Situation
- INDIGO West: open since 8 Aug, 39 days, per AusInternet. Operator status: Partial Service Disruption.
New update, 16 Sep 08:45 UTC (today): “We would like to provide you with the latest update regarding the shunt fault in Indigo West cable system. Our submarine cable provider has informed the completion of restoration works as scheduled was completed on 15 September 03:53 UTC. They have powered up Indigo West after the final bight was released and power control was handed back to CLS. However, traffic failed to restore. …” - Australia Singapore Cable: open since 4 Sep, 12 days, per Global Secure Layer. Operator status: Identified.
Latest update, 4 Sep 06:49 UTC (12 days ago): “We observed short flaps occurring on the ASC submarine cable system at 04/09/2026 03:50:33 UTC. However a hard down event followed at 04/09/2026 06:19:12 UTC Due to the Indigo West cable system also being offline for shunt fault repairs, traffic will take a longer path which will result in higher latency between Australia and Singapore. We are waiting for further information from Vocus regarding this outage. Information received will be shared via our status page.” - INDIGO West: notice posted by Superloop, already on its page when monitoring began 14 Sep; the notice carries no date of its own.
Notice: “We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.” - INDIGO West: works scheduled 2 Oct 00:00 UTC to 8 Oct 23:00 UTC, per AusInternet: “Indigo West (Perth-Singapore) Shunt Fault Repairs (Singapore)”
- Measured latency (RIPE Atlas, 24 hour median against each route's best sustained floor over 26 days): Perth to Singapore 274.1ms, up 76.3ms on its 197.7ms floor; Sydney to Japan 177.7ms, up 38.6ms on its 139.2ms floor; Sydney to Singapore 225.3ms, up 78.6ms on its 146.7ms floor.
No model writes this section. Operator updates are quoted from each operator's own status page and dated as the operator dated them. 1 of these operator incidents or notices is new since the last brief (15 Sep 19:34 UTC). Latency is measured between cities, not on any named cable: several systems serve each route and traffic moves to a survivor within seconds of a fault. Detail is in Standing status at the end of the brief.
Executive summary
- A restrictedhandling.substack.com report claims Western forces disrupted a Russian operation practicing methods to disable two systems connecting Svalbard to Norway [5].
- RAND Europe analyst John Aitken assesses that Iran may threaten to attack critical undersea infrastructure in the Persian Gulf [9].
- The U.S. Agency for Trade and Development is financing a feasibility study for the THUS submarine cable [15].
Today
A shift toward divergent subsea cable security strategies has emerged, with BRICS nations focusing on high-speed cross-border connectivity as highlighted in the September 2026 New Delhi Declaration [1]. In contrast, Western nations are prioritizing surveillance, regulation, and redundancy, exemplified by a €347 million EU investment in cable security unveiled in February 2026 [1]. India is currently navigating both tracks by seeking to increase domestic resilience while participating in the Quad's Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience [1].
Subsea Infrastructure Security and Interference
Western forces reportedly disrupted a Russian deep-sea operation near Svalbard in spring 2026 involving submersibles from the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) [5]. The operation involved Russian units rehearsing methods to disable two 1,400-kilometer systems connecting Svalbard to mainland Norway, which the restrictedhandling.substack.com report claims was an attempt to obscure attribution while practicing infrastructure disruption [5]. Additionally, Western officials reported that British, Norwegian, and American forces confronted Russian submersibles practicing with equipment capable of disabling undersea cables in the same region [4].
To counter these threats, the UK Ministry of Defence is collaborating with BAE Systems to develop distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) technology to turn the UK's £65 billion undersea cable network into a continuous array of microphones [3]. These sensors, currently in the experimentation phase, aim to detect vibrations from vessels or sabotage attempts to provide persistent data on the seabed [3]. Meanwhile, the EU's 2025 cable security plan seeks to address vulnerabilities through coordinated investigations and regional cable hubs, while the National Communications Commission in Taiwan previously ruled that cable cuts between the Matsu Islands and Taiwan in February 2023 were caused by illegal anchor dragging rather than deliberate sabotage [2, 4].
Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) Repair Status
Vocus has established a temporary telecommunications path via Jakarta to restore some direct capacity between Perth and Singapore following the Australia-Singapore Cable (ASC) break [6]. While the physical cable remains severed in Indonesian waters between Anyer and Singapore, Vocus stated it is currently working with marine repair partners to secure necessary permits [6]. The carrier expects to provide a clearer repair timetable within seven days, though the 4,600-kilometre system remains offline [6].
