity while the marine repair program progresses, and will provide further updates as key milestones are reached.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-06 13:32 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au/news/update-on-repairs-to-australia-singapore-cable</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
  - `21 Sep 05:49 UTC` Identified: Scheduled to repair the fault on Indigo West off the coast of Perth has completed. Unfortunately the existing shunt fault on Indigo West in Singapore has deteriorated into a full cable break and services remain down. Repairs off Singapore is expected to be on 16 Oct 2026 until 26 Oct 2026.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-06 16:12 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Australia Singapore Cable** · Global Secure Layer — network status · Identified, open since 4 Sep
  - `4 Sep 06:49 UTC` Identified: We observed short flaps occurring on the ASC submarine cable system at 04/09/2026 03:50:33 UTC. However a hard down event followed at 04/09/2026 06:19:12 UTC Due to the Indigo West cable system also being offline for shunt fault repairs, traffic will take a longer path which will result in higher latency between Australia and Singapore. We are waiting for further information from Vocus regarding this outage. Information received will be shared via our status page.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-06 16:11 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj</sub>
- **INDIGO Central** · Superloop — outages · active notice, first seen 5 Oct 03:11 UTC (the page gives no date)
  - There was a brief service disruption affecting the Indigo Central link due to instability, which has since recovered. Our team is investigating the cause and continuing to monitor the link closely. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-06 16:12 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>
- **INDIGO West** · Superloop — outages · active notice, on the page when monitoring began 14 Sep 21:44 UTC (the page gives no date)
  - We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.
  <sub>page last checked 2026-10-06 16:12 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/</sub>

<sub>1 other open incident(s) on those pages name no tracked cable system and are not shown.</sub>

<sub>Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: ACMA protection zone — Perth, ACMA protection zone — Sydney, AJC — cable system maintenance, AJC — news, SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, SUBCO — OAC, Southern Cross Cable Network, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.</sub>

**Incident threads:**

- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 18 documents, last 2026-09-26 (quiet 11d)

**Measured path state** (RIPE Atlas traceroute over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — best path **191.8ms, +145.3ms on its best sustained 46.6ms**; typical path 273.8ms (+79.2ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 150.6ms; queuing 0.6ms; 46 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s), 74 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — best path 100.4ms; typical path 181.9ms (+46.5ms per probe against its own history, 18 probes); ocean crossing 135.3ms; queuing 0.5ms; 46 days of history; clean crossing (18 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — best path 26.6ms; typical path 34.5ms (-0.1ms per probe against its own history, 8 probes); ocean crossing 27.8ms; queuing 0.2ms; steady against 46 days of history; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — best path **144.5ms, +48.1ms on its best sustained 96.5ms**; typical path 222.9ms (+43.0ms per probe against its own history, 22 probes); ocean crossing 160.8ms; queuing 0.6ms; 46 days of history; clean crossing (22 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in `cablewatch segments`.</sub>

**Every cable route leaving the mainland** (measured hourly, no model involved):

- **Australia to Guam** — best 70.6ms against a 52.0ms floor; 13/24 paths direct (normally 13) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Dili to Australia** — best 49.1ms against a 7.1ms floor; 3 paths measured <br><sub>Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable (TLSSC), North-West Cable System</sub>
- **Melbourne to Tasmania** — best 10.1ms against a 5.9ms floor; 8/17 paths direct (normally 8) <br><sub>Basslink, Bass Strait-1, Bass Strait-2</sub>
- **Perth to Jakarta** — best 64.1ms against a 29.5ms floor; 46 paths measured <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC)</sub>
- **Perth to Oman** — best 139.3ms against a 85.0ms floor; **0/4 paths direct (normally 2)** <br><sub>Oman Australia Cable (OAC) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Perth to Singapore** — best 52.9ms against a 38.3ms floor; 11/67 paths direct (normally 11) <br><sub>INDIGO-West, Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC), Darwin-Jakarta-Singapore Cable (DJSC)</sub>
- **Sydney to Fiji** — best 37.6ms against a 31.5ms floor; 5/6 paths direct (normally 6) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT</sub>
- **Sydney to Hawaii** — best 189.1ms against a 80.0ms floor; 2 paths measured <br><sub>Telstra Endeavour, Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Hawaiki</sub>
- **Sydney to Honiara** — best 38.3ms against a 28.0ms floor; 2/2 paths direct (normally 2) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²) · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Japan** — best 99.0ms against a 76.7ms floor; 19/106 paths direct (normally 25) <br><sub>Australia-Japan Cable (AJC), Japan-Guam-Australia South (JGA-S)</sub>
- **Sydney to New Zealand** — best 23.4ms against a 21.1ms floor; 48/65 paths direct (normally 50) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Tasman Global Access (TGA) Cable</sub>
- **Sydney to Noumea** — best 65.6ms against a 19.3ms floor; **0/8 paths direct (normally 6)** <br><sub>Gondwana-1 · only system on this route</sub>
- **Sydney to Port Moresby** — best 37.7ms against a 26.9ms floor; 3/6 paths direct (normally 3) <br><sub>Coral Sea Cable System (CS²), PIPE Pacific Cable-1 (PPC-1)</sub>
- **Sydney to US West Coast** — best 133.7ms against a 118.3ms floor; 282/302 paths direct (normally 283) <br><sub>Southern Cross Cable Network (SCCN), Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Telstra Endeavour</sub>

<sub>A route is a pair of places, not a cable: several systems serve most of these and IP routing does not reveal which one carried a packet, so a healthy route is not evidence that every cable on it is intact. A path counts as direct when it is within reach of the physical floor between the two places. Routes with no vantage at the far end are listed in latency_watch.yaml under `uncovered`.</sub>

**Cloudflare Radar outages attributed to a cable cut in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-10-03` HT — NETWORK — Fiber optic cable damage on Route Nationale #1 caused a complete loss of Internet traffic from Digicel (AS27653), Haiti's largest mobile operator.

<sub>Cause is Cloudflare Radar's own classification of its own observation, reproduced as they state it. It is not this archive's finding and it attributes nothing to anyone.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 619 successful fetches in 24h, 31 errors across 9 source(s). Generated 2026-10-06 16:16 UTC.</sub>
