---
date: 2026-09-12
issue: 50
title: United States and India Partner to Secure Indo-Pacific Undersea Cable Networks
standfirst: The TRUST Initiative aims to diversify cable routes and protect infrastructure
  against sabotage and cyberattacks. The partnership focuses on establishing new landing
  stations and utilizing trusted technology providers.
jurisdictions:
- US
- IN
- INT
- 'NO'
- GB
- RU
tags: []
vertical: cablewatch
---

## Executive summary

- The United States and India have partnered under the TRUST Initiative to secure and diversify global undersea cable networks, with the US Embassy in India stating the cooperation will focus on protecting infrastructure against sabotage, cyberattacks, and interception [1].
- NATO allies, including Britain, Norway, and the United States, tracked and confronted Russian vessels from the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) near Norway's Svalbard archipelago in spring 2026 [2].
- The operation involved Russian vessels testing secret technology to disable the Svalbard fiber-optic cables, which link Svalbard with mainland Norway over 1,400 kilometers and support the SvalSat station [2].
- Norway's Defense Minister Tore Sandvik stated the joint operation sent a clear message that any attempt to target critical infrastructure will be detected and met with consequences [2].
- The Government of Tuvalu and the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre (CCRC) presented a locally led cable protection framework and supporting legislation for the Vaka cable [4].
- The Vaka cable protection framework, shared during the 19th Asia-Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulation Forum, aims to establish a regulatory model for protecting subsea telecommunications infrastructure in the Pacific [4].

The United States and India have partnered under the TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technologies) Initiative to secure and diversify global undersea cable networks [1]. During an 'Undersea Cables Workshop' in September, the US Embassy in India stated the cooperation will focus on protecting infrastructure against sabotage, cyberattacks, and interception while establishing more landing stations and diverse routes across the Indo-Pacific [1].

## Suspected Russian Sabotage Near Svalbard

NATO allies, including Britain, Norway, and the United States, tracked and confronted Russian vessels from the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research (GUGI) near Norway's Svalbard archipelago in spring 2026 [2]. The operation involved Russian vessels testing secret technology to disable the Svalbard fiber-optic cables, which link Svalbard with mainland Norway over 1,400 kilometers and support the SvalSat station [2]. Norway's Defense Minister Tore Sandvik stated the joint operation sent a clear message that any attempt to target critical infrastructure will be detected and met with consequences [2]. While the incident occurred in the Arctic, it highlights growing security concerns regarding Russian efforts to map or sabotage vital undersea telecommunications and satellite data infrastructure [2].

## Tuvalu Cable Protection Framework

The Government of Tuvalu and the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre (CCRC) presented a locally led cable protection framework and supporting legislation for the Vaka cable [4]. Shared during the 19th Asia-Pacific Telecommunity Policy and Regulation Forum in Funafuti, the framework adapts international best practices to Tuvalu's specific context to safeguard the Vaka cable as critical infrastructure [4]. The initiative aims to establish a regulatory model for protecting subsea telecommunications infrastructure in the Pacific to ensure long-term digital resilience for the nation's healthcare, education, and economic growth [4].

## References

1. [US, India join hands to secure global undersea cable networks: What's TRUST Initiative](https://www.moneycontrol.com/world/us-india-join-hands-to-secure-global-undersea-cable-networks-what-s-trust-initiative-article-14028288.html) (moneycontrol.com)
   moneycontrol.com · Also reported by: firstpost.com
2. [NATO Foils Suspected Russian Undersea Cable Sabotage Near Svalbard: What Happened?](https://www.ibtimes.sg/nato-foils-suspected-russian-undersea-cable-sabotage-near-svalbard-what-happened-93659) (ibtimes.sg)
   ibtimes.sg
3. [NATO allies foil Russian subsea cable sabotage plot](https://www.staradvertiser.com/2026/09/10/breaking-news/nato-allies-foil-russian-subsea-cable-sabotage-plot/) (staradvertiser.com)
   staradvertiser.com
4. [News | Cable Connectivity & Resilience Centre](https://www.ccrc.gov.au/news-and-media?news%5B0%5D=publication_date%3A2026) (Cable Connectivity & Resilience Centre, news and media)
   ccrc.gov.au

---

## Standing status

**Operator-reported state** (read directly from each operator's own status page, not summarised by any model):

- **AusInternet — network status** — **INDIGO West**  
  Status: partial service disruption; Fault: shunt fault; Fault location: 65km from Perth Cable Landing Station; Repair ETA: 26 Aug 2026 / 30 Aug 2026 with an ETR on 4 Sep 2026; Delayed until: August 25th / 2nd of October NBN POI 2PTH (Penrith; Repair vessel: repairing the Shunt Fault off Perth betwee; Planned maintenance: NBN POI 3DAD (Dandenong) NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule / September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4  
  <sub>as at 2026-09-10 00:09 UTC · https://ausinternet.com.au/status/</sub>
- **Global Secure Layer — network status** — **INDIGO West**  
  Status: partial outage; Fault: shunt fault  
  <sub>as at 2026-09-12 00:13 UTC · https://status.gslnetworks.com.au</sub>
- **SUBCO — INDIGO West** — **INDIGO West**  
  <sub>as at 2026-09-12 04:10 UTC · https://sub.co/indigo-west/</sub>
- **SUBCO** — **Oman Australia Cable, INDIGO Central, INDIGO West, SMAP**  
  Status: monitoring  
  <sub>as at 2026-09-12 17:09 UTC · https://sub.co</sub>
- **Telstra — service status**  
  Status: monitoring  
  <sub>as at 2026-09-10 07:22 UTC · https://www.telstra.com.au/exchange</sub>
- **Vocus — network status**  
  Status: operational; Affected system: drum  
  <sub>as at 2026-08-31 01:33 UTC · https://www.vocus.com.au</sub>