To further mitigate the ongoing disruption, Vocus is adding capacity between Guam and Japan with equipment expected to be online in Guam within 24 to 48 hours [6]. These measures aim to alleviate pressure on contingency paths and reduce the increased latency currently affecting cloud applications and VPNs caused by the concurrent outages of the ASC and Indigo West [6].
International Infrastructure Developments and Security Assessments
EXA Infrastructure announced the launch of EXA Meridian, a 6,552-kilometer transatlantic cable connecting New Jersey, US, to Brean, UK [7, 8]. CEO Jim Fagan stated the project is necessary to address a capacity crunch driven by AI and cloud traffic, with the cable expected to provide 520 terabits of capacity by the final quarter of 2029 [7]. Meanwhile, Telxius is deploying Nokia ICE-X 800G ZR/ZR+ coherent pluggable optics across terrestrial networks in Europe, the US, and Latin America, following a successful trial on the BRUSA subsea system [10].
Security and planning frameworks are also evolving to address regional vulnerabilities and systemic risks. RAND Europe analyst John Aitken assesses that Iran may threaten to attack critical undersea infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, specifically targeting systems such as Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), and Gulf Bridge International [9]. The assessment suggests that shallow waters in the Strait of Hormuz make these cables vulnerable to sabotage using repurposed oil and gas equipment like ROVs or AUVs [9]. Additionally, a framework for town planning suggests that authorities must manage cable landing corridors as interconnected systems to ensure physical diversity and avoid common-cause failures caused by geographic concentration [11].
Regional Infrastructure Development and Regulatory Frameworks
WFN Strategies has extended its partnership with APTelecom to support submarine cable development across India, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, focusing on technical engineering and landing-site development [12]. In a related move to support the ASEAN Power Grid, Singapore’s Second Minister for Finance and Transport Minister, Jeffrey Siow, stated that ASEAN must finalize a regional blueprint for subsea power cables within two years to resolve regulatory barriers regarding unified legal frameworks and maintenance rules [13].
Infrastructure expansion is also being driven by AI demands and geopolitical diversification. Digital Realty and BW Digital are developing the Nongsa-Changi Cable System to provide over 1.6 Pb/s of capacity between Singapore and Batam, supporting a distributed AI model that separates high-power training workloads from inference [14]. Additionally, the U.S. Agency for Trade and Development is financing a feasibility study for the THUS submarine cable, a project APTelecom will study to potentially connect Thailand to the United States via several Southeast Asian nations while bypassing the South China Sea [15].
References
- Subsea Cable Strategy: BRICS-West Security | India Observers (indiaobservers.com)
Published: 16 Sep 2026 · indiaobservers.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis, precedent · Jurisdictions: AU, IN, JP, US, EU, GB (+1 more) · Also reported by: Submarine Networks - Two undersea cables were cut in one week. Fourteen thousand people were offline for fifty days. The official finding was that nobody did it on purpose. - Peter Theil (petertheil.com)
Published: 14 Sep 2026 · petertheil.com · Claim type: confirmed_fact · Subject: fault, precedent · Systems named: Matsu Islands to Taiwan cables · Vessels named: Chinese civilian vessels, sand dredgers, fishing boats · Jurisdictions: TW - Undersea microphones developed to protect UK's £65 billion cables from threats | WTX News (wtxnews.com)
Published: 16 Sep 2026 · wtxnews.com · Claim type: official_statement · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: GBR - Undersea Cables as the Next Chokepoint - Modern Diplomacy (moderndiplomacy.eu)
Published: 16 Sep 2026 · moderndiplomacy.eu · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent, policy · Jurisdictions: NO, GB, US, RU, TW, INT - Deep Dive: The Arctic Cable Plot NATO Stopped Before It Started (restrictedhandling.substack.com)
Published: 10 Sep 2026 · restrictedhandling.substack.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: vessel_activity, analysis, precedent · Systems named: Latvia-Sweden cable · Vessels named: Akula-class submarine · Jurisdictions: NO, RU, GB, US, FI, LV (+1 more) - Vocus Restores Perth-Singapore Capacity as ASC Cable Break Continues to Disrupt International Routes - Tech Business News (Tech Business News (AU))
- EXA to lay new transatlantic cable as AI gobbles capacity (Light Reading)
lightreading.com · Also reported by: Submarine Telecoms Forum - Exa to deploy subsea cable linking UK and US (DCD, subsea)
datacenterdynamics.com - Iran threat to cut Hormuz undersea cables puts Gulf on edge - Asia Times (asiatimes.com)
Published: 16 Sep 2026 · asiatimes.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: analysis, precedent · Systems named: Fibre in Gulf, Falcon Network, Asia-Africa-Europe1 (AEE1), Gulf Bridge International · Jurisdictions: IR, SA, AE, QA, OM, BH (+2 more) · Also reported by: theconversation.com - Telxius Deploys Nokia 800G Coherent Pluggables (Converge Digest)
convergedigest.com - How Town Planning Works | TPW-0271, The Submarine Cable Landing Corridor: How Beach Landings, Cable Stations, Backhaul Diversity, Marine Hazards, Repair Access and Route Concentration Become One ... (edukatesg.com)
Published: 16 Sep 2026 · edukatesg.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Jurisdictions: INT - WFN Extends APTelecom Work in Southeast Asia (Submarine Telecoms Forum)
subtelforum.com - ASEAN Sets Two-Year Deadline for Subsea Power Cable Blueprint (Telecom Review Asia)
telecomreviewasia.com - Digital Realty Combines Scale, Colocation, and Connectivity to Advance Asia Pacific AI Growth (Telecom Review Asia)
telecomreviewasia.com - Thais are balancing. About the new Thai-American submarine cable Americans are building not only military and trade routes in Southeast Asia, but also digital ones - Pravda USA (usa.news-pravda.com)
Published: 15 Sep 2026 · usa.news-pravda.com · Claim type: analyst_assessment · Subject: policy, analysis · Systems named: THUS, Asia Direct Cable · Jurisdictions: TH, US, ID, MY, PH, SG (+2 more)
Standing status
Operator incident timelines (quoted from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):
- INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · Partial Service Disruption, open since 8 Aug
16 Sep 08:45 UTCIdentified: We would like to provide you with the latest update regarding the shunt fault in Indigo West cable system. Our submarine cable provider has informed the completion of restoration works as scheduled was completed on 15 September 03:53 UTC. They have powered up Indigo West after the final bight was released and power control was handed back to CLS. However, traffic failed to restore. …
page last checked 2026-09-16 19:12 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/- Australia Singapore Cable · Global Secure Layer — network status · Identified, open since 4 Sep
4 Sep 06:49 UTCIdentified: We observed short flaps occurring on the ASC submarine cable system at 04/09/2026 03:50:33 UTC. However a hard down event followed at 04/09/2026 06:19:12 UTC Due to the Indigo West cable system also being offline for shunt fault repairs, traffic will take a longer path which will result in higher latency between Australia and Singapore. We are waiting for further information from Vocus regarding this outage. Information received will be shared via our status page.
page last checked 2026-09-16 19:13 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au/incidents/wqmz5wt7l8qj- INDIGO West · Superloop — outages · active notice, on the page when monitoring began 14 Sep 21:44 UTC (the page gives no date)
- We are currently experiencing a service disruption affecting the Indigo West link due to instability. Our team is actively investigating and working to resolve the issue. Updates will be provided as more information becomes available. Support remains available via phone and email during this time.
page last checked 2026-09-16 19:12 UTC · https://www.superloop.com/outages/ - INDIGO West · AusInternet — network status · works scheduled 2 Oct 00:00 UTC to 8 Oct 23:00 UTC: “Indigo West (Perth-Singapore) Shunt Fault Repairs (Singapore)”
page last checked 2026-09-16 19:12 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/
Also polled for changes, but carrying no incident listing, so nothing is said about their state: SUBCO, SUBCO — INDIGO West, Telstra — service status, Vocus — network status.
Incident threads:
perth_indigo_2026_08(INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 15 documents, last 2026-09-15 (quiet 2d)
Measured path state (RIPE Atlas traceroute, median across probes over 24h, no model involved):
- perth to singapore — ocean crossing 150.8ms; queuing 0.7ms; end to end floor 274.1ms, +76.3ms against its best sustained floor of 197.7ms over 26 days; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 37 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- sydney to japan — ocean crossing 133.1ms; queuing 0.5ms; end to end floor 177.7ms, +38.6ms against its best sustained floor of 139.2ms over 26 days; clean crossing (16 probe(s))
- sydney to nz — ocean crossing 27.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; end to end floor 32.0ms, steady against its best sustained floor over 26 days; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- sydney to singapore — ocean crossing 153.2ms; queuing 0.7ms; end to end floor 225.3ms, +78.6ms against its best sustained floor of 146.7ms over 26 days; clean crossing (21 probe(s))
A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in cablewatch segments.
Collection: 634 successful fetches in 24h, 54 errors across 11 source(s). Generated 2026-09-16 19:35 UTC.