<sub>Cable systems shown are those named anywhere on the captured page, matched against the systems tracked in `geofences.yaml`. A named system is not by itself a claim that it is the affected one.</sub>

**Changes in the last 7 days:**

- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: Indigo Central (Perth-Sydney) Shunt Fault Repairs Planned Maintenance → **NBN POI 3DAD (Dandenong) NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 15, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 14, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 16, 2026 1:00PM - 8**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 16, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 16, 2026 1:00PM - 8 → **September 17, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 17, 2026 1:00PM - 8**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 17, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 17, 2026 1:00PM - 8 → **October 2, 2026 10:00AM - 9:00AM AEST October 2, 2026 12:00AM**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — System named on page: INDIGO Central → **INDIGO West**
- `2026-09-10 00:09` AusInternet — network status — System named on page: INDIGO West → **(removed)**
- `2026-09-09 16:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: Data Centres → **Indigo Central (Perth-Sydney) Shunt Fault Repairs Planned Maintenance**
- `2026-09-09 16:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 15, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 14, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4**
- `2026-09-09 16:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: Indigo Central (Perth-Sydney) Shunt Fault Repairs Planned Maintenance → **September 15, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 14, 2026 2:00PM - 4**
- `2026-09-09 16:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 16, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 16, 2026 1:00PM - 8 → **September 17, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 17, 2026 1:00PM - 8**
- `2026-09-09 16:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 16, 2026 1:00PM - 8**
- `2026-09-09 14:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: NBN POI 3CBN (Cranbourne) - NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule → **Data Centres**
- `2026-09-09 14:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 10, 2026 10:00AM - 10:00AM AEST September 10, 2026 12:00AM → **Indigo Central (Perth-Sydney) Shunt Fault Repairs Planned Maintenance**
- `2026-09-08 16:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: Data Centres → **NBN POI 3CBN (Cranbourne) - NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule**
- `2026-09-08 16:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 11:00PM - 6:00AM AEST September 16, 2026 1:00PM - 8**
- `2026-09-08 16:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 15, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 14, 2026 2:00PM - 4 → **September 16, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 15, 2026 2:00PM - 4**
- `2026-09-08 16:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: NBN POI 3CBN (Cranbourne) - NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule → **September 10, 2026 10:00AM - 10:00AM AEST September 10, 2026 12:00AM**
- `2026-09-08 16:10` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: September 10, 2026 10:00AM - 10:00AM AEST September 10, 2026 12:00AM → **September 15, 2026 12:00AM - 2:00AM AEST September 14, 2026 2:00PM - 4**
- `2026-09-08 14:11` AusInternet — network status — Planned maintenance: NBN POI 3CAU (Caulfield) NNI Rehoming Planned Maintenance Schedule → **Data Centres**

**Incident threads:**

- `other` — 76 documents, last 2026-09-12 (quiet 1d)
- `perth_indigo_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 13 documents, last 2026-09-09 (quiet 4d)

**Measured path state** (RIPE Atlas traceroute, median across probes over 24h, no model involved):

- **perth to singapore** — ocean crossing 150.3ms; queuing 0.7ms; end to end floor **273.3ms, +71.8ms against its 23 day baseline**; clean crossing (21 probe(s), 34 reading(s) excluded as below the corridor's physical floor)
- **sydney to japan** — ocean crossing 133.4ms; queuing 0.5ms; end to end floor **177.9ms, +35.0ms against its 23 day baseline**; clean crossing (16 probe(s))
- **sydney to nz** — ocean crossing 27.7ms; queuing 0.2ms; end to end floor 34.4ms, steady against its 23 day baseline; clean crossing (8 probe(s))
- **sydney to singapore** — ocean crossing 151.9ms; queuing 0.6ms; end to end floor **223.6ms, +23.2ms against its 23 day baseline**; clean crossing (21 probe(s))

<sub>A corridor is a city pair, not a cable. Several systems serve each of these routes and IP routing does not reveal which one carries a packet, so a healthy corridor is not evidence that any particular cable is intact: traffic reroutes onto a survivor within seconds of a fault. Per-probe detail is in `cablewatch segments`.</sub>

**Vessel review queue:**

- `darwin_cpz_standing` (North West Cable System, Timor-Leste South Submarine Cable System) — 4 candidate(s), top review priority 0.40
- `sydney_cpz_standing` (Australia Singapore Cable, Southern Cross NEXT, Hawaiki, Southern Cross Cable Network, Tasman Express, Tasman Ring, Japan Guam Australia -North, Japan Guam Australia -South) — 4 candidate(s), top review priority 0.35
- `perth_cpz_2026_08` (INDIGO West, INDIGO Central) — 4 candidate(s), top review priority 0.33

<sub>Review priority is a heuristic score from this repo ordering which tracks a human should look at. It is not evidence, and it implies nothing about any vessel.</sub>

<sub>Collection: 881 successful fetches in 24h, 49 errors across 13 source(s). Generated 2026-09-12 19:12 UTC.</sub>
